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ABSTRACT PAGE

This dissertation re-conceptualizes the scandals that engulfed the intelligence community
in the mid-1970s. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) confronted an unprecedented
crisis during these years: the Pike hearings in the House of Representatives, the Church
Committee in the Senate, and an executive branch commission led by then Vice President
Nelson Rockefeller. Historians and political scientists have studied these events before,
but I present a nuanced interpretation of the intelligence investigations by placing them in a
broader political and cultural context. To fully understand the impact of the so-called "Year
of Intelligence," I argue that scholars need to focus on what was happening outside of
Congress. The CIA encountered a backlash from both ends of the political spectrum. I
provide the first history of Counter-Spy, a left wing magazine founded in 1973 that called
for the abolition of covert action. The magazine's editors directly challenged the "culture of
secrecy" at the CIA by publishing the names of Agency operatives. At the same time,
conservatives embarked on a very different confrontation with the Agency. Like CounterSpy, they charged that the CIA was keeping secrets from the American people, but their
concern was with Agency analysis of the Soviet Union, not covert action. I also examine
Hollywood portrayals of the CIA in this tumultuous era; rather than simply responding to the
Congressional investigations and the Rockefeller Commission, filmmakers actually
anticipated the widespread concerns about the complex relationship between espionage
and democracy. The events of the mid-1970s badly tarnished the CIA's image. In
response to this rapid decline in popular support, the Agency developed an aggressive
public relations campaign designed to restore confidence in government secrecy and
covert operations. This dissertation contains the first systematic history of CIA public
relations. The public relations staff has consistently portrayed the CIA as the most open
intelligence agency in the world, heroically protecting national security while accepting the
necessity of Congressional oversight. But despite these public statements, Agency
officials worked to revitalize the "culture of secrecy." They have dramatically restricted the
ability of former employees to write critically about CIA activities; they have successfully
lobbied Congress for exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); and they have
repeatedly broken promises to de-classify historical records. Agency officials have been
obsessed with protecting their image, and this obsession has frequently undermined
historical research. Robert M. Gates launched an openness initiative in February 1992, but
the culture at the Agency was not fundamentally changed. In fact, George Tenet shut
down the voluntary de-classification program at the CIA in 1998. A key conclusion of this
study is that the "culture of secrecy" at the Agency remains firmly entrenched. Since the
CIA cannot be reformed from within, I argue that outside intervention is required.
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INTRODUCTION
Few authors have better understood the "culture of secrecy" at the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) than Victor Marchetti. In 1966, eleven
years after joining the CIA as an analyst, Marchetti became the assistant to the
deputy director, and he worked for the next three years on the elite seventh
floor of headquarters in Langley, Virginia. There he learned about many of
the CIA's most guarded secrets: covert operations, budget and personnel
statistics, front companies (known internally as "proprietary organizations"),
and propaganda tactics, among others. He resigned from the Agency in 1969
disillusioned with the Vietnam War, the Agency's old-boy bureaucracy, and
the reckless use of covert action in the Third World.
Much to the dismay of his former colleagues, Marchetti soon
articulated these grievances in The Rope-Dancer, a spy novel about the
imaginary National Intelligence Agency (NIA). The main character, Paul

J.

Franklin, closely resembles Marchetti. Franklin is the special assistant to
General Smithy, the NIA's Deputy Director, and he no longer takes pride in
working for the intelligence community. "I'm fed up with being a careerist in
an organization that's too big for its own good and out of step with the
times," he complains to his wife. 1 He later tells General Smithy that the
"Agency has turned into a decrepit bureaucracy, dominated by incompetent
old fools and self-seeking sycophantic phonies-all being manipulated by the

1

Victor Marchetti, The Rope-Dancer (New York: Dell Publishing, 1971), 35;
Henry Allen, "Ex CIA-Man's Ultimate Fantasy: Selling U.S. Secrets,"
Washington Post, 6 November 1971, C1; Henry Allen, "Quitting the CIA and
Living to Tell About It, More Or Less," Washington Post, 8 October 1972.
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Director for his own gain."2 Franklin is disgusted with the Machiavellian
director of the NIA, Kenneth Lewis, who refuses to deliver unwelcome news
to the president and claims that the State Department does not have the right
to know about an impending covert operation in South America. 3 He begins
selling NIA secrets to the Communists, but in the process, he discovers that
Director Lewis is also working for the Soviet Union. Franklin regrets his
betrayal of the United States and ultimately agrees to help the chief of
counterintelligence, Frank Wellington, in his attempt to thwart Lewis's
sinister activities.4
When The Rope-Dancer was published in the fall of 1971, CIA officials
easily grasped the parallels between the fictional NIA and their own
institution. Richard Helms, the CIA director between 1966 and 1973, had
clearly inspired Kenneth Lewis, while Wellington had been patterned after
James Jesus Angleton, the legendary head of counterintelligence. Like Lewis,
Helms was a talented Washington insider who understood how to protect his
bureaucratic turf. Helms did not take kindly to the novel, and he ordered the
Office of Security at Langley to launch a surveillance operation against
Marchetti codenamed BUTANE. This secret operation began on March 23,
1972 and continued for about a month.5 In addition to monitoring Marchetti's

movements, the CIA used an informant in New York City to obtain a copy of

2

Marchetti, 280.
Ibid., 20.
4
Ibid., 98, 291-296.
5
"Family Jewels" Report [PDF file], 27. After the report was de-classified in
June 2007, the National Security Archive posted it on their website. See
http:/ Lwww.gwu.edu/-nsarchivLNSAEBBLNSAEBB222Lindex.htm
(accessed July 9, 2007).
3

4
a book proposal that had been mailed to six publishing firms. 6 Even though
Marchetti had not written the book yet, Helms claimed that it "[would] cause
grave and irreparable harm to the national defense interest of the United
States . . . ." 7 Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr. agreed and issued a life-long
injunction against Marchetti in May that required him to obtain the CIA's
permission before publishing anything in the future.

This injunction

ultimately authorized the Agency to censor all material that was "classified." 8
Marchetti soon joined forces with John D. Marks, a former State
Department official, to write the manuscript that became The CIA and the Cult

of Intelligence. After submitting a draft to the CIA in August 1973, they
discovered that Agency officials defined "classified" rather broadly.
According to Marks's account, the CIA "said that the book could only be
published if we deleted 339 items, [an estimated] 15 to 20 percent of the
book." 9 Marks, Marchetti, and the ACLU protested the number of deletions,
and within five months, the CIA had reduced the list of deleted items to 168.10
The authors were now allowed to re-insert information that had obviously
never presented a threat to national security; they could, for instance, tell
readers that Helms had incorrectly pronounced the name of an African
country during a meeting, and they also received permission to include
6

John Marks, "On Being Censored," Foreign Policy 15 (Summer 1974): 96;
Taylor Branch, "The Censors of Bumbledom," Harper's, January 1974, 56-63;
VictorS. Navasky, "In Cold Print: Marchetti et AI.," New York Times Book
Review, 17 February 1974, 2-3; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept The Secrets:
Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 282-283.
7
Helms quoted in Marks, 96-97.
8
Ibid., 99; David E. Rosenbaum, "Judge Bars Book By Ex-C. I. A. Agent:
Temporary Order Is Granted to Justice Department," New York Times, 19
April1972, 9.
9
Marks, 100.
10
Ibid., 101.
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budget information that had been published in The Congressional Record. 11
They decided to sue the CIA over the deletions that remained in effect, and in
early 1974, Judge Bryan granted them the right to print all but 27 of the
items. 12 When the CIA appealed the case, however, Marks and Marchetti
published their book in June with the 168 deletions in order to avoid further
delays. They left spaces in the text to show readers where the Agency had
censored material. 13
In their legal battle with Marchetti, CIA officials were following a
precedent that had been established in the 1960s with The Invisible

Government. This groundbreaking CIA expose, written by journalists David
Wise and Thomas Ross in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion,
threatened the mystique of the intelligence community, and as a result, the
Agency unsuccessfully attempted to prevent Random House from publishing
the book.14 In 1972, just months after Judge Bryan issued an injunction
against Marchetti, CIA management once again attempted to interfere with a
critical book when they convinced Harper & Row to send them a copy of
Alfred W. McCoy's The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia prior to its
publication. Concerned with the accusations leveled by McCoy about the
CIA's knowledge· of illegal drug trafficking, Agency executives lobbied
Harper & Row to re-consider sections of the manuscript, but the editors
11

Ibid., 101-102; Eric Pace, "Cuts That C. I. A. Sought in Book Touch on
Official Slips," New York Times, 15 April1974, 24~
12
Marks, 106.
13
Ibid., 107.
14
Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2006), 319; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible
Government (New York: Random House, 1964; reprint, New York: Vintage,
1974), viii.

6

refused. 15 Since McCoy, then a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University, had never
worked for the CIA, the Agency could not legally censor his writings.
The CIA's public image had changed significantly in the decade
separating the publication of The Invisible Government (1964) and The CIA and

the Cult of Intelligence (1974). Ramparts magazine had printed multiple
exposes of the Agency in the mid-l960s that eventually prompted a shortlived inquiry within the executive branch in 1967.16 In retaliation for the
articles, the Agency collected information on the citizens involved in

Ramparts, and President Lyndon Johnson subsequently ordered Richard
Helms to clandestinely monitor opponents of the Vietnam War. 17

This

domestic covert operation, appropriately codenamed MHCHAOS,
accelerated during the Nixon administration.

Then, after the. botched

Watergate burglary in 1972, Americans learned that several of President
Richard Nixon's "plumbers" had connections to the CIA. It later became
clear that the break-in had been authorized by the White House, not the CIA,
but revelations about the Agency's initial willingness to cooperate with E.
Howard Hunt, the retired CIA man who directed the operation, exacerbated
the public's disillusionment with the intelligence community that had set-in
15

Seymour M. Hersh, "C. I. A. Aides Assail Asia Drtig Charge," New York
Times, 22 July 1972, 1; Richard R. Lingeman, "The C. I. A. As Book Reviewer,"
New York Times Book Review, 3 September 1972, 23.
16
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 3rd ed. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 153-164. The Ramparts article that
directly contributed to the inquiry revealed that the CIA had been funding
the National Student Association (NSA). Nicholas Katzenbach,
Undersecretary of State at the time of the scandal, chaired the commission,
and according to Jeffreys-Jones, "[t]he salient feature of the Katzenbach
reform was its cosmetic, stopgap character." Ibid., 163.
17
Angus Mackenzie, Secrets: The CIA's War at Home (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 15-25.

7

during Vietnam. According to Thomas Powers, "Watergate did what the Bay
of Pigs had not: it undermined the consensus of trust in Washington which
was a truer source of the Agency's strength than its legal charter, and it gave
outsiders their first good look at CIA files and tables of organization ....
Watergate, in short, made the CIA fair game." 18
It was around this time that former CIA officers began to speak out.

Patrick

J. McGarvey's

C. I. A.: The Myth and the Madness was published in

1972, and it attempted to provide a more realistic depiction of the intelligence
establishment. "In contrast to the Hollywood image of rugged
individualism," McGarvey observed, "today's intelligence scene is dominated
by the committee, the mainstay for intelligence decision making-belittling
initiative, rewarding compromise, and contributing to the emergence of
corporate yes-men." 19 In the final chapter, he argued that intelligence reform
was a necessity, calling the Agency "a tired old whore that no one has the
heart to take in off the street." 20
As McGarvey had done in The Myth and the Madness, Marks and
Marchetti focused on the failures of the CIA.

The CIA and the Cult of

Intelligence, however, received far more attention. The CIA's aggressive
campaign against them provided the authors free publicity, but an equally
important factor contributing to the book's success was that it became
enmeshed in a larger series of events leading to three major investigations of
the intelligence community in 1975 and 1976-what historians refer to as the
18

Powers, 298.
Patrick J. McGarvey, C. I. A.: The Myth and the Madness (New York: Saturday
Review Press, 1972; reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 1973), 28.
20
Ibid., 221.
19

8
"Year of Intelligence." Marks and Marchetti disclosed aspects of CIA covert
intervention in Chile prior to Salvador Allende's inauguration as the
president of that South American country in 1970. The discussion of Chile,
which appeared at the beginning of the second chapter, had been heavily
censored during the CIA's review process. For instance, the authors were
forbidden to include Henry Kissinger's now infamous comment at a meeting
a few months before the Chilean election: "I don't see why we need to stand
by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own
people." 21 The CIA also prevented Marks and Marchetti from sharing
information on what the Agency had done after Allende was democratically
elected in September 1970. "Attempts were made to undercut Allende
through continued propaganda, by encouraging a military coup d'etat, and
by trying to enlist the support of private U. S. firms, namely ITT, in a scheme
to sabotage Chile's economy," they explained.22 Although this passage was
withheld from the first edition of the book, journalist Seymour Hersh began
to put the pieces of the puzzle together, and in early September 1974, he
wrote a front page story for the New York Times that detailed the CIA's
destabilization operation against President Allende.23 A few weeks after
Hersh's story a photograph of then CIA director William Colby appeared on

21

Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974; reprint, New York: Dell Publishing, 1980),
12.
22
Ibid., 16.
23
Seymour M. Hersh, "C. I. A. ChiefTells House Of $8-Million Campaign
Against Allende in '70-73," New York Times, 8 September 1974, 1; Seymour M.
Hersh, "Censored Matter in Book About C. I. A. Said to Have Related Chile
Activities," 11 September 1974, 14.

9

the cover of Time with a provocative question emblazoned over his homrimmed glasses: "The CIA: Has It Gone Too Far?" 24
The revelations about the intervention in Chile served as the prologue
to the most famous news story ever printed on the CIA. On December 22,
1974, Hersh revealed the existence of Operation MHCHAOS in another New

York Times front-page scoop, setting the stage for the "Year of Intelligence." 25
President Gerald Ford initially hoped to head off a Congressional
investigation by appointing Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to launch an
inquiry into the allegations of domestic wrongdoing.

The Rockefeller

Commission issued a report in the summer of 1975, but it did not prevent
both houses of Congress from creating separate investigative committees.
Senator Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho) held hearings in the fall of 1975, and
his committee published several lengthy reports in April 1976.

The

investigation in the House of Representatives, which was led by
Congressman Otis Pike (Democrat-New York), received less cooperation
from the Ford administration than the Church Committee. The Pike Report
was leaked to The Village Voice in February 1976. 26
Much has been written about the Rockefeller Commission and the two
Congressional investigations, and historians have debated the impact that
24

The title of the actual story on the CIA answered the question posed on the
front cover. See "The CIA: Time to Come In from the Cold," Time, 30
September 1974, 16-24.
25
Cynthia M. Nolan, "Seymour Hersh's Impact on the CIA," The International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 1 (1999): 18-34.
26
Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate
Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1996), 161-162; for a succinct overview of the Pike Committee,
see Gerald K. Haines, "The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA,"
Studies In Intelligence (Winter 1998-1999): 81-92.
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they had on the intelligence establishment,27 In Challenging The Secret

Government, Kathryn Olmsted argues that the CIA and the other members of
the intelligence community "clearly emerged the winners of their long battle
with the investigators." 28 Olmsted points out that scholars have exaggerated
the achievements of the Congressional hearings. Although the Inquiries
directly contributed to the establishment of permanent oversight committees
in both the House and Senate, the CIA continued to embark on covert
operations in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. From
the perspective of historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "[a]ttacks of the 'rogue
elephant' type [from Senator Church] were painful for a while but, in the
process of being debunked, they actually helped the Agency. The CIA
emerged from its trial with a refurbished reputation." 29 Jeffreys-Jones,
however, never precisely outlines how the CIA's image was rehabilitated so
quickly. This study agrees with Olmsted's conclusion that the CIA survived
the "Year of Intelligence" essentially unscathed, but it disagrees with the
argument that the investigations "refurbished" the Agency's standing. In
reality, the events that unfolded in the mid-1970s badly damaged the CIA's
mystique, which had been assiduously cultivated since the Agency's
inception in 1947.

27

Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation
{Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985); FrankJ. Smist, Jr.,
Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994, 2nd ed.
(Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994); for a detailed
examination of William Colby's role in the investigations, see John Prados,
Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 297-330.
28
Olmsted,169.
29
Jeffreys-Jones, 214-215.
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With the passage of time, as Jeffreys-Jones suggests, the CIA's image
did improve, but this development should be attributed at least in part to the
pu~lic

relations strategy of the CIA. Critics of the Agency in the 1970s

directly challenged the "culture of secrecy" at Langley, and more than
anything else, CIA higher-ups sought to protect that culture at all costs. In
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Marks and Marchetti specifically warned

that "secrecy and deception in intelligence operations are as much to keep the
Congress and the public from learning what their government is doing as to
shield these activities from the opposition." 30 As the Agency withheld
information from Congress and the American public, they observed, it
simultaneously promoted a clandestine mystique "designed to have us
admire it as some sort of mysterious, often magical profession capable of
accomplishing terribly difficult, if not miraculous, deeds." 31

Marks and

Marchetti recognized that public relations and government secrecy were
simply two sides of the same coin, but unfortunately, they failed to elaborate
on this crucial insight.
In 1989, Marchetti delivered a paper at a conference that re-visited
several of the themes that he had raised fifteen years earlier. But rather than
focusing on the inner-workings of the CIA, he chose to examine the ways in
which the Agency aggressively guarded its own history. These PR schemes
presented a unique challenge to scholars interested in studying the Agency:
"By suppressing historical fact, and by manufacturing historical fiction, the
CIA, with its obsessive secrecy and its vast resources, has posed a particular
30
31

1\-farchetti and Marks, 6.
Ibid.

12
threat to the right of Americans to be informed for the present and future by
an objective knowledge of the past. As long as the CIA continues to
manipulate history, historians of its activities must be Revisionist if we are to
know the truth about the agency's activities, past and present." 32 My study,
which traces the history of CIA public relations from the early 1970s through
December 2007, confirms Marchetti's accusations. In fact, I have found it
constructive to embrace a research methodology that analyzes both CIA
secrecy and CIA public relations, since they have been inseparable from each
other.

The study opens with a nuanced discussion of the "Year of

Intelligence" that illustrates the multi-faceted threat to the "culture of
secrecy" at Langley. In addition to confronting the Congressional committees,
I reveal that the CIA had to deal with criticism on the far Left as well as the
far Right. Chapter 1 provides the first detailed history of Counter-Spy, a left
wing magazine founded in 1973 that called for the abolition of covert action.
The magazine's editors directly challenged the "culture of secrecy" by
publishing the names of CIA operatives. Chapter 2 shows how conservatives
embarked on a very different confrontation with the Agency. Like CounterSpy, they charged that the Agency was keeping secrets from the American

people, but their concern was with Agency analysis of the Soviet Union rather
than covert action. In many ways, Hollywood anticipated the pervasive
backlash against the CIA .. Chapter 3 analyzes several espionage movies
released between 1973 and 1975.

32

Victor Marchetti, "Propaganda and Disinformation: How the CIA
Manufactures History," Journal of Historical Review 9 (Fall1989): 319.

13
The dissertation's second section, Chapters 4-7, outlines how the CIA
has used public relations to fight back against its critics since the 1970s.
Admiral Stansfield Turner, the CIA director under President Carter,
established a modern Office of Public Affairs at Langley in 1977. There has
been tremendous continuity in CIA public relations since then. First, and
most importantly, the PR staff has attempted to project an image of openness
and accountability. Second, they have perpetuated the CIA's mystique,
portraying the Agency as the heroic guardian of national security. 110ur
failures are known, our successes are not" has been a recurring mantra of this
initiative. Third, PR officials have done their best to put a positive spin on
secrecy. Turner's director of public affairs went so far as to suggest that there
was 11 [m]ore openness with greater secrecy."33
The history of PR at the CIA may appear fairly innocuous at first
glance, but this history must be considered in conjunction with the Agency's
successful efforts to withhold documents from historians and the media.
While Admiral Turner described the CIA as the most open intelligence
agency in the world, he was trying to undercut the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) and the ability of former employees to publish memoirs. Turner's
successor, William Casey, continued the fight against the FOIA and secured
passage of the CIA Information Act in 1984. He also employed PR in a
clandestine domestic campaign to win public support for covert action in
Central America. In the years following the end of the Cold War, the actions
33

"ABC GOOD MORNING AMERICA 19 SEPTEMBER 1977," Briefing book
prepared by Public Affairs Office for Admiral Turner, Document No.
CK3100202484-CK3100202532, Declassified Documents Reference System
[DDRS] (Declassified, 11 April1985), Tab E, 2.

14
of CIA directors have repeatedly contradicted their public rhetoric. In
February 1992, then CIA Director Robert M. Gates boldly promised a new era
of openness, but he failed to deliver. While claiming in 1998 that the Agency
did not have enough funds in the budget to continue the voluntary declassification program, George Tenet, the CIA chief from 1997 to 2004, had no
trouble acquiring the money to sponsor a covert program to "re-classify" CIA
documents at the National Archives.
The poisonous relationship between PR and secrecy is not unique to
the CIA. In The Presidency and Individual Liberties, published in 1961, Richard
Longaker recognized the widespread abuse of the classification system:
"Exploiting the legitimate claims of secrecy, the executive branch habitually
overclassifies documents, absurdly segments scientific research, and
maintains convenient shields to protect administrators from the curiosity of
the public and the press." 34 Unless something was done to challenge the
excessive secrecy, he warned, "the public will be forced to subsist on the
. sugar-water of the public relations man, and important aspects of public
policy as well as administrative errors will go unobserved by Congress, the
press, and the electorate."35
Nearly fifty years after Longaker wrote these words, the twin dangers
of PR and secrecy have assumed more importance than ever before. This
dissertation will use the CIA as a case study to illustrate how the complex
interplay between secrecy and public relations undermines historical
34
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research. As any institution within a democracy, the CIA must be held
accountable for its actions-past and present. But by withholding documents
from scholars, Agency officials have effectively manipulated the historical
record to create a mystique that has been repeatedly used to thwart calls for
greater oversight.
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CHAPTER I
WATCHING BIG BROTHER: COUNTER-SPY, NORMAN MAILER,
AND THE FIFTH ESTATE, 1973-1976

As Norman Mailer approached his fiftieth birthday in 1973, he was
closely guarding a secret, something so important that he would later
describe it "as the best political idea in my entire life." 1 Mailer, author of such
classics as The Naked and the Dead (1948) and The Armies of the Night (1968),
had been deeply influenced by the political and social turmoil of the previous
decade and had run unsuccessfully for mayor of New York City in 1969 with
"No More Bullshit" as his campaign slogan. Mailer made it well known that
he was keeping a secret, and he sent out around five thousand invitations to
his birthday party, promising to "make an announcement of national
importance (major)" at the event. 2 Given his reputation for activism and his
legendary combative personality, it is not surprising that over five hundred
people attended Mailer's party on February 5 at Manhattan's posh Four
Seasons. Andy Warhol, Bernardo Bertolucci, Pete Hamill, George Plimpton,
Larry McMurtry, Senator Jacob Javits (Republican-New York), Eugene
McCarthy, Shirley MacLaine, Jack Lemmon, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. all
showed up to hear Mailer reveal his secret. 3
1
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The evening began around 10:00PM with considerable anticipation,
but by the time Mailer was introduced, he had downed several glasses of
bourbon. His speech, which he prefaced with a dirty joke, was incoherent
and poorly received. He called for a Fifth Estate that would be "a people's
FBI and a people's CIA to investigate those two [agencies] .... If we have a
democratic secret police keeping tabs on Washington's secret police, which is
not democratic but bureaucratic, we will see how far paranoia is justified."4
The disappointment with the announcement was obvious, and many guests
simply walked out on Mailer. As Jules Peiffer later explained, "it was a
wonderful evening that had stayed wonderful until the guest of honor got up
and made a mess of it." 5 One woman complained about the sexist joke he had
told and proceeded to physically attack him.6 Perplexed by Mailer's drunken
proposal for a Fifth Estate to monitor the FBI and CIA, but not angered, Pete
Hamill wondered, "Why couldn't he just give a party and have everyone
throw balloons?" 7 The guest of honor was distraught over the negative
response, and when someone expressed sympathy with his idea and asked
for more details, Mailer ended the conversation abruptly: "I don't know. I'm
too drunk and too stupid." 8 At the end of the party, when only a few people
remained, Mailer entertained them with an impromptu boxing match against
on 'Secret Police,'" New York Times, 6 February 1973, 23; Linda Francke, "A
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Joe Shaw, a professional fighter. The birthday extravaganza finally came to
an end shortly after 3:30AM.9
If nothing else, Mailer had boldly and sensationally declared war on

the "culture of secrecy" at the CIA and FBI. Yet when he awoke after the
evening of heavy drinking, he immediately recognized that his performance
at the Four Seasons had jeopardized his vision of a Fifth Estate. He appeared
at a press conference to clarify his proposal where he declared it was time "to
face up to the possibility that the country may be sliding toward
totalitarianism." 10

Mailer specifically mentioned the need to further

investigate the findings of the Warren Commission and the Watergate breakin, extending the hope that the Fifth Estate would someday compare to the
ACLU in stature. "When you have a country as morally dastardly as this," he
said, "you begin to question the whole shape of the country." 11 He explained
that a steering committee would be assembled to supervise the creation of the
Fifth Estate, and rather than running the organization himself, he wanted to
have "an umbilical relationship" with it. 12 As he was wrapping up the press
conference, Mailer acknowledged that the project might be a failure: "This
may appeal to only 10 percent of the people. There may be apathy because
people don't like to be told they're impotent." 13
Mailer was suggesting that the Fourth Estate (the media) was poorly
equipped to expose government conspiracies.
9
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existed, required years of detailed scholarly research to uncover. Not
surprisingly, most accounts of the birthday party did not take the Fifth Estate
proposal seriously. When a reviewer for the New York Times took aim at the
idea a few weeks after the announcement, Mailer, never afraid to pick a fight
with his critics, responded to the attack with a lengthy essay that offered a
more coherent outline of the Fifth Estate. He admitted that his drunken
announcement at the Four Seasons "was a disgrace. It had neither wit nor
life-it was perhaps the worst speech on a real occasion that the orator ever
made." 14 But despite the inadequate presentation of his idea, Mailer believed
that there were larger reasons why so few people were expressing interest in
the Fifth Estate. He made reference to the assassinations of John and Robert
Kennedy, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the attempted murder of
George Wall ace. Having confronted so much violence and national tragedy
in recent years, Americans were dealing with "surrealistic shock," and Mailer
concluded that, as a result, "we must probably numb ourselves in advance in
order to bear the next disaster." 15
He worried that the emotional toll of this shock was leading to both
apathy and conspiracy thinking. Sinc.e people are naturally inclined to create
explanations for events that they cannot fully understand, blaming tragedy
on shadowy conspiracies was inevitable. Yet Mailer was concerned that no
one was checking out any of these theories. "Is our history developing into a
string of connected conspiracies, or is there less ground finally for our
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national paranoia than any have supposed," he asked. 16 Perhaps after
thorough investigation, it would turn out that Lee Harvey Oswald was truly
a lone gunman. Perhaps the Watergate break-in was simply a botched
burglary and nothing more. Once again, Mailer emphasized the limitations
of "the walled-in eyes of the poisoned Fourth [Estate]" that only could be
corrected with an organization devoted to intensive research of controversial
events of national importance. 17 He suggested that there might be some
cooperation between the Fourth and Fifth Estate. Because the media often
received obscure leads on a variety of stories that they did not properly
explore given limited resources and tight deadlines, Mailer thought that the
Fourth Estate could possibly share information with the Fifth Estate after it
developed into a reputable organization. 18
According to Hilary Mills, one of Mailer's many biographers, the
prolific author eventually discussed "his counterintelligence Fifth Estate plan
on more than twenty campuses and would compile a list of several hundred
people interested in watching the CIA and FBI." 19 Although Mailer's critics
considered him a paranoid, the investigative reporting of Bob Woodward and
Carl. Bernstein ultimately demonstrated that there was indeed a massive
conspiracy surrounding Watergate. These revelations prompted Frank
Crowther, who had helped organize Mailer's birthday party in February, to
write an article in the Village Voice that attempted to revive his friend's image.
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"Not only was Mailer right," argued. Crowther, "he was prophetic." 20 Mailer
had long suggested that there was a story behind Watergate, but when he had
proposed the Fifth Estate, he was apparently unaware that a similar
organization already existed. Nat Hentoff brought this to Mailer's attention
in his Village Voice column one week after Crowther's article. Hentoff
explained that a group of former intelligence officers had formed the
Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC)
back in 1972. They published a magazine known as Counter-Spy, and after
hearing about Mailer's call for a Fifth Estate, they attempted to contact him.
As they told Hentoff, however, "we've never been able to get past his
[Mailer's] secretary." 21 Hentoff encouraged readers to provide support to
CARIC, because "in following and expanding his [Daniel Ellsberg's] lead,
[CARIC] is working full-time for all of us." 22 He even made a direct appeal to
Mailer: "Norman, these three ex-intelligence agents are legitimate. I mean
really legitimate." 23
The three former intelligence officers that Hentoff referred to were
Winslow Peck, Tim Butz, and Kenneth Barton Osborn. "Winslow Peck" was
actually the pseudonym of Perry Fellwock. After spending about four years
in Air Force intelligence working in collaboration with the secretive National
Security Agency (NSA), Fellwock left the intelligence community and
eventually revealed his secrets to Ramparts magazine in 1972 using his
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pseudonym. James Bamford, the leading expert on the NSA, observes that
while some of Fellwock's revelations proved inaccurate, "the majority of the
sixteen-page article was, unfortunately for the [NSA], quite accurate." 24
Around the time he decided to tell his story to Ramparts, Fellwock developed
the idea for an organization to monitor the intelligence establishment. He
explained to Hentoff that when he joined the Air Force, he "was apolitical at
the time. But then I went to Vietnam for NSA, and that was no game. I was
killing people." 25
Like Fellwock, Tim Butz had served in Vietnam with Air Force
intelligence where he provided ground support for the aerial reconnaissance
missions of a RF4C Phantom 2 spy plane; in addition to collecting intelligence
on North Vietnam, these flights also routinely entered the airspace of Laos
and Cambodia.26 Hoping to put his life back together after returning from the
war, Butz became a student at Kent State University. Allison Krause, one of
the four students killed by the National Guard at Kent State in May 1970, was
Butz's friend. As Angus Mackenzie observes, Butz's outrage over the tragedy
convinced him to establish a local branch of Vietnam Veterans Against the
War at the university. He later joined forces with Fellwock, a fellow member
of the anti-war organization, and early in 1973 they began to publish Counter-

Spy out of Butz's apartment in Washington, DC. 27
The other founding member of CARIC was K. Barton Osborn.
Assigned to Army intelligence in Vietnam during the late 1960s, his tour of
24
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duty disillusioned him, and he became involved in the protest movement as
well.

Claiming direct knowledge of Operation Phoenix, the CIA's

controversial counter-insurgency program against the Viet Cong, Osborn told
a House Subcommittee in 1971 that the CIA was fully aware of severe
prisoner abuses. The CIA had established interrogation centers in every
province of South Vietnam, and based on his experiences in Quang Nam,
Osborn explained to the subcommittee: "I never knew in the course of all
those operations any detainee to live through his interrogation .... There was
never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those
individuals was, in fact, cooperating with the VC, but they all died and the
majority were either tortured to death or things like thrown out of
helicopters. 1128 Osborn was initially an editor of Counter-Spy along with Butz
and Fellwock, and starting with the fall issue in 1974, he moved to the
magazine's advisory board.
Soon after Mailer discovered the existence of CARIC, he met with Butz

and Fellwock at the bar inside the Watergate complex. He agreed to support
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them financially, and his funding continued until early 1976?9 It is important
to emphasize here that Mailer did not create Counter-Spy; in fact, by the time
of the meeting at the Watergate, two issues of the magazine had been
published already.30 The first issue of Counter-Spy, which came out in March
1973, began with a one-page description of CARIC, which included the
following declaration: "We all know that Big Brother is watching, but no one
in our government has taken the time to explain who is being spied upon,
and why we are being watched. Too often, we American citizens don't even
know who Big Brother is." 31 The members of CARIC announced that their
organization would "serve as an independent 'watchdog' on the government
spy apparatus" and inform the public of their findings; they made it clear that
because of the people's right to know, "[t]he secrecy with which the
government surrounds itself must stop." 32 The inaugural issue featured an
article about FBI infiltration of right wing groups in San Diego that raised
questions about the use of informants. Counter-Spy contended that the FBI
was abusing their authority and collaborating with local police deparbnents
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to disrupt groups that they perceived to be subversive, which, in many cases,
were a~tually committed to non-violent protest. 33
The second issue contained a detailed examination of pacification
efforts in Vietnam that attempted to place the CIA's Phoenix program in
historical context. The article discussed the French counter-insurgency
strategy in Vietnam after World War II. Using information gleaned from The

Pentagon Papers and other sources, Counter-Spy traced the gradual escalation
of American intervention in the aftermath of the French withdrawal in the
mid-1950s. They assessed early CIA involvement under the leadership of
Edward Lansdale, the failure of the agroville project, and the similar fate of
the Strategic Hamlet Program in the 1960s. From the perspective of Counter-

Spy, "the pacification effort has been do9med to failure from the inherent
contradiction of the American involvement-trying to make peace by waging
war .... " 34 Frustrated by the continued instability in the country, the CIA
formulated a counter-insurgency program that evolved into Operation
Phoenix, described by Counter-Spy as "a systematic murder program" that
"had the counterproductive effect in the provinces of instilling fear and hate
for the GVN [government of South Vietnam] in the hearts and minds of an
over-taxed and exploited rural population." 35 Included at the end of the
article were diagrams of the command structure for both Operation Phoenix
and its successor program, F-6.36
33
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Through their expose of Phoenix, Counter-Spy clearly wanted to hold
American officials accountable for their actions. They printed the names of
individuals involved in the various pacification campaigns, and this list
included Thomas Polgar, then CIA Station chief in Saigon, in addition to his
five predecessors. 37 Accusing William Colby of committing perjury when he
testified to Congress about Operation Phoenix, Counter-Spy called on him to
resign.

Anyone with "a career of directing assassination and torture

programs can play no legitimate part in US government," they charged.38
Despite the controversy over Colby's role in the Phoenix program, however,
Richard Nixon appointed him to replace James Schlesinger as DCI later that
year, and the Senate confirmed him.

It appeared that few people were

listening to Counter-Spy, but the editors remained determined to uncover
evidence of malfeasance within the intelligence community.

In the next

issue, they wrote another story about American intervention in Southeast
Asia, claiming that the intelligence establishment had helped overthrow the
Cambodian government in 1970. The article blamed the United States for
failing to accept Cambodia's neutralism and also criticized the Cold War
mentality of "equating a nationalistic anti-imperialism with communism." 39
After the issue on Cambodia in the fall of 1973, Counter-Spy was not
published again until the following summer. The summer edition, which
contained both the fourth and fifth issue of volume one, obviously benefited
from Mailer's donations. The magazine, now published from Suite 519 of the
Dupont Circle Building, soon expanded to over fifty pages and displayed
37
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improved copy-editing, although it still contained some typographical errors.
CARIC's new name was the Organizing Committee for a Fifth Estate, a
change that Mailer apparently requested to Butz and Fellwock. The summer
issue of Counter-Spy in 1974 was devoted to terrorism. The magazine
predicted that the topic was destined to receive increasing attention in the
years ahead: "the focus of security agencies in the United States has shifted
from combating monolithic communism and dissent at home to the new
focus of counter-terrorism. Terrorists are being promoted within the security
community as the new 'Bogey Men,' and agencies are requesting less
restraints and more money to develop new techniques." 40 In keeping with
the terrorist theme of the issue, Butz wrote a story on the FBI's
counterintelligence program (COINTELPR0). 41

In retrospect, there was

undoubtedly a conspiracy theory dimension to the issue's coverage of
terrorism, but recent events have demonstrated that their underlying
prediction in 1974 was accurate, since counterterrorism has certainly emerged
as the primary mission of the American intelligence establishment.42
In the second volume of Counter-Spy, the editors became far more
focused on the activities of the OA. Perry Fellwock, for instance, published a
detailed overview of the relationship between the CIA and organized labor.
He discussed Jay Lovestone's role in charting the AFL-CIO's foreign policy;
"He, more than any other man, was responsible for shaping that policy,
40
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including its allegiance with the CIA." 43

Because of the AFL-CIO' s

willingness to cooperate with the Agency, "the CIA has been able to establish
a pro-CIA infrastructure among foreign labor. This infrastructure has been
used to gather information on foreign workers, governments and Third
World national liberation movements," Fellwock alleged. 44

Compelling

evidence indicated that the CIA manipulated an organization called the
American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in order to collect
this intelligence, and according to Fellwock, "a CIA case officer is undercover
in almost every AIFLD office abroad." 45
The subsequent Counter-Spy, an issue dedicated entirely to the CIA,
provided even more information on AIFLD, and it also told readers of
another organization that the CIA had infiltrated.46 A woman named Ann
Roberts had brought her concerns about the Overseas Education Fund (OEF)
to the Fifth Estate.

After further investigating the OEF, a branch of the

League of Women Voters, Counter-Spy fout:td significant interlocking
relationships with CIA officers that strongly suggested OEF was gathering
"intelligence data under the guide [sic] of international sisterhood"
unbeknownst to most of its members.47 The story about the CIA and OEF,
43
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however, was a relatively minor feature of the winter edition of 1975. This
issue, the most famous ever published by Counter-Spy, devoted a section to
the identification of over one hundred CIA station chiefs around the world.
"The time has come for the cloak of secrecy surrounding the activities of the
CIA to be examined and cut down to size, a size that reflects the people's
right to know," said the magazine's editors in a preface to the list of CIA
officials. 48 For every chief of station and chief of base mentioned, Counter-Spy
provided their address-typically an American consulate or embassy-and a
few pieces of biographical information. In the same issue, Philip Agee, who
had just published a controversial book detailing the operations that he
learned of while a CIA officer in Ecuador, Uruguay, and Mexico, praised the
magazine for naming names: "Having this information, the peoples
victimized by the CIA and the economic exploitation that CIA enforces can
bring pressure on their so-often compromised governments to expell [sic] the
CIA people. And, in the absence of such expulsions, which will not be
uncommon, the people themselves will have to decide what they must do to
rid themselves of CIA." 49
It was not the first time that Counter-Spy had revealed the identities of

CIA officers, but the scope of the revelations gave many observers the
impression that Agee was responsible for them. He had attached a twentyfive page appendix to Inside The Company that was a "list of CIA employees,
agents and collaborators and of organizations which ... were either financed,
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influenced or controlled by the CIA," 50 so he was a ~ogical suspect. In reality,
however, Counter-Spy had learned how to identify CIA officials using two
State Deparbnent publications. John Marks, who co-authored The CIA and the

Cult of Intelligence with Victor Marchetti, was a former State Deparbnent
official, and in November 1974, he contributed an article to The Washington

Monthly titled "How to Spot a Spook" that outlined a detailed method of
exposing CIA operatives. Marks argued that the CIA was undermining the
image of the United States by fO<::using too much attention on covert
operations: "Could any rational person, after surveying the history of the last
20 years, from Guatemala to Cuba to Vietnam-and now Chile-contend that
the CIA's clandestine activities have yielded anything but a steady stream of
disaster? The time has come to abolish them." 51 Once the CIA stopped
intervening in the affairs of other countries, Marks thought that it would be
better equipped to gather and analyze intelligence.
By cross-referencing the Biographic Register with the Foreign Service List,
Marks explained, it was possible to uncover CIA officers stationed in
American embassies. He pointed out that "more than a quarter of the 5,435
employees who purportedly work for State overseas are actually with the
CIA." 52 To show how easy it was to pinpoint CIA officers on the Foreign

Service List, Marks advised readers to look for employees described as Foreign
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Service Reserve (FSR) or Foreign Service Staff (FSS). 53 Since there were State
Department employees legitimately designated as FSR and FSS, the proper
identification of operatives required additional steps.

First, employees

categorized on the Foreign Service List as both FSR and political officers were
most likely CIA officials. Second, after obtaining the names of suspected CIA
operatives, their profiles in the Biographic Register were almost always
different than actual State Department officials. Marks revealed that Agency
employees typically had short biographies with "gaping holes," and in the
event that the Register indicated an individual had previously worked as "an
'analyst' for the Deparhnent of the Army (or Navy or Air Force), you can bet
that he or she is really working for the CIA." 54

Counter-Spy followed the directions outlined in "How to Spot a Spook"
to identify CIA station chiefs for the winter issue in 1975. On page twenty-six
of that issue, there was a brief entry for Richard S. Welch that listed him as
the CIA's chief of station in Lima, Peru and offered some biographical
information: "Born Connecticut, December 14, 1929.

Graduated from

Harvard in 1951. Has served in Cyprus, Guatemala, and Guyana." 55

The

editors of Counter-Spy had no idea that the inclusion of Welch's name would
turn out to be the most controversial item ever printed in the history of their
magazine.
Ironically, Welch was actually serving as CIA station chief in Athens,
not Lima, when Greek terrorists gunned him down on December 23, 1975 as

Ibid.
Ibid., 7.
55
"Chiefs of Station: Who's Who and What They Do," 26.
53
54

32
he was coming back from a holiday party.56 The Athens News had printed a
letter to the editor on November 25 from a group that called themselves the
"Committee of Greeks and Greek Americans to Prevent Their Country, Their
Fatherland, from Being Perverted to the Uses of the CIA." 57 According to
Kathryn Olmsted, this letter contained Welch's "name, address, and phone
number." 58 It appears, then, that Welch would have been murdered even
without the Counter-Spy disclosure. But what was the magazine attempting
to achieve with the exposure of CIA officers? In the issue preceding the 1975
edition that disclosed Welch's name, the editors had renounced violence.
"We believe that armed struggle is not, at this time, a valid tactic for opposing
the forces of reaction," they said. "Such attempts are suicidal, unnecessary,
and play into the hands of those committed to fascism." 59
Rather than encouraging violence against CIA officials, Counter-Spy
claimed that they were trying to force the Agency to withdraw their
operatives, a pivotal step in bringing an end to covert action. Yet there is no
question that the magazine was taking a radical approach in their opposition
to the intelligence establishment. Nothing reflects this better than the press
release that the Fifth Estate issued the day after Welch was killed. According
to the statement, "if anyone is to blame for Mr. Welch's death itis the C. I. A.
that sent him there to spy, perhaps even to intervene, in the affairs of the
Greek Government." 60 It also called attention to America's contribution to
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government repression in Greece and the CIA's role in "U. S.-supported
tortures, imprisonment, and death [there], as well as intervention in the
country of Cyprus." 61 In response to the press release, the CIA and its
supporters immediately went on the offensive. Agee later recalled that his
friends in the Fifth Estate "were literally under siege-several times [they]
had to call police for protection after threatening phone calls." 62 DCI William
Colby lashed out at the Fifth Estate's words, arguing that they were
exploiting the tragedy to further their radical agenda: "The so-called
Counterspy of The Fifth Estate, without even an expression of human
sympathy, has issued a statement which can only be called a shocking
attempt to use the death of a dedicated American as fuel for its irresponsible
and paranoic [sic] attack on other Americans serving their country here and
abroad." 63

Counter-Spy ultimately survived the ordeal, but the backlash proved
costly. The most significant casualty of the negative publicity was Mailer, the
symbolic leader of the Fifth Estate. Although his main contribution to the
Fifth Estate was monetary, Mailer had attempted to re-invigorate it in the
spring/ summer issue of Counter-Spy in 1975. "The irony is that in fighting
Communism," Mailer warned, "we have come to a point where we have been
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destroying our own potential." 64 Not surprisingly, he singled out the CIA as
one institution that undermined this national potential. He referred to the
Agency as "a sinister element in American life, as capable of destroying the
reasonably free play of human forces as any other spiritual Mafia," and he
even suggested that the CIA might be controlling "the Federal Reserve, the
Securities Exchange Commission, and the stock market." 65 Over two years
earlier, Mailer had wondered out loud in front of his birthday guests "how
far paranoia is justified." 66 He was now convinced that his paranoia was
totally justified.

He proclaimed that the CIA "has manipulated and

despoliated every left-wing movement in America" and "savaged the heart of
Black militancy" through "so many dirty tricks and illicit manipulations of
history ...." 67 Despite Mailer's impassioned rhetoric, he stopped supporting
the Fifth Estate shortly after Welch's death. The IRS had revoked the
organization's tax exemption, and as Mary Dearborn explains, the
government "put a fifty-thousand-dollar lien on Norman's Brooklyn Heights
property, presumably because he was taking deductions relating to the Fifth
Estate's tax-exempt status." 68
Mailer's withdrawal from Counter-Spy forever changed the magazine.
Starting with the winter issue of 1976, the editors dropped the hyphen and

Counter-Spy became CounterSpy, but this was a relatively minor development
compared to the issues that were dividing the magazine's staff. According to
64
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the recollection of Agee, a member of CounterSpy's advisory board, financial
difficulties, fear of prosecution, and personality conflicts "had paralyzed the
magazine." 69 With the problems mounting, the editors continued to expose
the identities of CIA officers in a section of the magazine known as "CIA
Around the World." The three issues that appeared in 1976 also included
more revelations about the intelligence community. The winter issue had a
story about American intervention in Angola, while the spring issue featured
yet another examination of the FBI's COINTELPRO program by Tim Butz?0
The December CounterSpy marked the end of an era. Butz had recently
left the magazine, and the only editor that remained from the early days in
1973 was Perry Fellwock, who was still using his pseudonym. Fellwock
wrote in the issue about the murder of Orlando Letelier, a Chilean diplomat
who had been deposed along with Salvador Allende in 1973.

Fellwock

accused Pinochet's intelligence service (DINA) of orchestrating the car
bombing on embassy row in Washington, DC that killed Letelier, but he did
not end there. Not only did he claim that there were close ties between DINA
and the CIA, he told readers of an elaborate plot to target left-leaning groups
throughout Latin America. 71 Although Fellwock's article most likely sounded
like a bizarre conspiracy theory at the time, future revelations about
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Operation Condor would substantiate the general thrust of his 1976 report. 72
Another article in December 1976 focused on suspicions of CIA maneuvering
in Jamaica to counter Prime Minister Michael Manley. Ellen Ray, the editor
who authored the story, had visited Jamaica with Agee, and based on her
investigation there, she found that Manley's economic program posed a
threat "to such corporations as Kaiser, Alcoa, and Reynolds, which have
extensive investments in Jamaica." 73 "Though charges of destabilization in
Jamaica are difficult to prove-just as they were in Chile before the coup-a
pattern is discernable behind the events which rocked the country for six
months," she argued/4 noting that eleven Jamaicans died from a recent
shipment of flour that had been poisoned with Parathion. The substance,
which must be added intentionally, had previously contaminated flour in
Guiana prior to the overthrow of Cheddi Jagan.15

Counter Spy would not re-appear for another two years, and by that
time, the original staff was long gone. John Kelly, the new editor, continued
publishing the magazine until1984 when it became the National Reporter. The
magazine's hiatus resulted in part from the creation of a new journal
dedicated to exposing American covert action, which was established by
Agee, Lou Wolf, Jim Wilcott, Elsie Wilcott, Ellen Ray, and her husband Bill
Schaap. The Covert Action Information Bulletin began publication in 1978, and
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in the tradition of CounterSpy, there was a regular "Naming Names" section. 76
The Bulletin continued the coverage of Jamaica that CounterSpy had started in
December 1976. After a press conference where they identified fifteen CIA
employees working in Jamaica, shots were fired outside the home of the CIA
station chief in Kingston. 77 The story revived the controversy that had
surrounded Welch's murder in 1975, and both incidents were later used to
support the passage of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act in 1982. The
1982 legislation made it illegal for CounterSpy and the Covert Action

Information Bulletin to print the names of any intelligence operatives. Rather
than face the possibility of prosecution, the publications complied with the
law. Two years later, after over thirty issues, CounterSpy came to an end. The

Bulletin, on the other hand, survived, but it is now published under a
different title?8
Between the first issue of Counter-Spy in 1973 and the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act, the anonymity of CIA officers was seriously
threatened. Hundreds of operatives were named in the pages of Counter-Spy
and the Bulletin, and the CIA believed that these disclosures were
endangering its employees and national security. Of all the officers identified
during this time, Richard Welch was the only one harmed. The Agency's
investigation of his murder strongly indicated that Counter-Spy was not to
blame, but this conclusion does not necessarily exonerate the magazine's
radical tactics. The history of the Fifth Estate and their publication begs the
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question: did the organization threaten national security and jeopardize the
lives of American spies? Or were the disclosures necessary in the face of
overwhelming evidence of CIA wrongdoing uncovered by Senator Frank
Church (Democrat-Idaho) and Representative Otis Pike (Democrat-New
York)?
These are emotionally charged questions that are difficult to answer
objectively. From the perspective of CIA supporters, the Fifth Estate was
guilty of treason; CIA critics-even those uncomfortable with the radical
approach of Counter-Spy-would counter that the public had the right to
know what the Agency was doing with their tax dollars. But what often gets
overlooked in this debate is the undeniable impact of Counter-Spy. As a
consequence of the magazine, the organization responsible for monitoring
enemies overseas ac_tually became the target of surveillance at home. This
role reversal proved deeply troubling for the CIA's "culture of secrecy,"
especially since the editors of Counter-Spy, who Colby described as "a scruffy
group of anti-CIA activists,"79 based the vast majority of their revelations on
open source intelligence. For instance, the realization that so many CIA
officers could be identified from unclassified State Department publications
raised embarrassing questions about the Agency's competence. More than
anything else, though, Counter-Spy argued for the necessity of drastic
intelligence reform. The founding members of CARIC started with the belief
that the American people would seriously curtail the clandestine powers of
the intelligence community if only they were better informed.
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The CIA, thanks to the efforts of William Colby in 1975, gradually
accepted the inevitability of tougher Congressional supervision, but Agency
officials aggressively fought against the more expansive definition of reform
that Counter-Spy had embodied-the· idea that, given the past abuses of the
intelligence establishment, covert operations had to be abolished. 80 And, as
later chapters will reveal, the CIA mounted a successful public relations
campaign. By selling the Agency's mystique to politicians and the American
people, CIA officials actively sought to preserve covert action and the
"culture of secrecy."

80
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CHAPTER II
THE HUNT FOR RED OCTOBER: TEAM B
CONFRONTS THE CIA
Although the "Year of Intelligence" is most commonly associated with
the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee, and the Pike Committee,
historians of the intelligence community need tore-conceptualize the existing
interpretation of the crisis that the Agency faced in the mid-1970s. A key
limitation of the traditional narrative is its failure to include the conservative
attack on the CIA. While Senator Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho) and
Congressman Otis Pike (Democrat-New York) criticized the Agency from the
Left, and the editors of Counter-Spy launched a campaign against covert
action from the far Left, conservatives skillfully manipulated the situation to
achieve different objectives.
Rather than viewing the CIA as too powerful, conservative critics,
especially the members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board (PFIAB, pronounced Piffy-Ab), believed that Agency analysts were
actually too weak. They worried that the "culture of secrecy" at Langley was
obscuring what they perceived to be critical flaws in the Agency's estimates
on the Soviet Union. Several of these conservatives were also opponents of
Henry Kissinger's negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control, and
they argued that CIA reports had repeatedly downplayed the Soviet threat to
national security in order to foster support for SALT I.. They had been deeply
concerned with Albert Wohlstetter's two-part series in Foreign Policy, which
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appeared in the summer and fall of 1974. 1 Wohlstetter, a professor at the
University of Chicago at the time, bludgeoned readers with detailed
quantitative analysis of intelligence estimates on the Soviet military build-up
that were contained in previous posture statements of the Secretary of
Defense. Contrary to a popular mythology of American overestimation of the
Soviet threat, Wohlstetter attempted to show that there was actually a
"systematic underestimate." 2 He included several graphs to demonstrate his
conclusion that "[i]n 49 out of 51 cases the eventual Soviet deployment
exceeded the mid-range of the Secretary's estimates. In 42 of the 51, it
exceeded the Secretary's high." 3
Critics of Wohlstetter immediately accused him of "selective analysis,"
since he did not mention that there had been examples of intelligence
estimates that exaggerated Soviet strength, most notably their ability to
produce an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense. 4

In his pioneering

assessment of intelligence estimates during the Cold War, John Prados also
shows that Wohlstetter's criticism had limitations. Prados cautions that "the
estimators were engaged in an inherently complex task,." and as a result, they
made the assumption that the Soviets would retire obsolete missiles once
1
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better technology became available; "This single difference between
assumption and reality accounts for over two hundred ICBMs in the
'underestimates' after 1966," he says. 5 But what was the nuclear strategist
hoping to achieve? He fundamentally disagreed with the widespread belief
that arms proliferation on one side of the Cold War would inevitably lead to a
similar build-up on the other. 6 In certain circumstances, he theorized, a
massive proliferation might convince an opponent that they were doomed,
and that their only viable option would be to abandon the arms race
altogether.

Wohlstetter believed that the intelligence community's

underestimates could be attributed to the false predictions of a missile gap in
the early 1960s. Since they had overestimated the deployment of Soviet
missiles, the analysts developed a more cautious approach later in the decade
that, from Wohlstetter's perspective, turned out to be unwarranted.
Interestingly, Wohlstetter worried that his conclusions could potentially lead
to unintended consequences: "It would be unfortunate if we should swing
now from understatement to the opposite extreme. It would be nice, though
far from easy, to get it nearly right." 7
PFIAB, which had been established during the Eisenhower
administration, apparently did not take Wohlstetter's warning into
consideration. Instead, they used his analysis to put pressure on the CIA's
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) dealing with the Soviet Union. Almost
5
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a year after the resignation of Richard Nixon, George Anderson, the chair of
PFIAB, questioned the accuracy of NIB 11-3/8-74 in a letter to President
Gerald Ford. Anderson called the 1974 estimate of Soviet forces "seriously
misleading in the presentation of a number of key judgments and in
projecting a sense of complacency unsupported by the facts; as a consequence
it is deficient for the purpose it should serve." 8 Anderson recommended that
there should be an outside critique of the estimate process, an idea that was
first proposed by two of his colleagues on PFIAB, John Foster and Edward
Teller. "If Wohlstetter's articles were the opening salvo in the conservative
assault on the CIA's Soviet estimates," says Anne Cahn, "Anderson's letter
... began the

secon~

round." 9 CIA director William Colby refused to allow a

group of outsiders to second guess CIA analysts. On November 21, 1975,
Colby wrote to President Ford and explained why he could not allow the
experiment in competitive analysis to take place: "It is hard for me to
envisage how an ad hoc 'independent' group of government and nongovernment analysts could prepare a more thorough, comprehensive
assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities-even in two specific areas-than
the Intelligence Community can prepare." 10
When Colby blocked PFIAB'srequest, it is important to realize that,
technically speaking, he had been fired already. Colby's dismissal was just
one dimension of President Ford's so-called "Halloween Massacre," a cabinet
8
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re-shuffling during the first week of November 1975 that would have a
profound impact on American history. According to most historians, Donald
Rumsfeld, Ford's chief of staff, was at the center of the dramatic shake-up.
This skillful bureaucratic maneuver ousted both Colby and Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger, who had served briefly as CIA director 'in 1973.
Rumsfeld replaced Schlesinger at the Pentagon, while George H. W. Bush
was appointed to Colby's position. Henry Kissinger remained Secretary of
State, but he was forced to relinquish the title of National Security Advisor to
Brent Scowcroft. Richard Cheney, one of Rumsfeld' s closest allies, became
Ford's new chief of staff. He was only thirty-four years old at the time, but he
had already established a reputation for getting things done. 11
Colby remained in charge at the CIA until the Senate confirmed Bush
late in January 1976. The following month the OA revised its estimate of
Soviet military expenditures, which was a calculation that had been the
source of controversy in the intelligence community. CIA analysts had
typically determined the amount of Soviet defense spending by using a
technique known as the "building-block" approach. In essence, if there were
"X" number of Soviet tanks, they would determine how much it would cost
American manufacturers to produce the same quantity, and they then
converted the figure into rubles through a series of complicated and arcane
calculations.

The analysts applied this approach to every weapon {tanks,

missiles, planes, ships, etc.) to determine the total defense budget for the
11
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Soviet Union. Since the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not agree
with the "building-block" assessment, the CIA began looking for more
concrete information to test their conclusion, and in 1975 it seems that the
clan4estine service was able to acquire a handbook that contained budget
information. The CIA modified its estimate in response to the new
intelligence; although they had previously believed that Soviet defense
spending was 6-8% of their GNP, they now raised the figure to 10-15%.12
This 40% increase became public, and conservative critics gave the
impression that the CIA's revision somehow meant that the Soviets had 40%
more weapons than the United States once thought.
As Prados demonstrates, however, "[t]he revised budget estimates did

not mean that the Soviets were stronger than before-the number of
'observables' counted by intelligence did not change at all, butonly the cost of
these items to the Soviet economy and the burden of defense spending within
that economy." 13 In other words, American analysts had given too much
credit to the Soviet military-industrial complex; in fact, even though there
was considerable waste in America's defense industry throughout the Cold
War, the Soviets were far more inefficient than the CIA had imagined. "We
now know that the [Soviet] military burden was in play by the 1970s,
probably

alr~ady

by the late 1960s, and that the Soviet economy was already

contracting in the Brezhnev era," argues Prados. 14 Contrary to what CIA
critics claimed in the mid-1970s, the revised estimate of Soviet spending was a
12
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sign of weakne'ss rather than strength. The inefficiency of the Soviet economy
was simply not conducive to lcmg-term stability. 15
.The CIA completed another report in February 1976 that angered
conservatives.

The study was titled "The Track Record in Strategic

Estimating," and it examined NIEs between 1966 and 1975 in order to assess
the accuracy of past CIA predictions. It openly acknowledged "the failure of
the earlier estimates to foresee the degree to which Soviets would not only
catch up to the U. S. in number of ICBMs but keep right on going," 16 but as
George Carver observed in his description of the report, "in no case have the
Soviets ever deployed a major weapons system which the Intelligence
Community did not spot. and assess well before its operational
deployment." 17 PFIAB had requested the track record study, and a few
months after the report was completed, the board renewed their request for
outsiders to compete against CIA analysts. Carver, who believed "that the
balance is very much on the plus side of the ledger [for analysts]," 18 wrote a
memo in which he warned that PFIAB's proposed experiment "would be
extremely difficult to accommodate without prostituting the whole
intelligence process." 19 Bush, unlike Colby, accepted the recommendation at
the end of May with a brief notation to Carver: "[L]et her fly. OK, GB." 20
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Bush had set in motion a project that would have long-term
consequences for CIA analysis. The group of outsiders was divided into
three panels, and they later became known collectively as "Team B." Charles
Lerch chaired the panel on the Soviet air defense system, Roland Herbst led
the study of Soviet missile accuracy, and Richard Pipes, an expert on Russian
history at Harvard University, became the chair of the panel on Soviet
strategic objectives. 21 The "Team B" study of Soviet strategic thinking is by
far the most widely known of the three as well as the most controversial. This
report, which remained classified until 1992, has developed a certain
mythology among both its critics and supporters. Conservatives often argue
that "Team B" forced the CIA to re-evaluate their allegedly dovish
perspective on the Soviet Union.

Paul Wolfowitz, who studied under

Wohlstetter at the University of Chicago, had joined Pipes's panel as a
technical advisor upon the recommendation of Richard Perle, an advisor to
21
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Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (Democrat-Washington).

According to

Wolfowitz, the experiment "demonstrated that it was possible to construct a
sharply different view of Soviet motivation from the consensus view of the
analysts, and one that provided a much closer fit to the Soviets' observed
behavior ... ."n Other alumni of Team B share Wolfowitz's assessment. Paul
Nitze, veteran Washington insider and another advisor on the 1976 project,
re-examined the report when it was de-classified and told the Washington

Post: "I don't find anything wrong with it at all." 23 Not surprisingly, the most
vocal defender of Team B has been Pipes himself. In a 1986 article in

Commentary, he claimed that liberals had unfairly maligned his panel. "So
preoccupied were the politicians, journalists, and left-wing intellectuals with
what they presumed to have been the motives of Team B and the potential
political fallout from its findings that they never bothered to inquire whether
its principal conclusion was correct," he observed. 24 Pipes, an unrepentant
cold warrior, suggests in his memoirs that the legacy of Team B directly
contributed to Ronald Reagan's victory in the 1980 presidential election,
contending that "while we [supporters of Reagan] argued on the basis of facts
our opponents either spoke in terms of vague generalities or else resorted to
ridicule and abuse." 25
The Team A/Team B experiment began at the end of August 1976 and
ran through December. The Team B panel on missile precision believed that
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23
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CIA analysts had underestimated the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs, but the real
controversy unfolded when Pipes's panel clashed with their CIA
counterparts. Despite the claims of Team B members about their panel's
objectivity, it is difficult to believe that prior convictions did not influence
their approach to the experiment. In fact, it would be something of an
understatement to describe the members as hard-liners. Pipes, a Jewish
emigre from Poland, had been forever changed by his first-hand encounters
with the Nazis in the 1930s. "When you see this violence, when you see these
cruel barbarities, you tend to look at things more realistically," he later
argued. 26 Prior to his involvement with Team B, he had developed a
reputation for criticizing the idea that American society and Soviet society
would eventually experience a peaceful convergence. Pipes believed that
there was an irreconcilable and fundamental difference between communism
and democracy, which would inevitably lead to conflict.27
Two other hard-liners on the panel were Professor William Van Oeave
and Lieutenant General Daniel 0. Graham. Van Cleave taught at the
University of Southern California, and he had participated in the SALT
negotiations in 1971. Van Cleave expressed significant reservations about
these talks, and when secret information on SALT appeared in the New York
Times, the Nixon administration considered him a prime suspect for the leak.

Although he passed a polygraph, he did not deny talking with William
Beecher, the Times reporter, and acknowledged there existed "some
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possibility that I might have said something that could be taken to be an
indiscretion-but I didn't think so." 28
Like Van Cleave, Lieutenant General Graham was deeply suspicious of
the SALT process. Graham specifically distrusted CIA analysts for not taking
a tougher stance on the Soviet Union; "There are more liberals per square foot
in the CIA than any other part of government," he would say later. 29 This
antipathy can be traced to an earlier confrontation that Graham had with the
Agency during Vietnam while he was in charge of intelligence estimates for
the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). A headstrong CIA
analyst named Sam Adams asserted that the military was significantly
undercounting enemy forces, which led to a heated confrontation in Saigon.
Military intelligence refused to accept any estimate that placed the enemy
order-of-battle above 300,000. Adams's calculations indicated that the socalled irregular forces-dismissed by the Army as women, children, and old
men-needed to be included in the statistics, because a large percentage of
American casualties were the result of booby traps. In other words, since
Vietnam was not a conventional war, Adams argued that the order-of-battle
had to be adjusted accordingly. He estimated that enemy forces totaled
500,000-600,000, a number that horrified military intelligence.30
28
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Much to the dismay of Adams, however, the CIA essentially accepted
the MACV estimates in.September 1967. Adams never forgave the CIA for
refusing to challenge the military's numbers, and his story would eventually
receive national attention in 1982 with CBS's "The Uncounted Enemy." In
response to the accusations, General William Westmorland sued CBS. The
resulting trial convinced Adams that "[i]t wasn't right to pin the whole thing
on Westy .... As far as cutting the local forces, not many people knew. That
was a Danny [Graham] operation approved by General Davidson .... " 31
Ironically, while Adams protested to his superiors at the CIA and fell into
disfavor, Graham received promotions from the military, and he eventually
became the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Graham, Van Cleave, and the other members of Team B, believed that
the CIA was not recognizing the true dimensions of the Soviet threat. In their
meetings with CIA analysts (Team A), there were heated confrontations
described as "absolutely bloody." 32 "Sometimes we left them speechless," an
unidentified Team B participant told the New York Times. "We had men of
great prestige, some of them with memories going back 25 years or more, and
they made devastating critiques of the agency estimates." 33 Team B reviewed
old NIEs from 1962 to 1975, castigated their methodology, and outlined
recommendations for changes. The CIA assigned junior analysts to Team A,
Quarterly 106 (Summer 1991): 239-263. Even though Wirtz criticizes the CIA's
methodology, he concedes that "the general thrust of its critique of American
golicy [in Vietnam] has been vindicated by events." Ibid., 261.
1
Bob Brewin and Sydney Shaw, Vietnam On Trial: Westmoreland vs. CBS
(New York: Atheneum, 1987), 373.
32
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and their counterparts in the experiment saw the mismatch as an opportunity
to influence the CIA's assessment of the Soviet Union. "I don't want to tell
you guys you're going to lose your jobs if you don't get on board, but that's
the way it is," Graham allegedly declared in one of the meetings at CIA
headquarters. 34
The report that Team B submitted in December 1976 has been
described as NSC-68 redux. NSC-68, of course, was a National Security
Council document approved in 1950 that called for a massive military buildup in response to the perceived hegemonic intentions of the Soviet Union. It
is not surprising that Paul Nitze, one of the principal authors of NSC-68, also
served on the strategic objectives panel.

At the beginning of the Team B

report, the authors "agreed that all the evidence points to an undeviating
Soviet commitment to what is euphemistically called 'the worldwide triumph
of socialism' but in fact connotes global Soviet hegemony." 35 The third
section of the study, which dealt specifically with the USSR's strategic
objectives, presented an even darker view of the Cold War. Although the
Soviets would prefer to destroy the capitalist system without fighting a war,
Team B concluded that "the Soviet Union is nevertheless preparing for a Third

World War as if it were unavoidable [italics original]." 36 "The intensity and
scope of the current Soviet military effort in peacetime is without parallel in
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twentieth century history," they added, "its only counterpart being Nazi
remilitarization of the 1930' s." 37
The central thesis outlined in the report was that the Soviet leadership
did not accept the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
Beginning in the early 1960s, American policymakers believed that the Soviet
Union wanted to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. From their
perspective, the quantity of nuclear weapons on both sides made it irrational
for either country to launch a first-strike, since the subsequent retaliation
would be suicidal. The advocates of MAD assumed that the Soviets would
act rationally as nuclear weapons proliferated. But Team B vehemently
disagreed with mirror-imaging, the tendency to make predictions based on
American pre-conceptions: "[t]his conceptual flaw is perhaps the single
gravest cause of the misunderstanding of Soviet strategic objectives found in
past and current NIEs." 38 The first part of the report, mostly written by Pipes,
complained that CIA analysts were too focused on "the hard evidence." 39
This evidence was collected using satellites and listening posts, and while
such technology could determine the strength of enemy forces (e. g. the
number of tanks, planes, ships, missile silos, and army divisions), it could not
tell

policym~kers

what the Soviets planned to do with their weapons.

Moreover, it also could not explain why certain military projects were
pursued and others abandoneQ.. "Facts of themselves are mute: they are like
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the scattered letters of an alphabet that the reader must arrange in sequence
according to some system," observed Team B. 40
In order to understand Soviet intentions, Team B argued that it was
important for the intelligence community to comprehend the profound
cultural differences between Americans and Russians. Military strategists in
the Soviet Union had inherited a history of expansionism, and according to
Pipes, they continued to embrace the teachings of A. V. Suvorov, a Russian
field marshall in the 1700s. (The report refers to Suvorov's treatise as the
"science of conquest," but interestingly, Raymond Garthoff has explained
"that the correct translation ... is 'the science of winning' or the 'science of
victory ."')41 The Soviets, unlike Americans, viewed nuclear warheads as just
another weapon in their military arsenal. Most importantly, they were
convinced that they could prevail over the United States in the event of
nuclear war: "The evidence suggests that the Soviet leaders are first and
foremost offensively rather than defensively minded. They think not in terms
of nuclear stability, mutual assured destruction, or strategic sufficiency, but of
an effective nuclear war-fighting capability." 42 From the perspective of Team
B, "both detente and SALT are seen by Soviet leaders not as cooperative
efforts to ensure global peace, but as means more effectively to compete with
the United States." 43 The Soviets, in other words, were lulling American
policymakers into a state of complacency.
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In the second section, the authors outlined specific problems with
predictions in the NIBs. Team B said that "Soviet strategic forces have yet to

reflect any constraining effect of civil economy competition, and are unlikely to do so
in the foreseeable future [italics originial]." 44 They warned that the CIA did not
fully understand the danger of the Backfire bomber, predicting the plane's
deployment "in substantial numbers, with perhaps 500 aircraft off the line by
early 1984."45 In other areas of their analysis, Team B members were puzzled
by the lack of hard evidence to support their theories. For instance, they
became convinced that the Soviets were developing non-acoustic technology
to enhance their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Rather than
allowing the fa~ts to undermine this belief, however, they concluded that the
absence of evidence might mean "that the Soviets have, in fact, deployed
some operational non-acoustic systems and will deploy more in the next few
years." 46 Although Team B was referring to the defensive use of non-acoustic
technology, readers of their report were left to wonder about the offensive
potential of these systems. If the Soviets could prevent American submarines
from retaliating with their SLBMs in a nuclear war, they might consider a
preemptive strike to be a realistic option. Team B also worried that Soviet
engineers were aggressively pursuing ABM technology through experimental
laser and particle beam research, and while acknowledging it was difficult to
evaluate development efforts, the report claimed "that the Soviets have mounted
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ABM efforts in both areas of a magnitude that it is difficult to overestimate [italics
original]. " 47

It is difficult to understand why the alumni of Team B have so
vigorously defended the report, for history has demonstrated that many of
their assessments were wildly inaccurate. They predicted that the Soviet
economy would remain strong in the years ahead, but in reality it soon
collapsed under the weight of high military expenditures.48

Instead of 500

Backfire bombers in 1984, there were only 235, and Team B had significantly
exaggerated their range. 49 Not surprisingly, the Soviets did not possess a
viable non-acoustic system or a research program for lasers and particle
beams. In the aftermath of the Cold War, it turned out that the installation in
Semipalatinsk, which Air Force General George Keegan believed to be a
center of beam weapon research, "was used to test nuclear-powered rocket
engines and was totally unrelated to so-called nuclear directed-energy
weapons." 50 In the final analysis, CIA analysts were more accurate and
intellectually honest than Team B, but this does not mean the NIBs that they
produced were without error.

In fact, a group of economists published a

study in 1993 that indicated that the CIA had overestimated the strength of
the Soviet economy. 51 If the CIA had exaggerated the Soviet threat during the
47
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Cold War, it is fair to say that Richard Pipes and his colleagues had engaged
in a process of irrational exaggeration in their 1976 study.
The Team A/ Team B exercise was an internal experiment, and both
groups had access to classified documents. The CIA assigned John Paisley, a
r~tired

officer who had previously served as Deputy Chief in the Office of

Strategic Research, to be the liaison for Team B. When they wanted to
examine a· document, me:inbers of Team B submitted their request to Paisley,
and in most instances, he complied. 52 Since they had access to secret material
with national security implications, it was abundantly clear that participants
in the experiment could not reveal any information to outsiders. Yet at the
end of October 1976, shortly before the presidential election, an article
appeared in the Boston Globe that revealed the existence of Team B. Someone
on Team B had clearly leaked information to Globe reporter William Beecher
with the intention of publicizing the neoconservative complaints about
American foreign policy. Although Pipes has been accused of the leak in the
past, Cahn convincingly argues that "[Daniel Graham], directly or indirectly,
communicated with Beecher."53 Subsequent stories on Team B appeared in
both the New York Times and the Washington Post after Christmas. During the
mid-1970s, conservatives often complained that liberals in Congress could not
be trusted with the oversight of the CIA, because their political biases would
products during the 1970s and 80s may indeed have tended to overstate the
size of the Soviet economy relative to the U. S. and, particularly, its military
threat." Ibid., 35.
52
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53
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inevitably lead to security leaks. Ironically, many of the same commentators
wholeheartedly endorsed the Team B exercise even after at least one of its
members talked with the media. This was a revealing double standard. 54
Paisley, the coordinator of the exercise, was furious with the leak.
When he died in 1978 under circumstances worthy of an espionage film, he
was reportedly investigating to determine what had gone wrong with the
project. Paisley departed on his sailboat in late September 1978 and never
returned. His body was found on October 1 in the Chesapeake Bay near the
Patuxent River, and local authorities complained that the CIA's Office of
Security contaminated the crime scene. Paisley was quickly cremated, but
before this happened, his hands were cut off.
decomposed

r~mains

The FBI identified the

using an old set of fingerprints, because the official

prints in Paisley's file could not be found. Although the gunshot wound that
killed him entered towards the back of his head and the body had been
weighted down, officials at the CIA viewed the death as a suicide. Reports
said that radio equipment and CIA documents were found on board Paisley's
sailboat, which led to speculation about his friendship with Soviet defector
Yuri Nosenko. Since the CIA report on the investigation of Paisley's death
remains classified, there is no shortage of conspiracy theories. Tad Szulc
concludes that "[i]n the end we do not know, and we may never know, what
happened to John Arthur Paisley. However he met his fate, in some sense he
54
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may have been the latest casualty of the great intelligence wars that are
invisibly waged around us."55
As stories about Team B began to circulate, there was a considerable
backlash against the project. Ray Cline, a retired CIA official, famously called
Team B "a kangaroo court of outside critics all from one point of view." 56
Henry Kissinger announced in January 1977 that the ordeal was an attempt to
"sabotage SALT 11."57 Even Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev entered the fray,
declaring in the same month that it was "absurd and totally unfounded" for
anyone to believe that his country was preparing for a nuclear strike. 58 More
than two years after Team B disbanded, a subcommittee of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence completed a review of the exercise. The final
report was apparently a toned down version of earlier drafts that had harshly
criticized Team B. Although "[t]he committee's report makes no attempt to
judge which group's estimates concerning the U. S. S. R. are correct," 59 it
nevertheless concluded "that the outcome of the exercise was predetermined
and the experiment's contribution lessened."60 In essence, the report said that
55
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Team B had been loaded with a group of devout conservatives, and
recommended that in the future, "outside critiques of NIE's should continue
to be conducted, but should, in each instance, be made by expert groups
which are broadly representative in character, and whose procedures are
thereafter more strictly monitored by the commissioning authorities than
obtained in the [Team] A-B case." 61
The review of Team B proved divisive, and three Senators on the
committee had separate views attached to the report. Senator Gary Hart
(Democrat-Colorado) charged that the "use of selected outside experts was
little more than a camouflage for a political effort to force the National
Intelligence Estimate to take a more bleak view of the Soviet strategic
threat." 62 Warning of the inherent

da~ger

of politicized intelligence, he

advised that the writing of estimates must be insulated from external
pressures. "Any attempt to bend intelligence to serve political needs other
than the truth is a danger as great as the Soviet threat itself," he remarked. 63
Senators Daniel P. Moynihan (Democrat-New York) and Malcolm Wallop
(Republican-Wyoming) both defended Team Bin their separate _opinions.
Wallop's statement, which was probably written by a staffer named Angelo
Codevilla, 64 complained that the committee's report made Team B look like "a
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Cahn says that Codevilla "alerted Daniel Graham and William Van Cleave
about the draft Senate committee report. Codevilla told them the report
vilified Team B and was an ad hominem attack on the motivations and
qualifications of Team B members." See Cahn, Killing Detente, 181.
62

61
narrow band of zealots with preconceived notions." 65 Contrary to this
characterization~

he said that the members of Team B were justified in their

attack on CIA analysts, since "it is quite accurate to characterize the NIE's
thrust and tone as very doveish indeed!" 66
In response to the backlash in the media, Richard Pipes wrote an
article for Commentary in July 1977 that summarized and attempted to explain
the major findings of his panel. He focused on a perceived cultural divide
separating the Soviet Union from the United States, emphasizing the idea that
Marxism contributed to "an extreme Social-Darwinist outlook on life which
today permeates the Russian elite as well as the Russian masses, and which
only the democratic intelligentsia and the religious dissenters oppose to any
significant extent." 67 Not only did Soviet leaders believe that they could win a
nuclear war, they viewed nuclear weapons as a "compellant" rather than a
deterrent. 68

Pipes made several observations about the Soviets: their

population was less concentrated in urban areas than America's; they had
aggressively pursued a civil defense program to protect important officials;
and they were conditioned by the lessons of history to accept massive
casualties in a war. According to Pipes, "the USSR could absorb the loss of 30
million of its people and be no worse off, in terms of human casualties, than it
had been at the conclusion of World War II. In other words, all of the USSR's
multimillion cities could be destroyed without trace or survivors, and,
65
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provided that its essential cadres had been saved, it would emerge less hurt
in terms of casualties than it was in 1945." 69 This interpretation led inexorably
to the conclusion that the Soviets rejected MAD and were prepared to
consider launching a pre-emptive strike under certain circumstances.
Pipes was profoundly skeptical of Soviet intentions, and he argued
that this skepticism should be applied to the analysis of Russian documents.
"Buried in the flood of seemingly meaningless verbiage," he explained to
readers, "nuggets of precious information on Soviet perceptions and
intentions can more often than not be unearthed by a trained reader." 70 He
provided the following quotation from a military book on Soviet strategy as
an example of such analysis: "[i]t is well known that the essential nature of

war as a continuation of politics does not change with changing technology and
armament." 71 This sentence might seem innocuous enough to the untrained
eye, but Pipes claimed that it was actually a "code phrase" for a sinister
strategy, the Soviet belief that "thermonuclear war is not suicidal, it can be
fought and won, and thus resort to war must not be ruled out." 72
When Pipes published his article in Commentary, he had already joined
the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), "an organization that saw eyeto-eye with Team B" on the Soviet threat?3 Paul Nitze, an advisor to Team B,
helped form the CPD in 1976. Nitze had participated in an organization of
the same title in the early 1950s, and he explains in his memoirs that the
69
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second CPD "owed a spiritual kinship to the first, but otherwise they were
unrelated."74 CPD members could be found in both political parties, but they
shared a common concern with the Soviet Union. The organization, which
was announced after Gerald Ford's defeat, "conducted press conferences,
commissioned opinion polls, and released facts and figures on the strategic
balance" with the hope of persuading Americans to adopt a starker view of
the USSR.75 The CPD challenged SALT II, called for a military build-up, and
served as a networking apparatus for critics of the Carter administration. 76
Ronald Reagan, a prominent member, embraced the CPD foreign
policy views in his 1980 campaign. After his election, over fifty of the
organization's members would serve in his administration, including several
veterans of Team B (Richard Pipes, Paul Nitze, William Van Cleave, and
Seymour Weiss).77 Graham did not join the administration, but he established
the High Frontier organization to lobby for a futuristic missile defense system
in outer-space. The High Frontier contributed to Reagan's Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI). 78 As Jim Klurfield remarked in Newsday, "on November 4,
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1980, Team B, in essence, became Team A." 79 It is true that Nitze would later
become a· driving force behind arms negotiations with the Soviet Union
during Reagan's second term, but most of Team B never wavered in their
distrust of Soviet intentions. For instance, Pipes wrote a New York Times
editorial titled "The Russians Are Still Coming" in October 1989. He warned
that "world stability and peace are nowhere as close as much of world
opinion would like to believe/' noting that the Soviets continued to interfere
in the affairs of Third World countries like Syria, Angola, Nicaragua, and
Afghanistan. 5° Pipes even theorized that Mikhail Gorbachev might be using
detente "to restore [the Soviet Union's] flagging economy and popular
morale, before resuming a worldwide offensive."81 Exactly one month after
this was printed, the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. The collapse of the
Soviet Union soon followed.
Pipes's failure to predict the end of the Cold War and his paranoid
rants would be comical were it riot for the damaging impact that Team B had
on CIA analysis.

In his succinct assessment of the Team A/Team B

experiment, Robert C. Reich has argued that the principal short-term result
was the revision of the intelligence community's most important National
Intelligence Estimate on Soviet forces (NIE 11-3/8-76).82 Although Bush
acknowledged in a memo that the final draft of the NIE "presents a starker
appreciation of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives," he also observed
that "it is but the latest in a series of estimates that have done so as evidence
79
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has accumulated on the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet programs
in the strategic offensive and defensive fields." 83 Bush vigorously denied that
Team B had pressured CIA analysts into modifying the estimate; "There is no
truth to such allegations," he said. 84
It is now abundantly clear that Pipes's report contributed to the

increasing politicization of intelligence. Team B entered the scene at a
moment when the CIA was at the crossroads. Agency officials had been
dealing with Vice President Rockefeller's Commission, Congressional
hearings, Counter-Spy exposes, and low morale among employees. There had
been significant internal shake-ups as well. In 1973, then CIA director
William Colby disbanded the Board of National Estimates (BNE) and
replaced it with twelve National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). 85 While the
BNE was designed to be insulated from outside pressures, the NIOs, who
were either in. charge of geographic regions or specific issues of concern,
answered directly to Colby. Although there is no comprehensive history of
the NIO system, it is fair to say that it was more vulnerable to politicization
than the BNE, which had worked effectively for two decades. 86

Colby

acknowledged in his memoirs that NIOs "were to have no more staff than
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one assistant and a secretary so that they could identify totally with my
position and not develop a role of their own." 87 The system may have been an
effective· tool for streamlining the bureaucracy at Langley, but unlike the
BNE, it was not conducive to independent thinking. If the Team A/ Team B
exercise had happened at a different time, it is probable that its impact would
have been less noteworthy. Under the circumstances, however, Team B's
findings put further pressure on CIA analysts and successfully accelerated
the shift to a darker interpretation of Soviet objectives.
Yet many conservatives were not satisfied with the changes in CIA
estimates. They did not forget Team B' s attack on the Agency, and shortly
after Reagan's election in 1980, his CIA transition team formulated draconian
proposals for intelligence reform.

Thi~

team, headed by Bill Middendorf,

had several members with different backgrounds, but as John Ranelagh
observes, "Angelo Codevilla led the ideological assault [against the
Agency]." 88 While serving as Senator Wallop's staffer on the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), Codevilla had vehemently disagreed with
the Senate report in 1978 that lambasted Team B. It is therefore not surprising
that the preliminary transition report in November criticized the CIA in a
strident tone. Although many policymakers in Washington believed "that the
CIA is a highly professional, non-political agency that produces 'objective'
intelligence," the transition team warned that "[t]hose assertions are arrant
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nonsense .... "89 The report described the Agency as "an elitist organization"
that planned "to capture and co-opt the next Director." 90 During their
meetings, the team outlined a long list of perceived intelligence failures that
rehashed portions of the Team B critique, blaming analysts at Langley for
"the consistent gross misstatement of Soviet global objectives." 91 The team
concluded that "[t]hese failures are of such enormity that they cannot help
but suggest to any objective observer that the agency itself is compromised to
an unprecedented extent and that its paralysis is attributable to causes more
sinister than incompetence." 92
Codevilla developed a proposal to dismantle the CIA that would give
rise to three separate institutions: "a new counterintelligence agency
composed of CIA and FBI staffs in this field; an analytical agency made up of
people from the Estimates side of the agency; and an operations agency to
perform the functions of the old CIA clandestine service." 93 Unfortunately for
Codevilla, there were former CIA _officials on the team who opposed his
radical approach. George Carver, who had earlier outlined the dangers of the
Team A/Team B experiment to Bush, joined forces with John Bross. Bross
had served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II
before embarking on a successful career at the CIA. When William Casey,
Reagan's campaign manager, was selected to run the CIA, Carver and Bross
89
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warned him about the inherent danger of Codevilla's plan. According to one
account, "Bross argued that the crazies on the transition team were trying to
sell Casey a bill of goods from some spy novel, some romantic notion of a
golden espionage past." 94 The anti-Codevilla forces prevailed in the end, and
Casey disbanded the transition team. His biographer provides a thoughtful
summary of this decision: "The report reminded Casey of what he had
concluded long ago about his fellow conservatives: the greatest enemies of a
cause are its blindest believers. He was not about to take over an empire in
order to dismantle it." 95
One wonders what would have happened if a different person was
appointed CIA director under Reagan. Would they have embraced or
rejected Codevilla' s strategy? It is, of course, impossible to provide a
satisfactory answer to this counterfactual question, but it is nevertheless clear
that the CIA came far closer to being dismantled in 1980 than it did in the
aftermath of the Congressional hearings five years earlier. This conclusion
emphasizes the fundamental importance of Team B's legacy. So much
attention has been given to Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis
Pike that "The Year of Intelligence" is wrongly remembered as a liberal attack
on the intelligence community, when, in reality, the conservative offensive
that began in August 1976 had a far greater impact in the long term.
The hearings directly contributed to the establishment of intelligence
oversight committees in both the
94
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they did not lead to permanent changes at the CIA. In fact, in the midst of the
sensational investigations, the Agency was mounting a covert venture in
Angola.% A few years later the CIA, which had allegedly been emasculated
by Pike and Church, launched an operation in Afghanistan that would
eventually become its largest since Vietnam. The Team B exercise, unlike the
Congressional investigations, did undermine the CIA.

The hard-line

conclusions of Pipes and his committee helped push CIA analysts to be
increasingly skeptical of Soviet intentions. To be sure, there had been
political pressures on the CIA since its establishment in 1947, but the
politicization of analysis that resulted from Team B was unprecedented. In a
different era, the BNE might have resisted this outside pressure. Yet in 1976
the BNE no longer existed, and Team B took full advantage of the vacuum.
Richard Pipes, like the editors of Counter-Spy, believed that the CIA

was keeping secrets from the American people. Rather than worrying about
the morality of covert operations in the Third World, however, Pipes believed
that the CIA was withholding information that indicated the Soviets were
readying themselves for World War III. He represented a markedly different
challenge to the CIA than critics on the Left, but he shared with them a
concern about the secrets hidden away inside Langley vaults. In the end,
Pipes and his fellow conservatives proved far more successful in their
attempt to "reform" the CIA, especially when compared to the rapid demise
of Counter-Spy magazine. Agency officials fended off the Left, but they were
less successful in dealing with the reactionary right. The politicization of
96
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intelligence since the late 1970s, and its tragic consequences for American
foreign

relations,

is

the

undeniable

legacy

of

Team

B.
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CHAPTER III
THE CIA ON THE SILVER SCREEN, 1973-1975

What is it with you people? You think not getting caught in a lie is
the same thing as telling the truth.-Joe Turner, Three Days of the Condor
Turner ... comes close to wreaking more havoc on the C. I. A. in
three days than any number of House and Senate investigating committees
have done in years.-Vincent Canby
Between 1973 and 1976, the public became increasingly distrustful of
the CIA. In the summer of 1973, only 19% of Americans questioned in a
Gallup poll had a negative view of the Agency. Two years later the number
of negative responses would rise to 39%/ and by January 1976, a separate
polling service found that almost 50% of those surveyed disapproved of the
CIA's performance. 2 When George H. W. Bush took over at Langley, he
desperately wanted to escape from the skeletons that had been unleashed
during the Congressional investigations. He delivered a speech to CIA
employees on March 4, 1976 inside the Bubble, the Agency's domed
auditorium, and although he acknowledged that recent polling data indicated
the Agency had "a fundamental public relations problem," he did his best to
put a positive spin on the situation. 3 Bush told the audience that the Harris
Poll was somewhat misleading, since it did not take into consideration the
pervasiveness of the anti-establishment mentality in the aftermath of
1
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Watergate. "We're going through a time in our country's history where the
American people seem to take delight in tearing down our institutions," he
observed, ". . . there were some mistakes made here . . . but I'll not be
troubled by these numbers because I'm not sure that the CIA, in terms of
basic support from the American people, is

~uffering

more than other

institutions." 4
The movies that appeared in the mid-1970s support Bush's argument
that there was widespread disillusionment in the country. At the same time,
however, the CIA came to symbolize American fears of government
conspiracies and the threat they presented to the nation's democratic ideals.
"[W]e can already look back to Hollywood in the 70s as the period when the
dorpinant ideology almost disintegrated," argues film scholar Robin Wood. 5
Likewise, Peter Lev concludes in American Films of the 70s "that the films of
the period constitute a dialogue or debate about the nature and the prospects
of American socie:ty." 6 Happy endings were temporarily abandoned, and
social commentary became increasingly popular. Until now, scholars have
claimed that the negative depictions of the Agency on the.silver screen during
the 1970s represented Hollywood's response to the "Year of Intelligence."
Through an examination of five espionage movies that premiered between
1973 and 1975-Scorpio, The Spook Who Sat By The Door, Breakout, Three Days of
4
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the Condor, and The Killer Elite-it becomes clear that screenwriters and
directors actually anticipated the backlash against the intelligence
community. These films outwardly criticized the intelligence community's
obsession with secrecy, portraying the CIA as an elitist, cold-blooded
organization that engaged in assassinations, cover-ups, and political intrigue.
In the spring of 1973, MGM released Michael Winner's Scorpio, which
marked the beginning of a new era in spy films. Scorpio offers what is
perhaps the first unflinchingly negative portrayal of the CIA in film history; a
poster for the movie depicted a dead body sprawled across the seal of the
CIA, and the trailer boldly declared: "When the Agency wants to get rid of
someone, they do it, even when it's their best man." 7 When the film begins,
CIA assassin Gerald Cross (Burt Lancaster) is overseas on assignment with
his protege Scorpio (Alain Delon). Cross soon discovers that the CIA has
turned against him, and after he goes on the run, a top Agency official
convinces Scorpio to track down and kill Cross in exchange for money and
Cross's job.
Agency goons break into Cross's home in hopes of gathering
information that will help them in the manhunt, but his wife returns home
early from a party, confronts the intruders, and gets killed. Cross hunts
down and kills his former boss in retaliation. Yet he is ultimately unable to
evade Scorpio's wrath, and as Cross lays dying in a parking garage, he
laments the futility of their chosen profession: "it's a bit like monopoly, only
more people get hurt. There's no good and no bad. The object is not to win,
7
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l?ut not to lose, and the only rule is to stay in the game." 8 The CIA apparently
has no interest in rewarding Scorpio with Cross's job, for at the end they send
an assassin to eliminate him ..
Despite the movie's fast pace, critics complained about the· convoluted
plot.

From Roger Ebert's perspective, Scorpio contained "[t]oo many

characters, too many situations, [and] finally too many twists." 9 The reviewer
for the New York Times was even more blunt: "There are people who take
[Michael] Winner seriously ... but I doubt if anyone could take 'Scorpio'
seriously, and that is the best I can say about it." 10 Winner has argued that the
movie would have received a better reception among critics if its release had
been delayed to take advantage of the headlines about the Watergate coverup. "Watergate and the C.I.A. had not quite hit the big time. I think just nine
months later and we would have done much better in America,'' he
explains. 11 In an interview in 1994, Winner continued to characterize Scorpio
as a prophetic .movie: "It showed the CIA doing things that nobody at the
time believed they did. And that now everybody believes they do." 12
In fairness to Winner, the movie did predate both Watergate and the
revelations about the Agency's assassination plots. In fact, during the filming
of Scorpio in 1972, some of the cast and crew were staying at the Watergate
complex, and shortly before the break-in at the office of the Democratic
8
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National Committee, Burt Lancaster and Alain Delon had a chance encounter
with the burglars. 13 Gerald Wilson, who wrote the final screenplay for

Scorpio, clearly envisioned the movie as a blistering critique of modern
espionage. As he explained in an interview, "I know people connected with
.

.

the intelligence business and I find the whole thing repugnant; self-servicing,
brutal, ugly and obsolete in the extreme. So I decided to write a story which
combined that with the question of real loyalties, instead of boundary
loyalties." 14 Wilson's negative assessment of spying finds expression in
Cross's interaction with KGB agent Sergei Zharkov (Paul Scofield) and his
dying words; however, Robert Gregg exaggerates when he describes the
movie as "one of the strongest indictments of the Cold War on film." 15
Zharkov wins the respect of the audience not only by protecting Cross, but
also through his forceful renunciation of Soviet atrocities during the Stalin
era. In the final analysis, the film's political message remains in the distant
background. "The plot is a peg to hang the action on," lamented Roger Ebert,
"and there is a lot of action in Scorpio. Maybe too much." 16 Even Burt
Lancaster confessed to the inherent limitations of the movie, describing it as
"nothing incisive, just a lot of action .... [it's] one of those things you do as
part of your living, but you try to avoid doing them as much as you can." 17
Unlike Scorpio, Ivan Dixon's The Spook Who Sat By The Door (1973)
never allows the action to undermine its commentary on the CIA. The movie,
13
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which is based on a Sam Greenlee novel, begins in the office of a United
States Senator who is trailing in the polls. Realizing that the black vote would
secure his re-election, the senator decides to deliver a speech accusing the
CIA of racial discrimination. 18 The CIA responds to the criticism with a
special recruitment program for African-Americans. The only recruit that
successfully completes CIA training is Dan Freeman (Lawrence Cook).
Freeman, a veteran of the Korean War, is a stereotypical "Uncle Tom" on the
surface, and he does not protest his appointment as the Agency's "top secret
reproduction center section chief." 19 When Freeman is not busy making
copies, he also volunteers to lead tours to show how the Agency is
"integrating." 20
· Everything changes after Freeman resigns from the CIA. He moves to
Chicago and finds employment as a social worker, but the audience quickly
learns that this is simply a cover job. Freeman uses his CIA training to
develop an underground guerilla movement, telling his recruits that black
men are ideal secret agents for domestic operations. "A black man with a
mop, tray, or broom in his hand can go damn near anywhere in this country,"
he explains, "and a smiling black man is invisible." 21 Freeman teaches his
followers the fundamentals of black nationalism; "what we got now is a
18
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colony, but what we want to create is a new nation," he declares. 22 And since
he believes "there is no way that the United States can police the world and

keep us on our ass too unless we cooperate," Freeman advocates a militant
challenge to the power structure. 23 After the Chicago police shoot a black
man in the back, there is a riot that prompts Freeman's organization to initiate
a well-coordinated insurgency.
The National Guard is ordered to the city, but they prove no match for
the well trained "black freedom fighters of Chicago." 24 Freeman's men
capture the commander of the National Guard, paint his face black, force him
to drop acid, and then kill him. OA officials cannot understand the success
of the urban uprising, and they become convinced that the Soviets have
organized the insurgency.

Not realizing that Freeman developed the

movement using cells, the CIA wrongly believes that they can stop the
rebellion by eliminating the leader. The audience learns that the rebellion has
spread to other cities, and the film ends with an ominous radio
announcement: "The president has declared a state of national emergency." 25
Although it was shot on a low budget, The Spook Who Sat By The Door
became a cult classic in African-American communities. It also inspired
future black moviemakers like Robert Townsend. When it was released in
the fall of 1973, most reviewers were clearly not prepared for the movie's
aggressive tone. Vincent Canby of the New York Times concluded that "[t]he
rage it projects is real, even though the means by which that rage is projected
22
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are stereotypes." 26 The reviewer for the Christian Science Monitor explained
that the film "culminates in a violent series of scenes that can only be
described as an incitement to riot," calling it "a virulent form of propaganda
.... [and] as much of a blueprint for violence as 'Battle of Algiers. 11127 Film
critics recognized the powerful emotions unleashed by The Spook Who Sat By

The Door, but they obviously were troubled with its violent implications. In
many ways, the criticism directed at Dixon's movie anticipated what some
reviewers would later say about Spike Lee's Do The Right Thing (1989), which
also ends with a black uprising in the inner city.

The Spook Who Sat By The Door mysteriously disappeared from
circulation until it was re-released on VHS in 1993, and there have been
unproven allegations that the government may have acted to suppress the
movie. It should have been clear to reviewers in 1973 that the film was more
of a cautionary tale than a call to arms. Adrienne Manns, one of the few
writers at the time who seemed to understand the movie, explained in the

Washington Post that "its triumph is that it lends humanity to persons who are
usually portrayed as vicious, savage, sub-humans-the street gangs, the
young people who have in many cities terrorized the communities they live
in. They are the real heroes, this time." 28 As Manns understood, the film
addresses conflict within the black community while arguing that race is a
social construction. Freeman warns his followers that "this is not about hate
26
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white folks." 29 In fact, Freeman selects Willie (David Lemieux), who is either
white or incredibly light-skinned, to serve as the organization's "minister of
information." 30 The movie also provides a stinging indictment of America's
black bourgeoisie for their unwillingness to acknowledge what is happening
in the ghetto. The black bourgeoisie is best symbolized in the character of
Dawson (J. A. Preston), a Chicago police officer and Freeman's childhood
friend. When Dawson discovers that Freeman is the leader of the insurgency,
he attempts to stop him; in the confrontation that ensues, Freeman kills
Dawson. Although The Spook Who Sat By The Door appeared in the midst of
the blaxploitation phenomenon, it was definitely not a blaxploitation movie.
Lawrence Cook's riveting performance as Dan Freeman helps to make the
film one of the most unique ever made about the CIA.
It is important to emphasize that both Scorpio and The Spook Who Sat By

The Door were conceived before the Watergate break-in. As a consequence, it
is wrong to characterize these movies as a response to the criminal activities
of the Nixon administration. Peter Lev has observed that film scholars
should not overlook the continued popularity of movies with conservative
themes. "If the early 1970s were the period of youth culture on film," he says,
"they were also the period of right-wing cop films starring Clint Eastwood
and Charles Bronson." 31 Lev's conclusion is undoubtedly true when taking a
broad view of the decade's movies, but there are also films that complicate his
assessment. He points to Charles Bronson's role in Michael Winner's Death

Wish {1974) as a classic example of a conservative Hollywood movie. Yet
29
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Winner had previously directed Scorpio, and Bronson would soon appear in

Breakout (1975).
Like Death Wish, Breakout is intended primarily as entertainment;
however, in Breakout it is the CIA that engages in criminal activity, not urban
hoodlums. The CIA frames Jay Wagner (Robert Duvall) for a murder
committed in Mexico, and after Wagner's extradition from Chile, the Mexican
government convicts and imprisons him. His grandfather is Harris Wagner
(John Huston), president of the Transpacific Fruit and Steamship
Corporation. Early in the movie, Harris Wagner meets with a CIA officer
(Paul Mantee) in New York City. The CIA officer informs him that they have
successfully framed his grandson, and it appears that Jay Wagner has done
something to embarrass the CIA. The CIA officer expresses disappointment
that Jay's grandfather intervened to prevent his assassination, since he
worries that Jay might try to escape from prison.32
Predictably, Jay's wife Anne

Gill Ireland) organizes a rescue attempt

and hires a freelance pilot named Nick Colton (Charles Bronson). Colton, a
man of few words, agrees to fly Anne into Mexico, but he is initially unaware
of her intentions. The first rescue attempt fails, prompting Colton to develop
a scheme

~n

which he sends his friend Hawk (Randy Quaid) into the prison

disguised as a prostitute. The Mexican authorities are not

trick~d

by such a

cunning plan, and they eject Hawk from the prison after severely beating
him. This makes Colton even more determined to exact vengeance on the

32
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<'pepperbellies" and rescue Wagner. 33 For the third rescue attempt, Colton
lands a helicopter in the prison yard at a· ·pre-arranged time.· Wagner is
rescued this time, but unbeknownst to him, his life remains in danger. When
flying back to the United States, customs officials at Brownsville, Texas order
Colton to land for an inspection. The Agency has arranged this inspection in
order to kill Wagner. In the movie's finale, Colton intervenes to protect
Wagner from the CIA officer chasing him. But just as the CIA man is about to
shoot Colton on the runway, he is sliced into pieces by the propeller of a
departing plane.
In his review of Breakout, Roger Ebert explained that he was somewhat

surprised "to find Charles Bronson starring in a Ramparts magazine cover
story .... " 34 As Ebert notes, the .movie is indeed based on a true story. Joel
David Kaplan was rescued from a Mexican prison with a helicopter in
August 1971 where he had been serving a

28~year

sentence for a murder

committed a decade earlier. Kaplan, president of the American Sucrose
Company, came from a wealthy family. Prior to the helicopter rescue in 1971,
there had been several unsuccessful escape attempts. In addition to declaring
his innocence, Kaplan claimed that he was connected with the CIA, which
might help to explain why he entered Mexico with a fake passport. His uncle,
J. M. Kaplan, operated a charitable foundation that the CIA had previously
used to funnel over. one million dollars into Central America.35 Breakout is
33
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adapted from Eliot Asinof' s book about the escape.36 Like Scorpio, however,
the movie emphasizes action, and it is "more concerned with the rescue
mission than with any shadowy political implications." 37
The movie does not contain any precise explanation for why the CIA
wants Wagner dead, but in comparison to other films with depictions of the
CIA, it is somewhat unusual. Patrick McGilligan argues that of all the movies
dealing with the Agency that appeared in 1975, Breakout "is the most
interesting politically, even though it is the least interesting, cinematically." 38
"In this film," says McGilligan, "the entire CIA is understood as the 'enemy,'
not simply a splinter cabal." 39 In other words, Breakout flagrantly violates one
of the most common themes of CIA movies: the idea that the sinister activities
of the CIA are attributable to a limited number of rogue agents. It is possible
that the CIA officer in Breakout is acting on his own, because the audience
never sees any other official from the Agency on screen. Yet it seems unlikely
that a rogue agent would be able to pressure the Mexican government into
framing an innocent American civilian.
The sensational "Year of Intelligence" undoubtedly contributed to the
popularity of Hollywood's increasingly negative depictions of the CIA.
Kathryn Olmsted correctly identifies Three Days of the Condor (1975) as "[t]he
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movie that best exemplified this change in the CIA's popular image ...." 40 At
the same time, however, Olmsted incorrectly suggests that "the film included
plot changes that demonstrated the influence of the investigations." 41
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the movie is that it was written prior to
the publication of Seymour Hersh's story in December 1974. As Sydney
Pollack, the movie's director, later explained in an interview, "[t]he film was
three-quarters finished before any of these CIA revelations began to
happen." 42 Pollack insisted that no changes were made to the script in the
final weeks of shooting, since "[w]e had shot the whole set-up, the whole
plot, we were locked. We couldn't, all of a sudden, start changing scenes." 43
By the time the Congressional hearings began, Three Days of the Condor was
already in post-production.
Hollywood producers traditionally defend the lack of message movies
by arguing that the American public is only interested in entertainment, but
this argument only begs the question: isn't it possible to make films that are
both entertaining and thought provoking? This is exactly what Pollack hoped
to achieve with Three Days of the Condor; in his words, "[t]he attempt was, first
of all, to make it faiflt!ul to the genre of a thriller. And within that, to explore
certain ideas of suspicion, trust, morality, if you will ... it was not intended in
any way as a documentary, I suppose, but as a warning-using the CIA
almost as a metaphor, and drawing certain conclusions from post-Watergate
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America." 44 One of the most effective features of the movie is the character
development; unlike the vast majority of thrillers, the villains in the film are
not simply cardboard cutouts. Interviewed during the shooting of the movie,
Robert Redford said that the he was attracted to the project because of the
script's complexity: "I think the movie is about trust and paranoia, it's about
bureaucracy run amok. That's something that really frightens me. A film
that just says 'Hey, the CIA are bad guys!' wouldn't interest me. We all know
that. But how frightening it is not to know how far you can trust the
CIA-how big it is and what it's doing." 45
The movie opens with Joe Turner (Robert Redford) arriving late for
work one December morning at the American Literary Historical Society,
which is a CIA research office in New York City. It is later explained that
Turner, whose codename is Condor, gets paid to read books dealing with a
wide range of topics. He analyzes these books in an attempt to provide the
CIA with new ideas as well as information about potential intelligence leaks.
After Turner enters the office, his boss, Dr. Lappe (Don McHenry), reminds
him that it is his turn to get everyone lunch. Dr. Lappe also asks Turner
whether he is happy with his job as an analyst. Turner confesses that he has
trouble not telling people what he actually does for a living, explaining that
unlike many of his colleagues, "I actually trust a few people." 46
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Turner leaves the building through the basement, and when he returns
with the lunch orders, he discovers that all six people in the office have been
gunned down. He instinctively takes the secretary's handgun before calling
the CIA's panic line from a nearby phone booth. The CIA arranges a meeting
in an alley with Turner's section chief in Washington, S. W. Wicks (Michael
Kane), in order to bring him out of the field. At this meeting, however, Wicks
attempts to kill Turner, forcing him to return fire. Turner now realizes that he
can no longer trust the CIA, and he randomly selects a woman to kidnap.
Although Kathy (Faye Dunaway) is obviously scared of Turner, he ultimately
gains her trust. In keeping with one of the most important rules of CIA
movies, Kathy sleeps with him not long .after her abduction and then helps
him track down Higgins (Cliff Robertson), Deputy Director of the CIA.
Turner becomes convinced about the strong possibility that "there's another
CIA, inside the CIA." 47
After saying goodbye to Kathy, Turner travels to the home of Leonard
Atwood (Addison Powell) in Chevy Chase, Maryland. He believes that
Atwood, the Agency's Deputy Director of Operations for the Middle East,
will be able to unlock the mystery. But Joubert (Max von Sydow), the
freelance assassin responsible for wiping out Turner's colleagues, kills
Atwood before he can disclose information to Turner. Joubert allows Turner
to live, and he tells Turner that he should leave the country. Although
William R. Taylor describes Joubert "as the most villainous of all of Pollack's
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characters," 48 he also manages to win the audience's sympathy for sparing
Turner. Joubert tells Turner that being an assassin "is not a bad occupation ..
. . [i]t's quite restful, it's almost peaceful. No need to believe in either side or
any side ... there's only yourself. The belief is in your own precision."49

Turner, however, refuses to take Joubert's advice about traveling to
Europe; "I was born in the United States," he says, "I miss it when I'm away
too long." 50 Instead of fleeing America, he arranges a meeting with Higgins in
New York City outside the New York Times building. Turner has concluded
by this point that he stumbled upon Atwood's covert plan to invade the
Middle East that the CIA was not willing to sanction. When he confronts
Higgins about these suspicions, Higgins replies, "We have games. That's all.
We play games. 'What if?', 'How many men?', 'What would it take?', 'Is
there a cheaper way to destabilize a regime?' That's what we're paid to do." 51
Higgins emphasizes that Atwood had embarked on "a renegade operation,"
but he proudly observes that "there was nothing wrong with the plan. No,
the plan was all right. The plan would have worked." 52 This response leads
to a famous exchange that is worth quoting at length:
Turner: Boy-What is it with you people? You think not getting caught
in a lie is the same thing as telling the truth.
Higgins: No, it's simple economics. Today it's oil, right? In ten or
fifteen years, food, plutonium ..Maybe even sooner. Now what do you
think the people are going to want us to do then?
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Turner: Ask them!
Higgins: Not now, then. Ask them when they're running out. Ask
them when there's no heat in their homes and they're cold. Ask them
when their engines stop. Ask them when people who've never known
hunger start going hungry. You want to know something: they won't
want us to ask' em. They'll just want us to get it for' em.
Turner: Boy; have you found ~-hoiile. 53
Turner proceeds to inform Higgins that he has told his story to the New

York Times.· Dumfounded by this development, Higgins declares to Turner
that he has "done more damage than you know." Turner's reply is bold in its
simplicity: "I hope so." 54 Will the Times print the story, or will the CIA
somehow arrange to block its publication? The answer remains unclear as
Turner walks away from Higgins with Christmas carolers singing "God Rest
Ye Merry Gentlemen" in the background. The movie ends with a dramatic
freeze frame of Turner looking back at Higgins over his shoulder, which
serves to reinforce the ambiguity of the ending. Turner's facial expression
suggests defiance, but it also appears he understands that he is "about to be a
very lonely man." 55
When Three Days of the Condor opened in September 1975, most critics
enthusiastically embraced the movie. According to Vincent Canby, "Turner
... comes close to wreaking more havoc on the C. I. A. in three days than any
number of House and Senate investigating committees have done in years." 56
"At its best moments," said Canby, "[the movie] creates without effort or
53
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editorializing that sense of isolation-that far remove from reality-within
which super-government agencies can operate with such heedless
immunity." 57 The reviewer for the Christian Science Monitor also recognized
the political issues raised by the movie, calling it "a thinking man's spy story"
with an ending "that mingles liberal humanism with a smidgen of skepticism
and a dash of doubt." 58 Joy Gould Boyum took notice of how effectively the
film explored the conflict between the various characters; "The villains here
are not traitors working for an enemy government. They, and the heroes as
well, are working for what they apparently believe to be in the best interests
of our own nation." 59
However, there were others who complained about the movie's
political message. In his assessment of the film's ending, William Buckley, Jr.,
conservative guru and former CIA officer, observed with a hint of sarcasm
that "[t]he director failed only to emblazon under [the New York Times
building], 'Daniel Ellsberg Slept Here."' 60 Buckley also criticized promotional
material for the movie, which said that the filmmakers wanted to describe
"the climate of America." "They really mean," he complained, "[t]he climate
of America as seen by I. F. Stone, Seymour Hersh, Susan Sontag and Shirley
MacLaine." 61 Three Days of the Condor also upset Ben Stein, and in an article in
the Wall Street Journal titled "Let's Tar and Feather the CIA," Stein called the
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movie "complicated and simple-minded at the same time .

"

62

Stein

criticized the.filmmaker and other critics of the intelligence community for
failing to consider "the possibility that the CIA might serve some valuable
function for the nation and that the Soviets may not be the friends they seem
to be. Fashion must be served."63 Both Buckley and Stein were not pleased
with American popular culture in the aftermath of Watergate, and they
equated the movie with the liberal politics C?f Sydney Pollack and Robert
Redford.
In fairness to the conservative critics, there is no question that the
political beliefs of Pollack and Redford influenced the movie~ Pollack openly
expressed disillusionment with American government: "I tried to deal, as
much as I could [in the movie], with trust and suspicion [and] paranoia,
which I think is happening in this country, when every institution I grew up
believing was sacrosanct is now beginning to .crumble."64 The movie's
screenplay, which was adapted from James Grady's Six Days of the Condor, is
considerably different than the novel, and the modifications in the story are
obviously intended to enhance the film's political commentary. In the book,
the rogue CIA officers are smuggling drugs rather than developing plans to
invade the Middle East. The villains in the novel ultimately shoot the Kathy
character (Wendy Ross); believing that she has been killed, Turner's character
(Ronald Malcolm) tracks down the assassin (Maronick) at National Airport
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and murders him. He then returns to the CIA. 65 In short, the book contains
more action and sex, but it does not address the ethical issues surrounding
espionage as Pollack does in the movie. The book's ending provides closure,
while the movie's finale leaves the audience feeling uncertain about Turner's
fate. Yet despite the changes to Grady's novel, Pollack vehemently denied
the charge that he was advocating the.abolition of the CIA, stating in an
interview that "I don't think we should abolish the CIA. What we have to do
is find some way of making a check and balance system work that,
conceivably, hasn't been working before." 66
But Pollack's willingness to accept the necessity of the CIA troubled
McGilligan, who referred to Three Days of the Condor as "a wide-screen
whitewash tantamount to the Rockefeller Commission" that was nothing
more than "a souped-up contemporary spy caper with lukewarm political
impact." 67 McGilligan faulted the movie for portraying the villains as "a
small, dangerous yet ultimately controllable clique-that is presumably
motivated by abstract power-mongering rather than economic imperatives." 68
From McGilligan's perspective, in other words, the real villain should have
been the CIA itself. The film's ending creates problems for this analysis,
however. It becomes clear during Turner's exchange with Higgins that
65
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economic factors (i.e. the desire for Middle Eastern oil) were a motivation
behind Atwood's plan, and even though Higgins reminds Turner that
Atwood was indeed the leader of renegade group not sanctioned by the CIA,
Turner is unimpressed with the distinction: "who the hell is Atwood? He's
you. He's all you guys. Seven people killed. And you play fucking garnes!" 69
Should the CIA be allowed to continue the "games" that Higgins and other
CIA men play behind closed doors at Langley, or as Turner suggests in the
finale, would it be better for officials to incorporate the American public into
the policyrnaking process? This is a provocative question that moviegoers
must resolve for themselves. Turner trusts that the American people will do
~hat

is right, while Higgins is far more cynical, claiming that most Americans

are unconc.erned about foreign policy as long as it preserves economic
prosperity at horne: "they won't want us to ask 'ern. They'll just want us to
get it for 'ern." 70
Sam Peckinpah's The Killer Elite, an adaptation of a Robert Rostand
novel, opened approximately three months after Three Days of the Condor, and
in the final week of December, it was the highest grossing movie, earning
$849,000. 71 The commercial success of the movie proved short-lived, which is
not surprising given its disjointedness. A transcript of an interview with
Lawrence Weyburn (Gig Young) appears on the screen at the beginning of the
movie:
Q.
69

What do you mean by special departments Mr. Weyburn?
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Some countries have 'special' departments for directly or
indirectly eliminating defectors and others who carry away
secrets which may jeopardize its national security.
Does our country have a similar department?
Not to my knowledge.
Would you admit it if we had?
No.72

This transcript is followed with a somewhat ironic disclaimer, reminding the
audience that "[t]his film is a work of fiction. There is no company called
[COMTEG] and the thought the C. I. A. might employ such an organization
for any purpose is, of course, preposterous." 73 Mike Locken Games Caan) and
George Hansen (Robert Duvall) are secret agents, but they do not work
directly for the CIA.

Instead, they are employed with a clandestine

organization that essentially does contract work for the Agency and other
groups willing to pay. They are experts on dirty work, but when they are
assigned to guard a prominent defector, Hansen betrays his partner at the
safe house. He kills the defector before cruelly shooting Mike in the knee and

ann.
Forced to go through months of painful rehabilitation in the hospital,
Mike remains determined to return to his job. Mike's boss, Cap Collis
(Arthur Hill), initially wants nothing to do with him after the shooting, but
Collis later recruits him to protect a foreign leader from Asia who has been
targeted by ninja assassins. Although Collis tells Mike that Hansen is. now
working with the enemies of the Asian leader, in reality he still answers to
Collis and COMTEG. Mike recruits two friends, Mac (Burt Young) and
72
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Jerome Miller (Bo Hopkins), to participate in the mission. Later in the movie,
in what Michael Bliss has labeled "the film's most analytical speech," 74 Mac
warns Mike that "[y]ou're so busy doing their dirty work you can't tell who
the bad guys really are." 75 Mike proceeds to explain that he defines the bad
guys as "anybody that tries to hurt me." 76 Mac, however, is not satisfied with
this response; "They need guys like you to do their bloodletting while they're
busy making speeches about freedom and· progress. They're all full of
bullshit." 77

During the final sequence that unfolds in a graveyard of

abandoned warships, Collis expresses a similar sentiment: "sides, sides, all
full of shit. They all want the same thing: to be in charge." 78 Mike shoots
Collis, and the movie ends with Mac and Mike sailing off together,
symbolizing their abandonment of. the world of assassinations and dirty
tricks. (Miller is unable to join them, because he has been killed shortly after

shooting Hansen on the pier.)
According to Bliss, "The Killer Elite is interesting, but it exhibits a great
deal of pessimism about the possibility of being delivered from corruption,
this not only in spite of, but to a fair extent because of, its unrealistic
ending." 79 One reviewer at the time noted that the movie's "theme is the
world as universal sell-out" and compared The Killer Elite to Three Days of the
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Condor. 80 Yet this comparison is somewhat misleading, for in many ways, The
Killer Elite is actually more similar to Scorpio than Pollack's film. Except for
~ac' s

critical assessment of covert operations, it is a traditional Hollywood

action movie that is often difficult to follow.

Bliss is correct when he

maintains that the film's ending "fails to confront the moral problems
inherent in the lives of secret agents." 81
By any standard of measurement, the movie is seriously flawed even
though it had the potential to be an engrossing thriller. Peckinpah blamed
the producers for the weaknesses of The Killer Elite; during pre-production, he
had sent a memo to Mike Medavoy, the executive in charge of production at
United Artists, complaining abo1.,1t how he had been prohibited from
modifying the script. Medavoy responded with a memo that re-iterated that
Peckinpah was expected to leave the screenplay alone.

Angered by

Medavoy's reply, Peckinpah had T-Shirts made "with his [memo] on the
front and Medavoy' s response on the back" and provided the shirt to
everyone on the set.82 Peckinpah' s feud with the producers continued
throughout the production, and it has been suggested that he intentionally
sabotaged the movie to retaliate. For instance, David Weddle claims that
"[Peckinpah] had his actors ad-lib sophomoric asides that undercut the
drama and encouraged the audience to jeer at the movie they'd paid good
money to see." 83
80

Richard Eder, "'Killer Elite,' or Copping Out of the Universal Sell-Out," The
N~ York Times, 18 December 1975,62.
81
Bliss, 273.
.
82
Gamer Simmons, Peckinpah: A Portrait in Montage (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1976), 211. ·
83
Weddle, 499.

95
Rampant cocaine use on the set also helped to undermine the quality
and coherence of the film. Peck.inpah "would forget conversations that he
had with you," recalled stunt director Whitey Hughes, "[y]ou'd set up a
stunt,.you'd discuss it with him and he'd approve it, then he'd come out of
his trailer and we'd do a take and. he'd completely reverse himself . . . ." 84
One of the movie's producers would later attempt to reconcile with
Peck.inpah. Not surprisingly, Peck.inpah was uninterested in mending fences;
as he explained to the producer, "[m]y problem is, I do not suffer fools
graciously and detest petty thievery and incompetence. Other than that, I
found you charming, and on occasion, mildly entertaining." 85 Although
Peck.inpah certainly had legitimate grievances, he deserved more of the blame
for the problems with The Killer Elite than he was willing to acknowledge.
Moviegoers were left to wonder how the director of The Wild Bunch (1969)
and Th.e Ballad of Cable Hogue (1970) could have faltered so badly with The

Killer Elite. The first sentence of the review in the New York Times probably
explained it best: "Sam Peck.inpah knows how to make movies but perhaps
he has forgotten why." 86
The espionage movies of. the 1970s demonstrate the importance of
studying the cultural history of the "Year of Intelligence." Films like Scorpio
and Three Days of the Condor have been frequently imitated in the past three
84
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decad~s.

Regardless of whether they romanticize or demonize the CIA,
'

'

filmmakers love to turn unsuspecting CIA analysts into heroic field
operativ.es in the image of Joe Turner (The Amateur, The Hunt for Red October,

The Sum of All Fears). There is also a tendency to examine what happens
when the CIA hierarchy turns against their own officers (Spy Game, The

Bourne Identity, The Bourne Supremacy). And, of course, much attention has
been given to assassination (In The Line of Fire, Conspiracy Theory, The Bourne

Identity, The Bourne Supremacy), mind control experiments (Conspiracy Theory),
and allegations of the CIA's connection to the mafia (JFK, Agent On Ice).
Popular culture is more than just a reflection of society, for it has
almost certainly helped to shape the public's perception of the intelligence
community.

In the same speech where he attempted to downplay the PR

problem facing the CIA, Bush's optimistic facade vanished when discussing
Hollywood's portrayal of the Agency. He explained to CIA employees that
he "made the mistake" during the holiday season of going to see Three Days of

the Condor with his daughter, "who is madly and passionately in love with
Robert Redford." 87 He described the movie as "a fairly good shoot-em-up
and, if I were totally untutored in this business, I might have got a yak out of
it''; despite this complimentary remark, however, he warned that "it was a
very vicious and sinister piece because what it did was to lay at the CIA's
doorstep all kinds of outrageous things that the CIA by its severest critics has
never been accused of." 88 The new CIA director was especially appalled that
the movie's finale implied that The New York Times might somehow be in
87
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cahoots with Langley. From Bush's perspective, the accusation seemed
irresponsible and downright foolish: "Well, if we control it, we're doing a
hell of a job with the editorial content they're coming out with! This is tough
propaganda." 89

89
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CHAPTER IV
'TELLING THE INTELLIGENCE STORY': WILLIAM COLBY, THE ARlO,
AND THE SELLING OF THE CIA
Although George H. W. Bush conceded in March 1976 that the CIA
confronted "a fundamental public relations problem," his attempt to combat
the negative publicity was simple: "I want to get the CIA off the front pages
and at some point out of the papers altogether," he informed President Ford
that summer.1 Bush's primary objectives were to revive Agency morale and
regain the trust of Congress, and from the perspective of most observers, he
succeeded admirably. Yet this "no publicity is good publicity" strategy
differed from the approach of his predecessor, William Colby. Colby, who
headed the CIA during this contentious era, decided that it was necessary to
reveal some of the Agency's darkest secrets in order to ensure its survival. As
John Prados has explained in Lost Crusader, Colby became "the man in the
middle . . . . . " 2

Not only was he caught between the Congressional

investigators and the White House, he also found himself in the middle of
two opposing factions within the CIA.

The first believed that it was

acceptable for him to share information with Congress and the public, while
the second lobbied aggressively for him to stonewall.3 Even though Colby
infuriated the old school Cold Warriors for

cooperati~g

with the

investigations, it is now clear, as Prados concludes, that the embattled CIA
1
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director was "far less open to inquiry than his critics claimed."4 In fact,
Colby's PR efforts-in conjunction with the well-organized campaign of
former CIA officials-helped make ifpossible for the CIA to emerge from the
"Year of Intelligence" essentially unscathed. In the end, Colby managed to
protect what he referred to as the good secrets." 5
(1

As the headlines announcing news of CIA scandals multiplied in the
mid-1970s, Colby began to realize that publication relations could help to
rehabilitate the CIA's image. He explained in his memoirs, Honorable Men,
that "[t]he CIA must build, not assume, public support, and it can do this
only by informing the public of the nature of its activities and accepting the
public's control over them." 6

Rather than weakening the CIA, Colby

concluded, creating the perception of greater openness would re-invigorate it:
"A public informed of the CIA's accomplishments and capabilities will
support it. A public aware of its true .mission and the limits of its authority
will accept it .... A public convinced of the CIA's value will help protect its
true secrets." 7 It is important to keep in mind that Colby did not invent CIA
public relations; in fact, as a budding CIA officer in the 1950s, he witnessed
how effectively Allen Dulles had used publicity to win support for the
Agency. 8
Dulles, more than any other person, cultivated the mystique of the CIA
that Colby and other Agency defenders would work so hard to protect in the
4
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mid-1970s. In reflecting on the contributions of "the Great White Case
Officer," one of his proteges perceptively observed that " ... Dulles loved
[the mystique], helped create it, and in many ways embodied it." 9

When

Dulles became CIA director in 1953, he led the Agency into what is
commonly known as the "golden age of operations." 10 Dulles controlled the
covert dimension of American foreign policy under President Eisenhower,
while his brother, John Foster Dulles, ran the State Department.
Despite the cold war consensus that emerged in the 1950s, Dulles's
clandestine power did not go unchallenged. In July 1953, just five months
after Eisenhower selected Dulles to be the country's top spymaster, Senator
Mike Mansfield (Democrat-Montana) made a proposal that stunned the
intelligence establishment. Mansfield, a former history professor who had
been elected to the Senate the previous fall, offered a resolution that would
establish a Congressional oversight committee on intelligence with ten
members drawn from both the House and Senate. 11 Dulles's supporters on
Capitol Hill easily quashed the resolution, but in March 1954, Mansfield
would try again. This time he delivered a stirring speech on the floor of the
Senate, declaring that "secrecy now beclouds everything about CIA-its cost,
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its efficiency, its successes, and its failures." 12 Mansfield even included a
prophetic warning in his address: "until we create some sort of 'watchdog
committee' ... we will have nothing but continued anxiety about the Central
Intelligence Agency and its widespread activities." 13
The evidence now available indicates that Dulles was reluctant to
challenge Mansfield publicly. 14 Dulles fought back against the senator
indirectly using a masterful display of PR, and the crowning achievement of
this campaign appeared in the form of a three-part series in The Saturday

Evening Post. The articles, written by Richard and Gladys Harkness, would
have been impossible without insider assistance at the Agency. Peter Grose,
Dulles's biographer, claims that Dulles did not simply leak stories to the
reporting team, but he does concede that the CIA director granted them full
access and later proofread their articles over dinner, "making a few
corrections or suggestions here and there." 15
Judging from the content of the series, however, Dulles most likely had
far more control over the articles than Grose suggests.

In fact, "The

Mysterious Doings of the CIA" nicely illustrates what historian Jonathan
Nashel has called "the incestuous and corrosive mix between the government
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and the media that developed during the Cold War years." 16 The first article,
which appeared on October 30, 1954, revealed to readers that the CIA had
been covertly involved in Guatemala.

The reporters claimed that this

intervention was justified since Dulles had "proof that the communistdomi:ry.ated government of Guatemala was part and · parcel'" of a Red
conspiracy, hatched in Moscow, to give Russia a military toehold in Latin
America hard by the Panama Canal."17

President Jacobo Arbenz of

Guatemala had been a "communist puppet," and his supporters were Soviet
hardliners posing as reformers. 18 Thankfully, from the perspective of the
authors, Dulles and his CIA operatives "met the Reds early enough to hand
Russia its defeat in Guatemala." 19 As a consequence, the United States had
averted the possibility of a large-scale military intervention "to save Latin
America." 20 It is evident, however, that Dulles and his subordinates withheld
crucial information during interviews for the story. In the aftermath of
Arbenz' s downfall, the CIA conducted PBHISTORY, an examination of
thousands of captured documents. This secret study firmly indicated that
Arbenz had not been Moscow's puppet. 21
The second article in the series told readers that the CIA had achieved
a similar success in 1953 when "the strategic little nation of Iran was rescued
16
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from the closing clutch of Moscow."22 Like Arbenz, Muhammad Mossadegh
was in cahoots with the Communists, according to the authors, and. they
obviously took pleasure in boasting that the Iranian prime· minister "was
captured as he lay weeping in his bed, clad in striped silk pajamas." 23 If the
coverage of Iran was propaganda masquerading as journalism, the final
article on November 13 was even worse. The Harkness duo described Dulles
as "a tough-minded, hardheaded, steel spring of a man with an aptitude and
zest for matching wits with an unseen foe." 24 On the final page, they
editorialized about the necessity and cost effectiveness of the Agency: "A
helping hand in the rescue of one country such as Guatemala or Iran from
communism is worth CIA's annual budget many times over." 25 In the event
that readers had somehow missed the implicit rebuke of oversight proposals,
they were reminded that "qualified observers in Washington believe that CIA
deserves the trust and confidence of Congress and the people." 26
The PR campaign ended in success for the CIA when the most recent
Mansfield proposal was defeated 59-27 in April 1956.27 Dulles remained
committed to CIA public reiations in the ensuing years. As Jonathan Nashel
reveals, the CIA director became so interested in the Hollywood adaptation
of Graham Greene's The Quiet American that he was willing to help the
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production team shoot the movie on location. 28 Unlike Greene's original
story, the movie version celebrated American involvement in Vietnam.
Edward Lansdale, the CIA's point man in Southeast Asia, helped director
Joseph Mankiewicz modify the script to transform "Pyle [the American
charcter] into a hero and Fowler [the British character] into a communist
stooge." 29 Dulles also did not disapprove of the fact that E. Howard Hunt, the
CIA officer who later became infamous for his role in Watergate, was
moonlighting as a spy novelist, and after he was forced to resign following
the Bay of Pigs· debacle, he enlisted Hunt and Agency veteran Howard
Roman to ghost write The Craft of Intelligence. 30
Future CIA directors did occasionally try to promote the Agency
mystique as Dulles had done. Not, long after the Soviets executed Oleg
Penkovsky in 1963, the CIA funded the publication of The Penkovsky Papers in
order to publicly flaunt the contributions of their high-ranking asset inside
Soviet military intelligence.31 In the early 1970s, moreover, Richard Helms
28
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allowed the director of Scorpio to film the exterior of Langley.

But

unfortunately for Helms, he was apparently unaware that the screenplay
called for the protagonist in the movie to gun down a high-ranking CIA
official. 32 A few years later Helms accepted an invitation to visit the movie
set for Three.Days of the Condor. He was then serving as Ambassador to Iran,
and according to the film's director, Sydney Pollack, Helms appeared to be
"having a great time" and was ·even "giggling." Oiff Robertson recalls that at
the moment Turner (Robert Redford) confronted his character (Higgins)
about CIA involvement in assassinations, he glanced over and noticed that
the former DCI was grinning. "As his grin wrapped around his mouth, the
hairs on the back of my neck stood upright at attention," says Robertson. 33
By the time Three Days of the Condor was released in 1975, however,
CIA officials were not laughing. On October 30, 1975, an ad hoc task group
chaired by Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson sent Colby a memo entitled
"Telling the Intelligence Story." Not surprisingly, Wilson and his colleagues
noted that "[p ]ublicity on the CIA in the last year has not resulted in a
rounded story. Much attention has been focused on specific sensational bits
and pieces of information."34 The authors of the memo proposed a strategy
for overcoming the negative publicity. "Altering this situation will require
patience and a gradual approach. It will also require a more open and
forthcoming attitude in the Agency's dealings with the media, which provide
32
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our only significant access to the American public," they advised.35 The
group outlined four recommendations for improving the CIA's relationship
with the media. They began with the suggestion that the Agency "collaborate
with the media when asked to do so in developing features articles, articles
for publication on selected topics, or television features," and in an
attachment, they listed several topics that might interest journalists.36 Second,
the committee thought that "[t]he present program for providing substantive
background briefings [for columnists] should be expanded as opportunities
arise." 37 They also believed that high-ranking CIA officials should consider
making more "public appearances and speeches," while their final
recommendation sought to highlight "CIA contributions to the advancement
of technology and keeping the peace." 38
In addition to their proposals for dealing with the press, the ad hoc
group hoped that other people might be encouraged "to help tell the true
story of intelligence."39 The CIA should ask "senior statesmen" to get
involved, and perhaps more importantly, they pushed for a stronger
relationship with ex-officers: "We can provide judicious assistance to selected
former Agency employees and retirees who want to defend the CIA in books,
articles, or public appearances. 'Judicious' and 'selected' are the operative
words." 40
35

Although the memo did not explain how. "judicious" and
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"selected" would be defined in practice, it is obvious that the authors were
only interested in dealing with individuals willing to support their former
employer.
Since Colby had already embraced similar ideas before receiving
"Telling the Intelligence Story," the memo should be viewed as a synopsis of
pre-existing polices that offered a blueprint for modifications in the future.
President Ford fired Colby only a few days after the document was prepared,
and although he stayed on for a few more months, he did not have much time
to implement changes. Yet there is no question that Colby desperately
wanted to change public perceptions of the Agency. As he explained in his
memoirs., the CIA adopted a "gradual strategy" for public relations during
hjs tenure at Langley/1 an approach intended "to get our story out to the
American people."42 In order to maintain ties witl,. ex-officers, for instance, he
established an event called "alumni day." This reunion was viewed as more
than an opportunity for intelligence veterans to reminisce about old
adventures, since Colby intended "to ann them with the answers they needed
to defend the institution to which they had given their loyalty."43 There was
undoubtedly a recruitment dimension to Colby's efforts. Groups of high
school students on trips to Washington visited CIA headquarters every
Tuesday night during the spring, and the Agency also opened its doors to
several college delegations. 44
41 Colby, 379.
42
Ibid., 378.
431bid.
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Colby's efforts were not always successful.

Seeking to improve

relations with the media, he initiated a briefing program for reporters that
proved disastrous. The first session with journalists, which Colby thought
would focus on world events, led to a confrontation over the CIA's
relationship with American businessmen. Finding himself cornered, he
accidentally blurted out the approximate number of Agency contacts in the
business community. Colby learned from the embarrassing incident; in the
future, such briefings would be done on a smaller scale that would enable the
CIA to retain more control over the topics discussed. 45
Unlike many of his colleagues in the clandestine service, David Atlee
Phillips, a twenty-five year veteran, supported Colby's strategy. At the same
time, however, he worried that the backlash against previous wrongdoing
might lead to the CIA's destruction.

The media, which Dulles had

manipulated with such ease in the 1950s, had turned on Phillip's beloved
Agency. He described the "Year of Intelligence" as "[t]he storm which
changed my life," a crisis that he believed could be solved using public
relations. 46
Phillips drew inspiration from the plight of Ray S. Cline and Harry
Rositzke. Cline had been Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) at the CIA
before leaving in 1969 to run the State Department's intelligence division
(INR), and Rositzke was previously a high-ranking officer in the Directorate
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of Plans (called the Directorate of Operations since 1973).47 In October 1974,
Rositzke reviewed the history of the relationship between the CIA and the
executive branch in a New York Times editorial, noting that the Agency did not
operate independently of th~ president. "Political-action operations-secret
support of foreign leaders, political parties and labor unions, and the
preparation of coups and countercoups-have been carried out under the
aegis of every postwar President," he observed.48 While Rositzke advised
that paramilitary operations like the Bay of Pigs should be moved to the
Pentagon, he believed that "more post-mortems" were unnecessary. 49 Cline
argued in the Times the following month that covert action was vital to
national security: "we should not be obsessed with piety but instead should
think earnestly of every way possible -short of total war to insure that our
society and political structures and alliances with like-minded peoples will
continue to flourish ...." 50 As the "Year of Intelligence" unfolded, Cline and
Rositzke also appeared on television to defend the intelligence community. 51
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Phillips admired their efforts, but it was obvious to him that they were badly
outnumbered.
If he had learned one thing during his years of service in the CIA,
~owever,

he realized that low manpower was not an insurmountable

handicap. His understanding of propaganda convinced him that even
though Colby should be forthcoming at the Congressional hearings, the
Agency had to simultaneously push back against critics. Phillips approached
Colby with his concerns, hoping to convince his boss to launch a more
aggressive public relations campaign aimed at restoring the public's
confidence in the CIA. Though he agreed with Phillips in principle, Colby
considered the approach too risky. He reminded Phillips about The Selling of

the Pentagon, a documentary that CBS had first broadcast in February 1971.52
Narrated by Roger Mudd, the expose outlined the Pentagon's massive efforts
to win the support of the American public, from displays in shopping malls
to promotional films that showed how the military was winning in Vietnam.
It revealed that the annual PR budget at the Defense Department had risen

from $2.8 million in 1959 to $30 million in 1971. (According to the Twentieth
Century Fund, the budget was actually closer to $190 million.) 53 Colby
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understood that the CIA could not allow a similar controversy to happen to
them. After Hersh's story, critics might characterize any PR venture as
nothing more than sinister propaganda. "We're just going to have to take the
heat," Colby declared. 54
Phillips accepted Colby's decision, but he could no longer tolerate
watching events from the sidelines. He left the CIA in the spring of 1975 to
form the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (ARlO). When Phillips
began planning the ARlO, he hoped that Cline might be interested in serving
as the president. Cline, an executive director at Georgetown University's
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at the time, declined the
offer.

"You know that I have been trying to build up a reputation as a

scholarly commentator on intelligence as distinct from a 'committed'
defender of CIA," Oine explained in a letter to Phillips. "While I am not sure
my tactics have been entirely successful, I do want to stay in the public view
as an independent rather than a partisan 'CIAnik' ."55 Although it is unclear
whether he sought out anyone else about the position, Phillips ultimately
became the first president of ARlO.
Taking addresses from the mailing list that his family used for
Christmas cards, he had sent out a letter to fellow intelligence officers in
March announcing his objective "to explain why our country needs an
intelligence service and to help clear up some of the erroneous impressions
and sensationalism surrounding us by explaining what CIA is and, more
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important probably, what it is not." 56 Membership was open to anyone who
had previously worked within the American intelligence community, and
annual dues of ten dollars included a subscription to Periscope, ARlO's
newsletter. More than anything else, the organization provided a network for
ex-intelligence officers.

Starting in 1975, for instance, the ARlO held

conventions every year.57 Over 1,000 people had joined by the fall of 1976.
Phillips hoped to address what he referred to as "a tough credibility
problem" for American intelligence. 58 The ARlO established a speaker's
bureau for anyone in the organization who wanted to publicly defend the
intelligence establishment against its detractors. Phillips, arguably the most
prolific speaker in ARlO, made numerous appearances across the country
after leaving the CIA. He spoke about his adventures with the Agency, and
he assured audiences that the policies of reform were working effectively.
Not everyone accepted what Phillips had to say.· In fact, when he appeared in
Madison, Wisconsin to deliver a speech in 1976, approximately four hundred
people protested·against him.59 But for the most part, demonstrations of this
magnitude were uncommon.
In addition to their speeches in front of local groups, Phillips and select
colleagues from the ARlO spoke to journalists and went on television shows
56
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to provide a counterpoint to opponents of the CIA.

Kathryn Olmsted

correctly observes that "he guaranteed reporters that pithy, pro-CIA quotes
were just a phone call away." 60 On an ABC morning show, Phillips squared
off against John Marks and Philip Agee, the former CIA officer who revealed
the names of Agency operatives in Inside The Company, and on another show
he sparred with Victor Marchetti. 61 Unlike Agee, who Phillips called "the first
CIA defector," 62 Marchetti had not outed any CIA employees. Marchetti
contends that Phillips put pressure on him to renounce any connection to

Counter-Spy, the radical magazine in Washington, DC that was exposing the
identities of Agency officers. "Marchetti respected the CIA's power and took
the warning to heart," says Angus Mackenzie, "[h]e withdrew from the
magazine and talked others into leaving with him." 63 Phillips briefly
mentioned in his memoirs that Marchetti left Counter-Spy, but he omitted any
r~ference

to his conversation with the noted CIA critic. 64

.The omission was not especially surprising, since ARlO members
typically wrote their memoirs with the intention of shaping public opinion.
Having ~een .how effectively former officers such as Marchetti, Agee, Frank
Snepp, and Patrick McGarvey had used their books to criticize the Agency,
they believed that the genre offered, a terrific opportunity .to counterattack.
Less.than three weeks after leaving the CIA, Phillips complained in the New

York Times that the media was treating the Agency unfairly. Phillips placed
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stories about the CIA into three categories: "factual," "sensationalist," and
"fact-and-fallacy." 65 The first type "we can endure stoically," he explained,
while the second

11

We

can also endure because the ridiculous is· patently

short-lived." 66 What most frustrated Phillips and his colleagues was 11 the
hybrid (fact-and-fallacy) story" because it "refuses to die or be straightened
out, and sinks into the public subconscious as durable myth." 67
Ironically, despite Phillips's concerns about so-called "hybrid" news
stories, he and fellow CIA defenders did not respond with "factual" accounts
of the Agency; on the contrary, they used their memoirs to create their own
"durable myths." Phillips published The Night Watch in 1977, a skillfully
written account of the various positions he held at the CIA between 1950 and
1975. After his initial recruitment in Chile, he gained extensive experience
with the Agency throughout Latin America-in Guatemala, Cuba, Mexico,
the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Venezuela-before finishing his career
as the head the Western Hemisphere Division in the Directorate of
Operations. In reflecting on his quarter century of service, Phillips admitted
the CIA had made mistakes. He condemned the MKULTRA experiments that
the Agency secretly conducted in the 1950s and 1960s. "Without question,"
Phillips acknowledged, "conducting the drug research on unwitting persons
or in a manner that could lead to suicide, as in the instance of one man [Dr.
Frank Olson], was unjustifiable." 68 He also criticized the CIA's actions
leading up to the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. Phillips, who had
65
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participated in these events, concluded that "[a]t some time we [CIA] should
have cried 'enough.' When told the plan was to be changed from a classic
guerilla landing at Trinidad to a military operation we should have protested
individually to the point of refusing to go along." 69
Phillips's primary objective, however, was not to apologize.
Throughout The Night Watch, he attempted to refute negative allegations that
had been leveled against the Agency. For instance, in order to counter the
accusation that the CIA lacked diversity, he casually mentioned that "[o]ne of
my friends became the first black Chief of Station," 70 and later described how
he "appointed the first female Chief of Station in CIA's history." 71
Interestingly, when Janine Brookner successfully sued the CIA in 1994 for
gender discrimination, evidence came to light that contradicted Phillips's
~ssertion

that he had named the first woman station chief. Brookner, who

joined the Agency in the late 1960s, had served as Acting Deputy Chief of
Station in Venezuela, and she later became Jamaica Chief of Station in 1989.
Brookner' s lawyer described her as the first female director of a CIA station in
Latin America. 72 If this information is indeed accurate, Phillips appears to
have misstated the facts in his book.
There are also significant flaws with the information he provided on
covert actions. In 1954, four years after the CIA first recruited him in Chile,
69
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he helped overthrow President Arbenz in Operation PBSUCCESS. Phillips's
version of PBSUCCESS evoked memories of "The Mysterious Doings of the
CIA." He referred to Arbenz as "a Soviet sycophant'' who "would have
undoubtedly succumbed to the political flattery and pressures of his
[Communist] advisers." 73 Phillips proudly told readers how the radio
broadcasts he initiated on May 1, 1954: were designed to convince Arbenz that
the opposition forces of Castillo Armas were too powerful for his government
to stop. "Arbenz would not have resigned had he not been manipulated into
what he conceived as an impossible situation by the rebel radio," Phillips
observed, "especially in creating a climate in which he would not allow his
pilots to fly or permit the colonel from St. Cyr to commit his troops." 74 He
relaxed in Guatemala City after Armas prevailed by playing golf at a local
course, and in a somewhat bizarre twist, he learned afterwards that the spikes
he wore during the outing actually belonged to Arbenz?5 Not only did
Phillips perpetuate the well-worn myth that Arbenz was a Soviet pawn, he
also appears to have exaggerated the effectiveness of his propaganda
campaign (Operation SHERWOOD)?6
Since Phillips portrayed covert action as a method of spreading
democracy and containing communism, he went to great lengths to explain
away CIA intervention in Chile. Afte:r Salvador Allende was democratically
elected in.Septembf2!r 1970, President Nixon ordered the CIA to prevent the
•
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Chilean leader from taking office. The Agency established a secret Chile Task
Force to execute this mission and appointed Phillips to direct it. Phillips said
1n his memoirs that he was aware he would be working to undermine
democracy, which made him reluctant to take the job: "Track II [Nixon's
covert policy in Chile] was the only episode in my CIA career which
disturbed me to the point that I even considered resigning in protest." 77
Instead of resigning, however, Phillips accepted the position to run the Task
Force. Shirting in the middle of September, he spent over forty days plotting
against Allende, and by his own estimation, he typically "worked twenty
hours a day" during the operation?8 De-classified CIA records indicate that
Phillips and his Task Force sought to establish "a coup climate [in Chile] by
propaganda, disinformation and terrorist activities."79 Phillips and the head
of the Western Hemisphere Division sent a cable to the CIA station in
Santiago on September 28 that bluntly outlined their objectives: "We conclude
that it is our task to create such a climate climaxing with a solid pretext that
will force the military and the president to take some action in the desired
direction." 80
Phillips attempted to disassociate the CIA from the assassination of
General Rene Schneider, the official determined to protect Chilean
democracy, but he neglected to mention that the Agency provided $35,000 to
the conspirators after the murder. 81 He also kept secret the praise that he had
77
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lavished upon CIA officials in Santiago after hearing about the attack on
Schneider. "The Station has done [an] excellent job of guiding Chileans to
point today where a military solution is at least an option for them," he said
in an October 23 cable. 82 Even though he later claimed that he had been
reluctant at first to participate in Track II, the sentiment expressed in this
cable reveals that Phillips took great pride in his work once he committed
himself to the covert project.
Phillips blamed Track II on President Nixon and Henry Kissinger,
calling the covert policy of the White House "inexcusable."83

The

condemnation of a plan that he implemented with such determination seems
rather self-serving to say the least. Some might be inclined to sympathize
with Phillips's situation in the fall of 1970: after all, he received orders from
his superiors, and he loyally followed them despite significant reservations.
Yet the evidence demonstrates that Phillips was a willing participant in
events rather than a hapless victim. After General Schneider was gunned
down on October 22, Phillips claimed in his memoirs that the CIA aborted
Track Il. 84 He argued that the CIA was not responsible for the military coup
that toppled Allende on September 11, 1973. Rather than de-stabilizing the
Chilean government, Phillips maintained, the objective of the CIA "was just
the opposite-to stabilize [Chile] by keeping alive

demo~ratic

institutions

until the election ... scheduled for 1976." 85 Cord Meyer, a retired CIA officer
who published his memoirs three years after Phillips, essentially made the
'
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same argument about Allende. Track II was an "unhappy incident" and
"secret Nixonian aberration" in Meyer's assessment, but "the Agency was
specifically enjoined from any action that might be construed as supporting
coup plotting" once the program ended in October 1970.86 Like Phillips,
Meyer said that the purpose of CIA involvement in Chile after Track II "was
to ensure the survival of a democratic coalition that would have a reasonable
chance of winning back the Chilean presidency in the election scheduled for
1976." 87
Denying CIA complicity in Allende's downfall was central to the
defense of covert action, since Agency supporters recognized that the
Am.erican public would not tolerate an institution that undermined
democracy and promoted dictatorships ... Recently de-classified CIA files
show that the assertions of Phillips and Meyer were significant distortions of
the historical record. Meyer served as the Deputy Director for Plans between
1967 and 1973, and in June 1973, Phillips took over as chief of the Western
Hemisphere Division.

Given their high-ranking positions within the

clandestine service, both men would have known that the covert operations
against Allende continued in the three years preceding the September 1973
coup. Thomas Karamessines, who ran the Directorate of Operations during
this era, later admitted that "Track II.never really ended." 88 Although the
CIA avoided any involvement in the logistical aspects of the coup, an Agency
report concluded in 2000 that Langley "provided assistance to militant right86
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wing groups to undermine the president [Allende] and create a tense
environment." 89
Phillips and Meyer perpetrated a clever disinformation campaign to
hide what the CIA had done in Chil.e. Phillips believed that the truck strikes
in the. months prior to the military takeover directly contributed to the
success of Pinochet, but he denied that the CIA had financed the truckers. 90
This denial was literally true; at the same time, however, it was completely
misleading. Instead of directly funding the labor unrest, the Agency offered
money to other groups ("cutouts") who, in turn, "supported ... key sectors
fomenting economic and social upheaval, notably the truck owners and
strikers that paralyzed Chile in 1973." 91 The CIA also supported El Mercurio;
rather than stabilizing Chilean democracy, the newspaper sought to destroy
it, using propaganda to force the resignation of Carlos Prats in August 1973.
Peter Kornbluh has eloquently summarized the tragic implications of his
resignation: "Like his predecessor, General Schneider, Prats had upheld the
constitutional role of the Chilean military, blocking younger officers who
wanted to intervene in Chile's political process." 92
Phillips, a true believer in the power of propaga:nda who once owned a
newspaper in Santiago, took over the Western Hemisphere Division at the
same time events began to escalate inside Chile.

Was this simply a

coincidence? Perhaps. But it is certain that Phillips knew about ongoing
89
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efforts to undermine Allende, participated in them, and then worked
assiduously to cover up the CIA's ties to the Chilean right-wing. "The
argument that these [CIA] operations were intended to preserve Chile's
democratic institutions was a public relations ploy, contradicted by the
weight of the historical record," Kombluh notes in The Pinochet File. 93 Phillips
and his ARlO friends were key architects of this "public relations ploy," and
they unleashed their propaganda techniques on Americans to mislead them
about what really happened in Chile during the early 1970s.
Phillips and Meyer downplayed the domestic operations of the
Agency using similar tactics of obfuscation. In his famous expose of the CIA
in December 1974, journalist Seymour Hersh revealed that the Agency had
"conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the
Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident
groups in the United States .... " 94 Defenders of the CIA took issue with
Hersh's decision to use the words "massive" and "illegal" in the opening
sentence of the article, which appeared on the front page of the New York

Times. "Based on the extensive evidence that is now available," argued
Meyer, "my own view is that the domestic surveillance activity involving
antiwar activists conducted by the Agency was neither massive in scope nor
clearly illegal at the time that it was undertaken." 95 Operation MHCHAOS
led to the infiltration of anti-war groups, :IJut he rationalized the activity by
claiming that the informants were simply attempting to establish whether the
93
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protestors were the puppets of Moscow. While he acknowledged that the
CIA team implementing CHAOS had "clearly exceeded its instructions" on
three occasions, 96 Meyer concluded that "[Richard] Helms was correct in his
judgment that the foreign dimension of domestic dissent was clearly within
the Agency's jurisdiction and that there was no choice but to trace down
every lead." 97
Not surprisingly, Meyer blatantly distorted Helms's assessment of
CHAOS. In February 1969, Helms had sent a letter to National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger, informing Kissinger that "[t]his is an area not
within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely
sensitive this makes the paper [on the anti-war movement]. Should anyone
learn of its existence, it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned." 98
Both Meyer and Phillips cited the report of the Rockefeller Commission to
support their claims. Phillips first developed this strategy in 1977: "these
violations were not 'massive'; the undisputed findings of the Rockefeller
Commission established less than a dozen cases which could be described as
clearly illegal." 99 Phillips embraced a puzzling definition of the word
"massive." In reality, the Rockefeller Commission actually disclosed that the
CIA had created files on approximately 7,200 Americans while
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simultaneously maintaining a secret computer database in the basement of
Langley with "the names of more than 300,000 persons and organizations." 100
In outlining their defense of the CIA, these Agency veterans also chose to
sidestep one minor detail: the National Security Act of 1947, which
established the CIA, specifically prohibits it from engaging in domestic
operations.
Skeptical observers in the 1970s charged that there was an active
relationship between Langley and the ARlO. The organization's decision to
move into an office building that was a short drive from CIA headquarters
did nothing to diminish this perception. While Colby approved of the project
and became a member after his retirement, he told Phillips "that he [Phillips]
could have no special help from or relationship with CIA or we would be
pilloried for attempting to run a covert operation on the American public." 101
Phillips vehemently denied any connection. "I wish to make it absolutely
clear that the C. I. A. management has not had, and will not have, a hand
officially, unofficially or otherwise in this organization and its efforts," he
said to the media in 1975. 102
At. first glance it appears that the ARlO, which was renamed the
Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) in 1977, had a fairly
innocuous relationship with CIA headquarters. Evidence suggests that they
made referrals to each other if they considered it appropriate. For instance,
100
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when a staffer on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence contacted the
Agency's Office of Legislative Counsel in January 1976 to see if Phillips could
make a speech in Texas, the Counsel's office extended a cautious response. "I
told [the staffer] we are at arms length with Mr. Phillips but provided him the
phone number where Mr. Phillips can be reached," wrote the official. 103
Referrals also worked in the other direction, since members like Cline kept
contact numbers for the CIA's public affairs office on hand. One member, an
assistant professor at Canisius College in Buffalo, New York, sent the CIA a
letter to arrange for students visiting Washington to meet with Agency
officials. The professor described the proposed meeting as "an opportunity
for the Agency to contact a group of highly motivated, intelligent, and
patriotic young men and women." 104
The editor of Counter-Spy magazine leveled one of the most sensational
charges against Agency veterans connected to ARlO, alleging in 1979 that
Cline and thirteen other Georgetown employees were still working for the
CIA..Cline lashed out at the accusation in the campus newspaper while
claiming that the magazine was "set up by Cuban intelligence, run by the
KGB (Soviet secret police) ... Where do you think they get their funds
from ?" 105 He further defended himself in a memo on the episode, saying he
had "received no compensation of any kind from CIA since [resigning in
103
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1969] except for three or four lectures given to training classes at CIA. My
total income from fees for such lectures is only a few hundred dollars spread
over several years." 106 In truth, Cline had remained in contact with the CIA
..

even though he was not on the payroll. Shortly after Admiral Stansfield
Turner succeeded George H. W. Bush as CIA director, Cline offered to assist
him. "If there is anything at all that I Can say or do to help you," Cline wrote
in March 1977, "please let me know." 107 He sent a more detailed letter about
four months later: "I wish I had an opportunity to counsel with you and your
staff with a view to supporting from outside of government the legitimate
goals of coordinated central intelligence. I have consulted your staff several
times in the past month to see if you ever have any time for sympathetic old
hands, so far with no response .... if you can think of any way in which I can
be helpful to the intelligence community, please let me know." 108
It appears that Turner never followed up on Cline's overtures. 109 Yet

there is also no question that other ARI,O members received assistance from
inside Langley. While working for the CIA's history staff in the early 1990s,
Nick Cull ather was amazed to discover that Phillips's chapter on the
Guatemal.a coup in The Night Watch had been "copied almost verbatim from a
106
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debriefing report that is still classified." 110 Assuming that Phillips did not
possess a photographic memory or steal documents from headquarters before
he retired, Cullather' s remarkable finding suggests that the president of ARlO
was actually collaborating with former friends still working at Langley in the
mid-1970s. This directly contradicts the official proclamations of both Colby
and Phillips in which they denied a relationship between Langley and the
ARlO.

CIA officials apparently had no problem leaking classified

information as long as Phillips could spin it to make them look good.
Ironically, when two authors filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request for documents on the Guatemala operation, the Agency turned them
down and ultimately prevailed in the legal battle that ensued.111 CIA lawyers
failed to disclose that at least one of the documents requested had been
published already in The Night Watch. If the information had not been
withheld from the court, it would have been far more difficult for the Agency
to win the case.
What most united the former intelligence officers was their belief that
the intelligence community needed to operate in secrecy.112 Much has been

°Cullather, 122.

11

111

Ibid.
As with any organization, it is important to emphasize that differences of
opinion sometimes surfaced within the ARlO. There was an early dispute
over Phillips's decision to. grant membership to Sam Adams, the former CIA
analyst who had tangled with the Pentagon during Vietnam. At least one
person resigned from ARlO in protest. See David Phillips to Board Members,
30 July 1976, 2, The Papers of Ray Cline, Part I: Container 7, Folder 4, Library
of Congress Manuscript Division; in addition, when the organization created
the George Bush Award to honor contributions to the intelligence
community, several members complained that the prize should have been
named after someone with a more distinguished record than Bush such as
William Donovan. For the press release announcing the George Bush Award
112
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written already about how the White House used Richard Welch's murder in
December 1975 to turn public opinion against the investigations of Senator
Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho) and Representative Otis Pike (DemocratNew York). FrederickA. 0. Schwarz, Jr., the Chief Counsel of the Church
Committee, has described it as a Machiavellian PR campaign: "They danced
on the grave of Welch. They egregiously and unfairly took advantage of the
situation. In a short-term, tactical way, they rejoiced in his death." 113 It is
important to remember that the Ford administration received assistance in
this effort from the ARlO and William Colby, who did everything in their
power to portray Welch as a fallen hero.
To commemorate the arrival of Welch's remains at Andrews Air Force
Base on the morning of December 3Q, 1975, Phillips, Colby, and about twentyeight others formed a receiving line and watched as an Air Force honor guard
escorted the casket from the C-141 transport plane to a nearby hearse.
Television crews filmed the brief ceremony, and thousands of Americans saw
the footage on the news. Perhaps the most iconic image of the event was of
Colby standing next to Welch's ex-wife and crying daughter, all three with
hand over heart. 114 The CIA organized a memorial ceremony for Welch
inside the Bubble at Langley, and although the press was not allowed to
and the resulting controversy, see The Papers of Ray Cline, Part 1: Container
7, Folder 3, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
113
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surrounding Welch's assassination, see Olmsted, 151-155; see also Scott M.
Cutlip, "Public Relations in the Government," Public Relations Review, 2
(Summer 1976): 14-15.
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attend, the Agency released detailed information about the service. It began
with the National Anthem and closed with "America The Beautiful." In
between the singing, Colby delivered a eulogy for Welch. 115 President Ford
granted a special waiver to authonze Welch's burial at Arlington Ceremony
on January 6.

The funeral, with an estimated five hundred people in

attendance, garnered national media attention. 116

"Although the Welch

family requested that reporters be barred from the chapel where the funeral
service was performed," observed Laurence Stem of the Washington Post,
"provision was made for news coverage of what the Ford administration
clearly conceived of as an important event." 117

As Senator Church

recognized, the White House carefully "stage-managed" the entire event. 118
Phillips nicely complemented the Ford administration's PR efforts. He
spoke out against the editors of Counter-Spy for disclosing the names of
American operatives, and just three days after Welch's killing, the Washington

Post ran a front page story drawn almost exclusively from information he
provided. Dan Morgan, the Post reporter, focused on Phillip's claim that
Welch had foreseen the possibility of terrorists murdering CIA officers. He
quoted Phillips several times in the article, which allowed the ARlO president
to shape the story's content. The reporter's sources portrayed Welch as a CIA
martyr, "an 'erudite' man with a mastery of classical and modem Greek,
Spanish and French," and a person who "reportedly would enliven
115
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government meetings on current topics by citing anecdotes and precedents
from ancient Greek and Roman history.;1119 Phillips described Welch, who
worked for him in the Western Hemisphere Division, as someone "who had
the potential for aiming at any position in the agency, given time and
experience." 120 Phillips later dedicated The Night Watch to Welch, and he even
based the title on a comment that Welch. made to a CIA recruit at Camp
Peary's bar: "[that intoxicated instructor is] trying to tell you that the night
watch can be lonely, but that it must be stood." 121

Phillips and his

organization would keep alive the memory of Welch, lobbying forcefully in
the years ahead for a federal law to guard against the disclosure of
intelligence officers. This effort directly contributed to the passage of the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act in 1982.
In order to tum Welch into a martyr, however, important evidence was
withheld from the American public. Kathryn Olmsted points out that the
CIA had unsuccessfully encouraged Welch to use a home in Athens that was
less conspicuous, 122 and John Prados found in his research that Welch's house
"was regularly pointed out on sightseeing tours of the Greek capital." 123 Yet
in the immediate aftermath of Welch's death, Agency officials kept secret the
warnings that they had sent. Supporters of the CIA placed blame for the
assassination on Counter-Spy, and a Washington Post article even claimed that
~thens
119
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Welch's name on November 25. Although a CIA investigation concluded the

Post story was "untrue," the Agency only released this information after a
Freedom of Information Act request forced its disclosure. 124
On January 8, 1976, two days after the Welch funeral, Times columnist
Anthony Lewis perceptively observed that the events "[were] being
manipulated in order to arouse a public backlash against legitimate criticism
[of the intelligence community]." 125 He expressed concern about the "careless
legitimizing of secrecy," predicting that President Ford and Langley would
exploit the situation "to prevent any thoroughgoing reform of the C. I. A." 126
Lewis was arguably the first person to recognize that the forces of secrecy
were turning the tide against the Congressional investigations.

These

inquiries, which initially threatened the future of the CIA, ended within four
months of Lewis's editorial. It is true that both the House and the Senate
established intelligence oversight committees, but at the same time politicians
refused to take more radical action.
In describing how Americans viewed the Agency prior to the
Congressional investigations, Jonathan Nashel offers an interesting
observation: "[t]he fact that the American public simultaneously respected,
feared, and approved of the CIA's actions until the 1970s was the result of one
of the most successful promotions undertaken by the U. S. officialdom." 127
Allen Dulles, of course, was the mastermind behind the "promotions." But if
124
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Dulles built up the Agency with PR wizardry in the 1950s, it is equally fair to
say that William Colby and David Atlee Phillips helped save the institution
two decades later using the same techniques. These men correctly perceived
that the American public had not completely lost their fascination with the
Agency despite all the ugly revelations that emerged in the mid-1970s.

It

was not accidental that Phillips intentionally evoked the legendary CIA
mystique by emphasizing the anonymous heroism of intelligence officers on
the final page of The Night Watch. "They have been in dark alleys working
hard-with some mistakes and some success-to protect those [American]
values," he observed, and then hopefully predicted: "American intelligence
will survive." 128
In retrospect, PR deserves at least part of the credit for making this
prediction come true.

378; Phillips subsequently wrote a guide on how to. start a care~r
in the intelligence field. "If we decide that covert action is wrong because it
constitutes meddling in other peoples' affairs," he said in the chapter on the
CIA, "we should re-examine not only our intelligence activities but our entire
foreign policy, our foreign aid program, and our tariff policies (to mention
only a few examples) because each of these can have a profound effect on the
internal affairs of any number of countries and very often is designed to have
just such an effect." See Phillips, Careers in Secret Operations: How to Be a
Federal Intelligence Officer (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of
America, 1984), 38.
128 Phillips,
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CHAPTERV
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, HERBERT HETU, & THE
LEGEND OF CIA OPENNESS, 1977-1981
In March 1992, William Colby provided a succinct and convincing
description of his objectives during the Congressional i.nvestigations: "I was
fighting for (a) survival of the agency, [and] (b) survival of the covert action
mission. We won both." 1 Public relations helped Colby achieve this victory,
and it would also assist his successors in their efforts to repair the CIA's
tarnished image. When Admiral Stansfield Turner became CIA director in
1977, he immediately revamped how the Agency interacted with the public.
Two years earlier Colby had shied away from using the Department of
Defense as the model for his PR campaign; citing the fallout from "The Selling
of the Pentagon" documentary on CBS, he worried the Agency might be
accused of violating the National Security Act's prohibition on domestic
activity. Given Turner's naval background, he was much more willing than
Colby to institutionalize public relations at the CIA. He recruited an outside
PR expert to establish a modern Office of Public Affairs, and between 1977
and 1981, this office developed media strategies for the Agency that are still
in use. Turner and his advisors sought to create the impression that the CIA
had learned its lessons from the intelligence scandals; that Agency officials
accepted and welcomed the newly established oversight committees; and that
the reforms were working effectively. By projecting an image of openness to
both Congress and the American public, they hoped to avoid further
1
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investigation of the intelligence community.

The PR hype served

simultaneously to obscure what was happening at the CIA in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Ironically, at the same time that Agency executives talked
publicly about their acceptance of greater openness, they worked forcefully to
undermine the Freedom of Information Act and the ability of former
intelligence officers to criticize the OA.
Agency employees distrusted Admiral Turner and the outsiders he
brought to Langley, but it immediately became clear to them that the new
policies on public relations were not open for debate. In April 1977, E. Henry
Knoche, Turner's deputy, sent his boss a packet of material titled
"Suggestions for CIA Outreach to the Public"-two pages of 'which remain
classified-that contained proposals for addressing public relations. For each
recommendation, the report's authors provided a short description, estimated
.the related costs, and assessed the idea's advantages and disadvantages. Not
only did Turner read the packet thoroughly, he also made notations at the
bottom of several pages. He approved most of the recommendations, even
offering detailed suggestions for improvement in certain cases. One of the
proposals was to provide tours of the Agency for groups from Congressional
offices that would offer politicians "the chance to look good in front of the
constituents." 2 In response to the idea that these visitors could watch "old
Agency P. R. films," Turner enthusiastically wrote: "Let's get a new one." 3

2
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He also advised that there should be an exhibit in the passageway between
the main building and the Bubble. 4
The packet contained a proposal to bring regional experts from
universities to CIA headquarters for a visit, a recommendation that had
obvious benefits for recruitment. Turner was warned that "[m]any of the
target academics have been hostile or critical of the Agency in the past, and at
least a few might well choose to make an issue of such an effort." 5 Yet despite
the potential challenges, such visits represented a tremendous opportunity:
"[t]he target academics are among the most prestigious and influential
regional experts in the United States, and in each instance where we succeed
in improving their understanding and appreciation of the intelligence process
there would be an extensive multiplier effect among both faculty and
students." 6 Similar proposals were made for think tank directors; meetings
with these officials could "identify areas in which the research of private
centers complements our own with an eye toward possible contractual
relationships in areas where they are especially well qualified." 7 In addition
to embracing the above suggestions, Turner approved a plan to participate
more extensively in career fairs at high schools and colleges. 8
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The packet on public outreach included ideas that would have
delighted David Phillips.

The Office of Public Affairs wanted to recruit a

"group of well qualified public speakers to represent the Agency at local level
speaking engagements ... throughout the country. Retired employees could
be.used for this purpose along with public personalities." 9 The proposal did
not make reference to the speaker's bureau ·that the ARlO had already
established, but it is clear that the intention was to institute a similar program
under Agency auspices. The CIA apparently no longer worried that the
project might be characterized as a domestic operation. Turner wanted to
pursue an ambitious public relations campaign, and few ideas were off limits.
His staff even proposed holding an "Open House" at Langley "advertised in
advance to which the public at large would be invited." 10 Turner, however,
ultimately decided against the plan, most likely because of concerns about "a
staged incident" and the possibility that the event could be condemned "as a
'Disneyland' approach to selling

th~

Agency's image, i.e., 'huckstering."' 11

Agency officials wanted to sell their image, but they planned on closely
guarding their tactics.
The person responsible for "selling the Agency's image" was Herbert
E. Hetu, a jovial PR man with over two decades of experience in the Navy,
who Turner would later praise for implementing "a far-reaching but carefully
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controlled plan." 12 Since public affairs at the Agency had been conducted
internally in the past, Hetu's arrival proved somewhat controversial at first,
especially since he reported directly to Turner and received the title
"Assistant to the Director." Hetu recalled in a 1984 interview that he joked
privately about looking underneath his car for explosive devices before
driving to Langley in the morning: "going in there perceived as the guy who
was going to let the press in, open the windows ... oh boy, [there was] a lot
of hostility." 13
During a series of interviews in 1996, Hetu explained that his
introduction to public relations began while serving as a deck officer on the

USS Salem. The Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean sustained extensive
damage in August 1953 after several earthquakes hit, and the Salem provided
emergency assistance to the disaster victims. Hetu, the assistant public affairs
officer on the cruiser, submitted reports on the situation that were used in
newspaper accounts of the tragedy. Time even printed a quote from one of
Hetu's dispatches. 14 After completing his tour on the Salem, the Navy
selected him to run the magazine and book division of the Office of
Information where he soon became a protege of Pickett Lumpkin. Hetu
12
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described Lumpkin as a member of the "40 Thieves," the moniker given to
the founding fathers of the Navy's PR apparatus in the early Cold War
years. 15 Hetu fondly remembered the advice that Lumpkin bestowed on
junior officers before sending them to meet with a reporter: "Write the music
and play him like a violin." 16 Lumpkin made it perfectly clear that the
objective of PR officers in the Navy was to emphasize the positive and
downplay the negative. This might sound like government propaganda, but
Hetu perceived it differently: "We were always trying to think about telling
the good side of the Navy. I suppose that's, in the classic of the definition,
propaganda in a way, but [it was] not propaganda in that we didn't
manipulate the message to be untrue or to say something that wasn't
honorable or truthful." 17
Yet the evidence indicates that that the Navy did "manipulate the
message" on several occasions. In fact, Hetu was directly connected to the
two most important books published about Vietnam during the 1950s. While
running the magazine and book division, he arranged for Admiral Arleigh A.
Burke, then Chief of Naval Operations, to write the foreword for Tom
15

As Hetu explained the term, "those were the first people after World War II
who, when the Navy decided to make public information a specialty, a
separate designator, 1650, 1655, these were the first 40 people. People now
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Ibid., 67.
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Dooley's Deliver Us from Evil. He also helped organize a national tour to
promote the book. Seth Jacobs, author of America's Miracle Man In Vietnam;
observes that "Deliver Us from Evil was a brilliant work of cold war
propaganda in which the communist enemy was irredeemably evil and the
Americans and their South Vietnamese allies were virtue incarnate." 18
Dooley, a Navy doctor in Vietnam, ultimately became a PR liability when, in
Hetu's words, "[t]hey found out that he and his sailors were running more
than a dispensary ... /' 19 After discovering Dooley's homosexuality, Hetu
admitted, the Navy forced him to resign.
Hetu left the magazine and book branch in 1956 and spent the next
three years with the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. He briefly shared an office there
with William Lederer, who was in the process of co-authoring The Ugly

American with Eugene Burdick. The novel, which was published in 1958,
inspired countless Americans to more aggressively confront communism in
the Third World, most notably in Southeast Asia. "Few books have had
greater influence on American popular and elite opinion," argues Jacobs.2°
Since Lederer asked Hetu for feedback on drafts, the young public affairs
18
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officer had the opportunity to "read the book as it came out of the
typewriter." 21 During his tour of duty in Hawaii, Hetu received another
interesting job when asked to be the location scout and technical adviser for
the movie South Pacific (1958).22 He subsequently served a year in Hollywood
using his PR skills to convince producers to portray "the Navy in a good
light." 23 Hetu and his PR colleagues actually collaborated with writers to
achieve this objective, even developing the entire plotline for an episode of
"The Real McCoys." He believed that their efforts improved perceptions of
the Navy: "Some people would think it was a waste of time, but the McCoys
then had a . . . big audience . . . they were one of the top shows. We said
something about the Navy to those people and that's what we were trying to
do."24

With the guidance of Pickett Lumpkin, Hetu learned how to persuade
reporters and producers to focus on the Navy's best attributes. During the
~ 960s,

however, he also became a pioneer in the field of crisis public relations.

In April1963, the USS Thresher sank off the coast off Massachusetts, and CBS

soon informed the Navy that they had plans for an hour-long program on the
loss of the nuclear submarine. Navy officials initially wanted nothing to do
with the documentary, but the PR experts convinced their superiors that it
was possible to "at least get a positive spin on the story ...." if they provided

21
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assistance to CBS producers.25 By getting involved with the project, Hetu
discovered, "[w]e were able to turn the thing around." 26
Hetu pursued his interest in crisis PR at Boston University by writing a
master's thesis on peacetime naval disasters. He stressed the importance of
disaster plans in the thesis: "The single most important conclusion of this
study is that the success or failure of public relations in a naval disaster is the
result of detailed preparation and planning, or the lack of it." 27 Hetu outlined
strategies for dealing with the media in the aftermath of a tragedy, including
a comprehensive "do" and "don't" list. "Be alert to positive stories which
may develop such as the heroic work of relief workers, [and the] number of
d,octors and nurses working to treat survivors," he advised. 28 In June 1969,
after the USS Frank E. Evans was sliced into two pieces by an Australian
aircraft carrier during a naval exercise, Hetu applied his theories to handle
the crisis. He coached the survivors on the most effective way to deal with
the media: "If you do w~nt to tell stories, from what I've heard just talking to
som,e of you guys, there's some real_ heroics that went on, people helping
pe()ple out [in] the dark, out in the middle of the night. . People helping other
pe()ple off the ship and in the water ... And those stories, you can't tell
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(master's thesis, Boston University, School of Public Communication,
Division of Public Relations, August 1965), 108; he also observed: "it becomes
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important. When disaster strike_s, the organizations which have planned to
meet the informational requirements are the ones which most effectively
survive public scrutiny. Perhaps the two mc;>st important words to remember
in a disaster situation are-Planning and Candor." Ibid., 50.
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enough of those." 29 He obviously hoped that these insbuctions would shift
news coverage away from the mistakes that caused the tragedy and towards
the heroisrn of Navy survivors.
Given Hetu's expertise on crisis public relations, he was a perfect
match for the CIA in 1977. He had warned in his thesis about the dangers of
cutting ties to the media when confronted with a tragedy. Hetu understood
that this was an understandable psychological response to a traumatic
situation, but nevertheless, he concluded that isolation only made matters
worse. 30 He argued that the media was an indispensable ally in repairing the
image of an institution under attack. Colby had previously attempted to regain the bust of reporters, but his understanding ofPR was limited. Hetu, on
the other hand, knew how to handle tough questions without giving the
appearance of stonewalling. "I had a standing order in my office," he
explained, "[w]e never said, 'No Comment.' I thought it was important, even
if we couldn't comment, to tell the reporter why .... " 31 While Hetu was in

charge of CIA public affairs, journalists frequently contacted him to discuss
stories that they were preparing. He listened to their information, provided
assistance if possible, and made sure that the names of covert operatives did
29

The Reminiscences of Captain Herbert E. Hetu U. S. Navy (Retired), 229; in April
1969, when North Korea attacked an EC-121 spy plane, Hetu had managed
the.PR response for the Navy. Ibid., 209-214.
30
"If the P.l. 0. [Public Information Officer] can establish himself as an ally of
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constructive manner," he observed. Hetu, "Public Relations During
Peacetime Naval Disaster," 18.
31
Hetu quoted in Edmunds, B3; see also Turner, 105; "We are trying a new
openness policy," said Hetu, "[w]e want advice on how better to serve the
media." Robert Green, "New CIA Image," Manila Bulletin, 27 October 1977,
CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park,
Maryland).
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not get revealed accidentally. 32 If the media needed a favor, Hetu was more
than willing to help. For example, when Time magazine asked the CIA to
participate .in an event that they were hosting for European businessmen, he
helped set up a meeting for them with Turner in October 1977.33
Hetu also moved quickly to combat unexpected PR problems. In
November 1977, CIA officer Paul Chretien spoke at a high school, and in
addressing concerns about the MKULTRA experiments, he criticized the
program but defended its underlying objective, observing that "[i]f you could
control the mind of (Soviet Premier Leonid) Brehznev it could be useful." 34
Displeased with the incident, Hetu sent a memo to the Deputy Director for
Administration in which he complained that Chretien was "meeting with the
public on a regular basis with little or no guidance from, or contact with this
office .... I am really concerned that Paul may get himself or the Agency
inadvertently into some serious difficulties by trying to field questions such
as the ones described in this article." 35 He emphasized the necessity of
coordinating all public appearances through his office to prevent PR gaffes.
Rather than obsessing about minor mishaps, however, Hetu focused
on larger objectives. He developed plans for CBS to film a "Who's Who"
32

Edmunds, B3.
Hugh Sidey and John L. Steele to Admiral Turner, 9 August 1977, CIA
Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, Maryland);
Herbert E. Hetu to Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, "Briefing
of TIME-Sponsored Tour of Western European Industrialists," 25 August
l977, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park,
Maryland).
34 Leonard Levitt, "CIA Visits Glen Coye," Newsday, CIA Records Search Tool
(CREST), National Archives II (College Park, Maryland).
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Herbert E. Hetu to Acting Deputy Director for Administration, "Public
Briefings," 29 November 1977, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National
Archives II (College Park, Maryland).
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segment inside Langley shortly after joining the CIA, and not surprisingly, he
had to overcome the skepticism of some Agency employees. One official
worried that Dan Rather might "air his own personal views

a~out

CIA and

the Intelligence Community" during the show, 36 while Robert Gambino, the
CIA's Director of Security, expressed concern that permitting "CBS to film
thjs program would be setting a precedent which has unknown future
37
complications."
Gambino requested. that CBS producers
allow the Agency
.
.
'

to view the footage to ensure that employees in classified positions did not
appear on screen.
Even though he acknowledged the risks involved, Hetu advised
Turner that CIA officials could "positively impress [Dan] Rather and realize
an overall good show." 38 The CBS visit represented an excellent opportunity
for the Agency to receive positive media publicity, and it would be, in effect,
a preemptive strike against those who continued to criticize the culture of
secrecyat Langley.

"If we don't open our doors under our own terms, we

could be forced to do so by external pressures (Congress, White House,
media, public opinion, etc.)," wrote Hetu. "I think it better to move in the
direction of openness voluntarily and in an orderly fashion. We may as well
get credit for opening our own doors and enjoy the credibility that goes with

36
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such a decision." 39

Breaking with .long-standing Agency fears about

outsiders, Turner signed off on the project.
Hetu' s "openness" initiative was an image-making operation and
nothing more; when he spoke about "opening our own doors," he was not
signaling the end of Langley's obsession with secrecy. He. wanted to protect
the Agency's mystiqu~, but he also hoped to draw the public's attention away
fr.om the scandals that had occupied the headlines just a few years earlier. In
the summer of 1977, Hetu began collaborating with ABC's "Good Morning
America" on a program devoted to the thirtieth anniversary of the CIA.' The
two-hour show, which aired on September 19, 1977, contained short segments
on the Agency that had been formulated in consultation with Hetu and his
PR staff. In addition to "a live interview with the DCI at the ABC studio in
Washington," there were proposals to feature the following aspects of the
CIA:
the automated cartography program; the Headquarters
Library facilities; the recruitment process employed in
hiring employees for several diverse positions; preparation
of analytical material on such issues as Soviet economy,
PRC [People's Republic of China] oil, weather and ecology;
the Operations Center; the support activities of the
[Oir~ctorate of Administrationj; and various aspects of
security-bum baskets, safes, and vaults.40
"[W]e will have no control over the narrative or story content," Hetu
acknowh~dged to Turner, "[b]ut I am confident that, as in the case of [the CBS

show], the product will sell itsel£." 41
391bid., 1.
Herbert E. Hetu, Memorandumfor the Record, "Second Meeting with ABC
GOOD MORNING AMERICA Representatives," 4 August 1977, Document
No. CK3100202459, Declassified Documents Reference System [hereafter cited
as DDRS] (Declassified, 11 April1985).
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Part of Hetu' s confidence stemmed from the fact that his cooperation
':Vith ABC made it unlikely that "Good Morning America" would deviate
from the script at the last minute. In fact, the only uncertainty would be the
questions directed at Turner during the broadcast.

After receiving the

authorization to move forward with the project, Hetu made arrangements for
ABC to shoot four segments at Langley on a Saturday. He knew in advance
which topics the producers had selected from the list created in early August,
informing the Acting Deputy Director that the camera crew would be filming
"a walking tour of the building" as well as features on security procedures,
cartography, and employee recruitment. 42

Then, on the morning of

September 19, "Good Morning America" conducted a live interview with
Turner at 2430 E Street, the landmark building that had housed the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II and the CIA between 1947 and
the early 1960s. Although it is unclear who made the decision to use 2430 E
Street instead of the studio at ABC, the new location was a vivid reminder of
the mystique that developed around the CIA in the early years of the Cold
War. William Donovan, the legendary OSS chief, and several CIA directors
had used the office where the interview took place. 43
41

Herbert E. Hetu to Turner, "ABC- 'Good Morning America,"' 10 August
1977DocumentNo. CK3100202460/CK3100202461, DDRS (Declassified, 11
April1985), 1.
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Herbert E. Hetu to Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, "ABC
GOOD MORNING AMERICA," 24 August 1977, Document No.
CK3100202462, DDRS (Declassified, 11 April1985).
43
Herbert E. Hetu to Turner, "GOOD MORNING AMERICA Program," 16
September 1977, Document No. CK3100202463/ CK3100202464, DDRS; Hetu
provided Turner with a briefing book to help prepare for the show, and they
<;onducted a walk through of 2430 E Street the day before the interview. He
also offered advice on how to dress: "I suggest you wear a light-weight, dark
colored summer suit and a loose-fitting, comfortable shirt. You might
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Since the CIA continues to withhold records on Hetu's tenure at the
CIA, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of his overall strategy.
However, the statistics for 1979 are revealing. That year public affairs
scheduled about thirty speaking engagements for Agency officials; provided
tours of Langley for over forty groups; and conducted 139 press briefings. 44
In October 1980, Acting CIA Director Frank Carlucci nominated Hetu and his
office for a Congressional public service award,. praising them for developing
programs that "resulted in an overwhelmingly favorable reaction from a
greatly enlightened and supportive segment of the American public." 45
Carlucci explained that the Office of Public Affairs had helped implement "a
new policy dedicated to the belief that a well-infprmed and supportive public
is essential to the fulfillment of the Agency's mission, and that the public has
a right to know as much as possible about the role of intelligence and the
responsibilities of CIA." 46 He emphasized, however, that the public's right to
know did not extend to CIA secrets. From his perspective, "[t]he new policy
[of openness] had a vital counterpoint: secrets essential to an effective
consider bringing an additional shirt of the same color on a hanger to change
during one of the lengthy film segments." Ibid., 2; for related documents on
the "Good Morning America" program, see Sonya Selby-Wright to Hetu, 28
June 1977, Document No. CK3100202458, DDRS (Declassified, 11 April1985);
Sonya Selby-Wrightto Hetu, 29 September 19771 Document N<;>.
CK3100202552, DDRS (DeClassified, 11 April 1985); and David Hartman to
Hetu, 3 October 1977, Document No. CK31002025S3, DDRS (Declassified, 11
April1985).
44
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14 October 1980, 2-3, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II
(College Park, Maryland).
· ·
45
Frank Carlucci to Incentive Awards Branch, Office of Personnel
Management, 14 October 1980, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National
Archives II (College Par~ Maryland).
46
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intell~gence organization must be protec~ed at all costs." 47

Informing

American_s of the need for secrecy was "a major objective" of Hetu's office.48
In other words, CIA officials believed that PR could be exploited to tutor the
public about the positive aspects ofsecrecy. In the briefing book that Hetu
assembled to prepare Turner for the "Good Morning America" interview in
1977, for instance, he advised his boss to argue that there was "[m]ore
openness with greater secrecy." 49
Despite Hetu's concerted effort to spin the American public, of course,
there was a fundamental incompatibility between openness and secrecy. The
rhetoric of openness diverted attention from the real strategy of the CIA
during the late 1970s. Rather than working to reform the culture of secrecy at
Langley, Agency officials were actually attempting to re-invigorate it. The
former CIA officers who published memoirs critical of the intelligence
establishment were directly threatening this entrenched culture. Patrick
McGarvey, Victor Marchetti, and Philip Agee differed significantly in their
motives and methods, but they all accused the CIA of using secrecy to hide
evidence of incompetence and malfeasance.

In responding to these

unprecedented exposes, CIA officials viewed the Publications Review Board
(PRB) as a convenient tool to re-assert control over disgruntled intelligence
officers. George H. W. Bush had created the PRB in June 1976 "to review
nonofficial writings of current employees," but as Stansfield Turner took over

~7

Ibid., 2.
Ibid.
49
"ABC GOOD MORNING A:tv1ERICA 19 SEPTEMBER 1977," Briefing book
prepared by Public Affairs Office for Admiral Turner, Document No.
CK3100202484-CK3100202532, DDRS (Declassified, 11 April1985), Tab E, 2.
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at the CIA in early 1977, the board received a much broader mandate. 50 In
addition to examining the writings of individuals still on the Agency payroll,
the PRB now had the power to inspect anything written by former personnel.
Given the board's responsibility for protecting classified information, one
might expect that the person chosen to supervise it would have been an
Agency veteran, someone with the years of operational experience necessary
to determine what information could conceivably threaten intelligence
sources and methods. But the man selected as the chairperson of the PRB was
none other than Herbert Hetu, the head of public affairs at Langley.
During the years that Hetu chaired the PRB, the board received a wide
range of submissions, from articles and books to speeches and editorials. The
annual number of PRB reviews increased from 42 in 1977 to 148 three years
later. 51 Hetu informed a Congressional subcommittee in 1980 that the
members of the PRB "consider ourselves negotiators. We often sit down with
authors and work out the differences. In other words, it is not an arbitrary,
cold-blooded process." 52 Hetu said that the board objectively evaluated each
item submitted without taking into consideration the author's opinions of the
Agency, asserting that defenders of the CIA and its critics received equal
treatment. Observers of the PRB, however, have accused the board of more
50

Charles A. Briggs to Deputy Director for Administration, "Inspection
Report of the Office of Public Affairs" [July 1981], Chapter V, "The
Publications Review Board," 2. CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National
Archives II (College Park. Maryland).
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Ibid., 5. Between 1977 and June 4, 1981, there were 420 submissions to the
PRB. 360 were described as "non-fiction," while the remaining 60 were
categorized as "fiction." Ibid.
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~ U.S. House of Representatives, Subco:rp.mittee on Oversight, Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Prepublication Review and Secrecy Agreements,
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readily approving the submissions of A&ency loyalists. "While it gave the
appearance of an orderly, even-handed approach," charges Angus
Mackenzie, "its purpose was to increase the CIA's ability to censor the
writings and speeches of CIA officers." 53 Congressman Les Aspin (DemocratWisconsin) offered a similar analysis of the PRB in 1980,

callin~

it "a very

arbitrary and capricious system." 54
In an internal assessment of the Office of Public Affairs written in 1981,

the CIA's Inspector General found only two recorded complaints against the
board. One person had appealed a PRB ruling to the deputy director, while
another had filed a lawsuit.55 The report did not disclose the percentage of
submissions modified by the PRB during the review process; however, it did
reveal that members of the board attempted "not only to delete specific
classified items but to recast entire passages and segments of manuscripts
that the DO [Directorate of Operations] considers damaging." 56 Although the
Inspector General never explained how the Agency defined "damaging," one
suspects that there was an overarching concern about potentially
embarrassing information.
In November 1977, less than a year after Hetu became the PRB's
chairperson, the CIA discovered a critical flaw in the review system when
53
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Frank Snepp published Decent Interval. Snepp, a· CIA officer who had
witnessed the fall of Saigon in 1975, decided to violate the Agency secrecy
a~eement by not submitting his book to the board. While Philip Agee had

,hoped to stop ~overt operations, Snepp had entirely different objectives. He
accused the CIA of betraying agent~ in South Vietnai?, leaving hundreds of
them behind and failing to destroy classified documents that revealed the
identities of several informants. Snepp vehemently condemned the Saigon
withdrawal: "It is not too much to say that in terms of squandered lives,
blown secrets and the betrayal of agents, friends and collaborators, our
handling of the evacuation was an institutional disgrace. Not since the
abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 had the agency put so much on the line,
and lost it through stupidity and mismanagement."57
The following· February the CIA initiated a landmark lawsuit against
Snepp.58 Rather than claiming that the former CIA officer had disclosed
classified material, Agency lawyers 'focused instead on Snepp' s violation of
his secrecy agreement. Judge "Roarin" Oren Lewis ruled against Snepp in a
bench trial that was far from impartial. Fred Barbash of the Washington Post
observed that the outcome was hardly a surprise, since "[t]hroughout the 1
1 I 2-day-long non-jury trial, [Judge] Lewis had made little effort to conceal his
57
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personal view of what Snepp, whom he generally referred to as 'Shepp,' had
done, lecturing him angrily when he took the stand and saying at one point
that 'it won't make any difference' what the evidence is."59 Lewis ordered
Snepp to tum over all profits from Decent Interval to the federal government.
Although an appeals court concluded in March 1979 that Snepp had indeed
~qlated

the secrecy contract, they overturned most of Lewis's decision. 60 But

in February 1980, the Supreme Court upheld the original verdict without
bothering to hear oral arguments. 61 Some attributed the 6-3 decision, one of
the most reckless ever issued, to an expose of the Court that Bob Woodward
and Scott Armstrong had recently published. Not only did the Court rule in
favor of the Agency, they described the CIA as "essential to the security of the
United States and-in a sense--the Free World." 62
As a result of the Supreme Court's judgment, Snepp would ultimately
forfeit over $140,000 dollars. The decision was an undeniable victory for the
culture of secrecy and a massive defeat for the advocates of openness. After
the

PR~

received the high court's sanction, Turner wasted little time in

pursuing John Stockwell, who had refused to submit his scathing account of
the Agency's covert operation in Angola to the board. This operation had
59
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occurred at the height of the Congressional investigations. 63 Turner, however,
did not target all former CIA officials in violation of the secrecy agreement.
Even though. the Agency discovered that the French edition of William
Colby's Honorable ly1en was not submitted to the PRB before its publication,
the former CIA director received no punishment and was allowed to the keep
the money he earned from his memoirs. Colby, unlike Snepp, had even
revealed classified information.64 Nothing happened either to Cord Meyer,
who had started a second career as a syndicated columnist. Hetu attempted
to convince Meyer to allow the PRB the opportunity to review his columns,
but according to the findings of the Inspector General, Meyer refused,
"insisting that as a journalist he writes only his opinions of current
devel9pments in foreign affairs without discussing operations or other
activities which he kno}VS about as a former Agency officer." 65 The Inspector
General discovered "that some believe that Meyer has maintained close ties
with still active former colleagues and periodically visits Agency
Headquarters .... " 66 Despite the evidence that Meyer was possibly receiving
insider information, the CIA did not take him to court.

"We have less

concern that Mr. Meyer would deliberately reveal a secret or would

63 "Third Ex-C.I.A. Agent Sued by U.S. for Profits," New York Times, 4 M~ch
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deliberately do harm," Agency lawyer Ernest Mayerfeld explained in
congressional testimony. 67
Mayerfeld came close to admitting that there were two sets of
guidelines. Agency supporters_ like Colby and Meyer would be forgiven for
clear violations of. the secrecy agreement,
while Snepp, Stockwell, and other
.
.

CIA critics received no such .mercy .. In the aftermath· of the Snepp ruling, the
.

PRB wielded its authority even more subjectively than before .. Wilbur
Eveland, a former National Security Council employee who had assisted CIA
covert operations in the Middle East during the 1950s, had recently finished a
manuscript about these activities when he learned of the Snepp verdict.
Eveland had been secretly assigned to Allen Dulles in 1955 and participated
in a covert CIA mission to undermine the government of Syria. After
contacting the CIA to determine if he had signed a secrecy agreement, a CIA
lawyer informed him in March 1980 that since the contract was "contained in
a document which is currently properly classified, I am not at liberty at this
time to forward it to you." 68 Eveland knew that he had not signed any
contract prior to September 1957, so he balked at the CIA's demand to.review
the entire manuscript. "I'm sure as hell not going to let you get into anything
before I signed the agreement [in 1957]," he declared. 69
67
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The CIA's pettiness was on display again a few months later when the
PRB analyzed a novel that Snepp had written. Snepp had included the
identities of actual CIA operatives in the book, and the board instructed him
to-remove one of these names in early July. The PRB, however, apparently
forgot that they had permitted David Phillips to identify the same person in
The Night Watch. "That gives you an idea of how good the clearance process

is," Snepp wryly observed, "[t]hey'd allowed one of their 'good old boys' to
release a name and now they were trying to get me to help squeeze the
toothpaste back in the tube." 70 He would ultimately remove the name from
the book, but not before chastising the PRB for the inconsistencies of its
reviews: "I have gone to great leng~s to avoid exposing a secret, a name or
an intelligence source whose confidentiality is crucial to the effective
functioning of our intelligence services. Although your own review staff has
shown itself to be somewhat less diligent, I will not violate my own moral
responsibility ." 71
The PRB reacted with even greater hostility to a manuscript Ralph
McGehee submitted one week after the Supreme Court ruled against Snepp,
demanding that he delete 397 items.

When he protested these deletions,

Agency officials were less than gracious. "It's too bad you didn't work for the
Israeli intelligence service," he was told. "They know how to deal with

Eveland reluctantly agreed to sign a secrecy pledge in December 1982. Ibid.,
131.
70
Snepp quoted in George Lardner, Jr., "CIA to Snepp: Delete Name of
(Known) Agent in Novel," Washington Post, 14 July 1980, All.
71
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people like you. They'd take you out and shoot you." 72 The CIA reviewers
took issue with his discussion of Langley's liaison arrangements with
Thailand even though McGehee could demonstrate the "relationship was so
well known that books had been written about it, academic studies discussed
it, pictures of CIA station chiefs appeared in the Thai press, and high-level
Thai officials openly bragged in the media about CIA support for their
organizations." 73
Another PRB deletion pertained to McGehee's criticism "of the
Agency's long-term operations against mainland China." 74 McGehee quickly
pointed out that they previously cleared Peer de Silva's Sub Rosa. De Silva, an
Agency supporter who had once headed the CIA station in Hong Kong, had
criticized the operations as well. 75 The board initially reversed their decision,
but then the China Division of the Directorate of Operations developed an
entirely different justification for blocking the undesired commentary on their
past failures, alleging that the

manusc~pt

divulged a technique associated

with CIA methods. "That technique,,recruiting persons from the other side,
was just slightly newer and less well known than prostitution," argued
McGehee. 76

The PRB backed down when McGehee demonstrated that

Agency defenders such as Phillips revealed extensive information about

"Bob~' quoted in Ralph W. McGehee, Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA
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recruitment techniques in their writings. 77 Based on his experiences with
Hetu' s board, McGehee believed that the double standard was self-evident:
The PRB, taking its responsibilities seriously, labels just
about everything secret until an author who is critical of
the Agency can prove this not to be the case. But the
situation for ex-employees who are advocates of the OA
is the opposite. They are given almost carte blanche to
discuss operations and techniques, and in some instances
they are assisted in the research and writing of their works?8
Moreover, he contended that the board wanted to protect the CIA's image
even in cases where there was no legitimate reason for withholding material.
"Agency officials show no hesitation in trying to censor embarrassing, critical,
or merely annoying information," he wamed.79
While the PRB made it increasingly difficult for current and former
employees to criticize the Agency, there was a simultaneous effort to combat
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The CIA and other members of the
intelligence community had been largely exempt from the FOIA, which
President Lyndon Johnson had gru9gingly signed in 1966, until Congress
passed an amendment to the law that took effect in early 1975.80 This
amendment, inspired in part by the Watergate scandal, made it possible for
requestors to gain access to Agency records, but the OA could still withhold
docun:tents for a long list of reasons. When speaking

pub~icly,

CIA officials

went so far as to cite the FOIA amendment as evidence of the new era of
openness and accountability at Langley. In 1977 Acting CIA Director John F.
77
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Blake, who also chaired the CIA committee in charge of complying with the
new law, told a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the
legal changes "constituted a somewhat traumatic experience" for the
Agency. 81

At the same time, however, Blake proudly· reported: "[m]y

colleagues have worked very hard during these past 30 months to make the
~ct

work according to the letter and spirit. We have been able to make the

necessary adjustments. I am pleased to report that, in fact, I think the Agency
is better off for it [the 1974 FOIA amendment]." 82
Sadly, Blake's optimistic testimony did not accurately reflect what was
happening behind closed doors at Langley. In reality, as an ACLU lawyer
explained in 1984, the Agency hierarc~y "developed a siege mentality toward
the public and the FOIA" in the 1970s.83 About fifteen months after he gave
the impression that the CIA had benefited from the increasing number of
FOIA requests, Blake, then Deputy Director for Administration, forwarded a
report on the FOIA and Privacy Act to Deputy Director Carlucci. The study
indicated that there was a backlog of 2,700 FOIA requests, that around
seventy full-time CIA employees were needed to respond to those inquiries,
81
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and that the Agency spent nearly $2.4 million dollars in 1977 on FOIA
processirig. 84 Rather than outlining the benefits of the FOIA to researchers, it
referred to "the burden imposed on the CIA ...." 85 Thus, the author of the
report informed his superiors that "a good case could be made for total
exemption from the Act, or, if that is impossible, partial relief." 86 While he
warned that there would be opposition to such an exemption, the official
argued "that all of our old 'dirty linen' has by now been thoroughly exposed
to public scrutiny. The public's interest in preventing future abuses or
illegalities by U. S. intelligence organizations will be adequately served by the
elaborate oversight mechanisms that have been established in the Agency, the
Intelligence Community, the White House, and the Congress." 87 In referring
to the increased oversight of the intelligence establishment, the report came
clo~e

84

to describing the FOIA as a wasteful redundancy.

"There is no

John F. Blake to DDCI, "IPS Report on Impact of the FOIA and Privacy
Act/' 6 December 1978, 7, 10, 11, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National
Archives II (College Park, Maryland); CIA officials blamed the extensive
backlog of FOIA cases on the Agency's records management system. David
Wise has vividly shown the limitations of these firewalls in his study of
Aldrich Ames, the CIA turncoat arrested in 1994. "On June 13, 1985, in his
fourth-floor office, Ames wrapped up between five and seven pounds of
Cqble traffic and other secret docu.ments in plastic bags, took the elevator
down, and pushed his laminated ID card into the turnstiles that block the
exits from headquarters .... No guard asked to look inside the plasti~ bags."
Wise, Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million
(New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 118.
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John F. Blake to DDCI, "IPS Report on Impact of the FOIA and Privacy
Act," 6 December 1978, 15. "While we take no issue with the concept that the
American public has a right to know what its Government is doing," the
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compelling need . . . for the Freedom of Information Act to be a means of
monitoring Agency activities," it concluded. 88
Although there is no question that CIA officials wanted to press for
exemptions to the FOIA, they recognized that lingering memories· of the
"Year of Intelligence" would make politicians reluctant to assist them. In fact,
the author of the 1978 FOIA study acknowledged "that the prospects for
obtaining relief th[r]ough amendments to the Freedom of Information Act are
not bright." 89 Instead of abiding by the law and opening their files in response
to FOIA requests, the CIA adopted unethical tactics to thwart these inquiries.
John Stockwell, the CIA officer who served in Angola, disclosed in his
memoirs the existence of "blind" memos. These documents were not even
allowed into the filing system, and as a result, "the inner-most records of the
war [in Angola] would forever be immune to any Freedom of Information
Act disclosures, or congressional investigation. Technically they did not
exist: legally they could be destroyed at any time." 90 Stockwell asserted that
the tactics used by the Africa Division were directly connected to concerns
about the FOIA:

"Since the Freedom of Information Act, the agency

increasingly uses a system of 'soft,' 'unofficial,' or 'convenience' files for
sensitive subjects, especially any involving surveillance of. Americans. Such
files are not registered in. the agency's official records system, and hence can
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never be disclosed under the FOIA." 91 (Interestingly, Blake revealed that the
CIA did indeed use "soft files" in his 1977 testimony. 92)
At the same time Admiral Turner publicly talked about the CIA's
greater openness, his deputy was quietly attempting to undercut the new
FOIA l)tatute. Carlucci began to lobby Congress for broad relief from the
FOIA in April1979. In order to downplay concerns about civil liberties, the
CIA said that it did not want to eliminate the ability of individuals to file firstperson requests to determine if they had been subjected to Agency
surveillance or experimentation. The Agency would also allow people to
submit FOIA requests for completed intelligence reports prepared by the
Directorate of Intelligence. In

essence~

Carlucci argued that all of the so-

called operational files should be placed off limits to the FOIA. After Carlucci
shared his concerns with Congress, Representative Robert McOory
(Republican--Illinois) drafted H~R. ?129, a bill that used "language which
[was] all but identical to [the CIA's]." 93
Carlucci, unsuccessful in 1979, appeared in front of a subcommittee of
the House Committee on Government Operations the following February to
continue his support for the proposed exemptions, offering a variety of
reasons why Congress should allow the CIA to more easily reject FOIA
requests. He told the members of the subcommittee about the backlog of
2,700 cases, and he claimed that requests for operational material inevitably
91
92

93
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forced Agency personnel to search through mountains of documents that
they ultimately could not release. 94 Such processing wasted time and money,
argued Carlucci, and the backlog could be substantially reduced if the CIA
was allowed to simply deny any request for operational files at the outset.
Even though the CIA's own study of the FOIA had acknowledged that the
risk of accidentally releasing classified information in response to a request
was minimal, Carlucci warned about the dangers of human error. If the
FOIA processors made a minor mistake, an enemy of the United States might
be given the final clue needed to damage national security-a concern known
as the mosaic theory.95 The deputy director even suggested: "there still exists
the very real possibility that an orchestrated effort by persons hostile to the
Agency could literally swamp the Agency with FOIA requests." 96 By covertly
inundating the Agency with FOIA letters, in other words, the communists
could potentially cripple the intelligence establishment. This argument was
~hockingly

duplicitous. The CIA report forwarded to Carlucci for his review

had concluded that there was no evidence that the Soviet Union or China had
filed any FOIA requests. 97
Carlucci focused extensively <;>n the alleged difficulty of convincing
potential

intellige~ce

assets and foreign governments that they could share

secrets with the Agency._ He claimed there had been situations "where agents
have cited the FOIA as the reason for unwillingness to either cooperate
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initially, [to] continue to cooperate, or [to] cooperate as fully as in the past." 98
Carlucci admitted that the Agency ha:d the complete power to protect secrets
under the existing laws, but he believed that foreigners "have· ·an entirely
different perception:" 99 Although he recognized that there were reasons other
than the FOIA that might explain why agents were reluctant to turn over
information to the CIA, he described the Act as an important "symbol" of the
problem. 100

He was essentially asking Congress to grant the CIA an

exemption to correct a problem that did not exist. Perhaps even more
troubling, Carlucci denied that the FOIA should contribute to the oversight of
the Agency. The internal safeguards within the intelligence community and
the designated committees in Congress were responsible for holding the CIA
accountable, "not ... 73,000 foreign and American FOIA requesters ...." 101
. Several representatives on the subcommittee responded

skep~cally

to

Carlucci's testimony. Congressman John Erlenborn (Republican-Illinois)
wondered. why the Agency "wanted relief from a misperception." 102 When
Congressman Peter Kostmayer (Democrat-Pennsylvania) further pressed
Carlucci on this point, he offered an Alice and Wonderland reply: "I think
98
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historian Lloyd Gardner questioned Carlucci's accusation that foreign
governments had expressed concern about the FOIA, noting that the State
Department had encouraged countries to complain during the controversy
over the Pentagon Papers. The objective, of course, was to manufacture
protest that would help justify the government's position in its case against
Daniel Ellsberg. He implied that the CIA might have used similar tactics to
build support for restricting the FOIA. Interestingly, the revelations about the
State Department resulted from a FOIA request filed by a student of Walter
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that we.have to base this decision on the reality in which we live, and the
world of perceptions in the intelligence business is the world of reality." 103
Later in the hearing, Koshnayer expressed concern that changing the current
law might make it easier for the CIA to withhold information on illegal
operations, observing that "the record of the Central Intelligence Agency
leaves a great deal to be desired in terms of upholding the law." 104 This
comment led to a testy exchange:
CARLUCCI: Mr. Koshnayer, you are posing hypothetical
upon hypothetical based on an assumption that nobody
in the CIA is an honorable person, and I frankly cannot
accept that.
KOSTMAYER: I am not suggesting that, and you are basing
part of your testimony on assertions which you acknowledge
are not valid, so I do not think you are in a position to
criticize my hypothesis. 105
Carlucci also faced tough questioning from other members of the
subcommittee. Father Robert Drinan, a Democratic Congressman from
Massachusetts, drew attention to the fact that the Agency had a perfect record
in FOIA litigation, and Congressman Ted Weiss (Democrat-New York) was
apprehensive about the lack of judicial review. 106 Weiss recognized that if the
CIA received an operational files exemption, a judge would be obligated to
reject all appeals from FOIA requesters any time the CIA claimed that the
relevant documents were considered operational in nature.

Like

Congressman Koshnayer, Weiss forcefully reminded Carlucci that Congress
had every reason to be suspicious of the promises made by CIA officials.
103
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"[T]he gentlemen who preceded you .... were thought to be every bit as high
minded, and noble, and patriotic American citizens as you are, and yet all
kinds of terrible things happened during their directorships," he declared,
"and I think the reason for our concerns-the reason for FOIA-is that ....
terrible things can happen, and that is why we need the protections of the
law." 107
.When the hearings on the proposed exemptions resumed three months
later, the ACLU, historians, and other groups stepped forward to block the
legislation. The Center for National Security Studies (CNSS), a division of the
ACLU, submitted a detailed report that provided a point-by-point refutation
of Carlucci's testimony. The study re-iterated that "as of March 1980, not one
sentence has been released to the pub~ic under a court o:rder in circumstances
where the CIA has argued that release would injure the national security." 108
Moreover, CNSS highlighted the dangers associated with reducing the
intelligence community's accountability to the public: "The CIA says it is
willing to give all information to the Congress for purposes of oversight and
that this is further reason for granting the exemption. Yet disclosures under
the FOIA have shown that the CIA did not tum over all information about
past operations to the Congress ...." 109
Lloyd Gardner,

;:t ~story

professor

repre~enting

the Orga;nization· of

American Historians, joined the ACLU in denouncing the CIA's campaign t~
restrict the FOIA. "This will be a trag~dy if it is allowed to go unchallenged,"

107
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he argued. 110 Gardner told Congress that the exemptions would seriously
undermine historical scholarship on American foreign relations.

He

htmented that "the post-Vietnam backlash against declassification and against
FOIA can only remind the historian of days when kings banished prophets
who displeased them and sent messengers bearing bad news to oblivion.
Surely, we are not prepared to go that route." 111 William Corson, the author of

The Armies of Ignorance (1977), elaborated on Gardner's protest, bluntly
advising "that the Congress should be encouraged by the CIA's attempt to
gain further exemptions from the FOIA. That, to me, is the best evidence that
the FOIA is working, albeit not completely as some might prefer, but
nevertheless still working." 112

He called the proposed legislation "a

bureaucratic Trojan horse/' since it would enable the Agency to withhold any
qocu~ent from

FOIA requesters by simply labeling it an operational file. 113

The forces aligned against the CIA in 1980 confirmed what Agency
officials had anticipated two years earlier: the political climate, still shaped by
the legacy of the Church and Pike committees, was not conducive to rolling
back the FOIA. Since Congress refused to grant the CIA's request for
exemptions to the FOIA, many requestors were able to obtain fascinating
information from the Agency between 1975 and the early 1980s. John Marks,
for instance, gained access to 16,000 pages of records on MKULTRA, which
enabled him to write The Search For The "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and

Mind Control.
110

Ibid., 171.
Ibid.
112
Ibid., 186.
113
Ibid., 184
111
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investigative reporting in the world could not have produced a book, and the
secrets of CIA mind-control work would have remained buried forever, as the
men
who knew them had
always intended." 114 The legal battle with the
'
.
Agency had taken three years, but Marks remained optimistic about the
FOIA, observing in October 1978 that "the system has worked extremely
well." 115 Journalists also used the Freedom of Information Act successfully at
this time. Students at the College of William and Mary learned in April1980
that the CIA had conducted surveillance of "radicals" on their campus during
the Vietnam War. 116 The Office of Security at Langley ran the operation as
part of Project Resistance, a program of domestic espionage that targeted
faculty andstudents at several colleges. The college newspaper at William
and Mary, The Flat Hat, had acquired the sensational information through a
FOIA request, which had been filed two years earlier. 117
The victories of FOIA requestors in the 1970s gave credence to the
image of openness that Hetu worked so hard to create. The tragedy of CIA
history·during these years is that Agency officials wanted nothing to do with
openness. They complied with FOIA requests with considerable reluctance,
and when they saw embarrassing information released to critics like John
Marks, it only reinforced their commibnent to secrecy. The Agency's crusade
against openness began with the formation of the PRB, which seriously
re.stricted what former employees could say about the intelligence
114
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community. The secondary target in Turner's secrecy campai.gn, of course,
was the FOIA amendment of 1974. His deputy fought aggressively to win
exemptions for the Agency, and although the ACLU and the Organization of
American Historians prevailed in that battle, the CIA would mount another
offensive a few years later in a much friendlier environment.
. If Turner had actually embraced openness while CIA director, it is

possible that he could have done something to change the irrational obsession
with secrecy at Langley. But in choosing to become a forceful defender of
that culture-sanctioning the lawsuit against Frank Snepp, encouraging
Herbert Hetu's bait and switch PR tactics, and allowing Frank Carlucci to
lqbby against the: FOIA-Turner helped set the stage for the abuses of power
committed by his successor, William Joseph Casey.
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CHAPTER VI
THE CULTURE OF SECRECY UNLEASHED, 1981-1987
By the end of the Carter administration, it appeared that Herbert
Hetu's policies had staying power.

But when William Casey became

President Ronald Reagan's CIA director, he questioned the need for
continuing the public relations campaign at Langley. The CIA had survived
the scandals of the 1970s, the Republicans now controlled the White House,
and the intelligence community's budget was no longer in jeopardy. As a
result, Casey wondered why the Agency still found it necessary to publicly
defend itself. He soon brought an end to the Agency's press briefings, and on
July 1, 1981, he shut down the Office of Public Affairs. "[T]he difficulties of
the past decade are behind us," he declared. 1 Casey acknowledged that the
public relations office served a purpose when it was first created, but he told
employees that "the time has come for CIA to return to its more traditional
low public profile and a leaner-but no less effective-presence on Capitol
Hill." 2 Hetu did not welcome Casey's decision/ and in August 1981, he left
the Agency to found Hetu & Lukstat, a public relations firm. The remnants of
1
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his office merged with the downsized Congressional liaison staff to form a
new division under the direction of future CIA chief Robert Gates. 4 Contrary
to Casey's thinking in 1981, however, the difficulties were only just
beginning. In fact, his first year at Langley forced him to completely reverse
his views on the value of public relations, and he would ultimately embrace
the most aggressive PR tactics in the history of the CIA. He used PR to
combat the media, to (covertly) sell the American public on the desirability of
covert action in Nicaragua, and to convince the ACLU to endorse the CIA
Information Act of 1984.
Max Hugel, a businessman Casey befriended during the Reagan
campaign, was a PR crisis waiting to happen. Hugel had never worked for
the CIA before, but Casey decided to let him run the Directorate for
Administration, the division in charge of personnel and management. In
May 1981, when the clandestine services was in need of a new director, Casey
moved Hugel into the position, a maneuver that dumfounded Agency
insiders. Gates subsequently described Hugel as "the appointment from
hell," 5 recalling that "[s]hort Max, with his toupee and mannerisms, his style
of speech and dress, was put down by the Agency hierarchy-apart from
Bill-as soon as he arrived." 6 Officials in the Directorate of Operations did
not respect Hugel, and they were determined to undermine him. "Leaks to
the press about Hugel's rn~stakes,
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immediately," says Gates?

It also appears that disgruntled Agency

employees helped mobilize the powerful network of former intelligence
officers. Less than two weeks after Hugel had been selected, Cord Meyer, the
author of Facing Reality, wrote a scathing assessment of the director's
decision, calling it "a breathtaking gamble for which the country will have to
pay heavily if Casey has guessed wrong." 8 A week later the New York Times
printed an editorial titled "The Company Mr. Casey Keeps" that
compounded the negative publicity. "Who can be surprised if there are fears
of a replay [of past abuses] in an Administration that talks loosely about
'unleashing' the C. I. A.," asked the Times. "These fears are fanned when an
outsider with tenuo1;1s credentials is given command of TheCompany's most
free-wheeling div.ision." 9
Despite the b~cklash in the media and the frustration of his employees,
~asey

adamantly defended Hugel. Viewipg _Hugel as a

politic~!

lackey,

skeptics at Langley were equally stubborn and somewhat merciless.
Agency humorists even compared him to Tatoo on Fantasy Island: "What does
Hugel say each morning to Casey? 'Boss, Boss-the plane, the plane/"' 10 Jokes
about his height undoubtedly proved embarrassing to Hugel, but the greatest
humiliation. did .not surface until July.

Washington Post reporters Bob

Woodward and patrick Tyler had been pursuing a story about Hugel's
7
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business dealings from the early 1970s. They had received tapes from
Thomas and Samuel McNeil that revealed Hugel had provided Thomas with
insider information. The McNell brothers, both former high-rolling brokers
on Wall Street, were disreputable and openly despised Hugel. But when
}Voodward ~nd Tyler played the tapes for Hugel, he admitted that they
contained his voice.
The investigation ended with a sensational front-page story on July 14,
1981. According to the article, which contained extensive quotations from the
recorded conversations, Hugel told Thomas McNell information about
Brother Limited that was unavailable to the public: "We originally forecast
sales in the U.S. [at] $80 million ... We now forecast $70 million, okay, which
is a $10 million swing." 11 In a subsequent conversation, he offered details
about a recently completed deal between Brother and another company. "I'm
telling you confidential stuff, now," he warned, "[y]ou understand that?" 12
The tapes also revealed that Hugel had made illegal loans to the McNelis, and
at one point, he politely advised Thomas to pay the money back, because "if
you don't, I'll cut your balls off .... I'll get my Korean gang after you and you
don't look so good when you're hanging by the balls anyway." 13 Hollywood
screenwriters simply could not have written a better script for the scandal.
On the morning that the article appeared, Hugel resigned from the CIA. 14 He
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blamed li.is demise on "the old-boy network. Some guys on the inside were
out to get me. Some were retired guys working from the outside." 15
With Hugel out of the picture, Congress and the press increasingly
scrutinized Casey's own business ventures. "The papers provided the grist,"
observed Joseph Persico, Casey's biographer, "and the Senate intelligence
committee provided the mill." 16 The committee selected Fred Thompson, a
prominent attorney and future Republican Senator, to investigate the
allegations of financial wrongdoing. Casey was one of the people charged in
a lawsuit with deceiving the investors of Multiponics, an agricultural
company that had gone bankrupt years earlier, and reporters discovered that
he had withheld information from the disclosure forms that federal
appointees are required to submit.. Casey, moreover, initially refused to put
his massive portfolio into a blind trust. 17 After the CIA director testified in
detail to the intelligence committee about previous investments, the senators
ruled "that no basis has been found for concluding Mr. Casey is unfit to serve
as DCI." 18
15
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More than anything else, the extended controversy in 1981 convinced
Casey that there was indeed a crucial need for public relations at the CIA. In
1982 Casey dismantled the office he had created a year earlier; as. Persico
explains, "[h]e went back to the arrangement that had prevailed when he
took over the CIA, a separate lobbyist for the Hill and a separate Office of
Public Affairs for the media." 19 Charles E. Wilson, Hetu's former assistant,
initially ran the public affairs division, but Casey ultimately selected George
V. Lauder, a member of the clandestine service for over three decades, to take
over the PR campaign in 1983. 20 Lauder had spent years in the Middle East,
and although he was an amateur in the realm of public relations: he knew the
basics. For instance, CBS repeatedly approached him about the possibly of
interviewing Casey. Given Casey's tendency to mumble, Lauder shrewdly
declined the offer from 60 Minutes. "If you had a guy who talks like Bill
Casey," he told them, "would you put him on television?" 21
As the CIA's top PR man, Lauder obviously communicated with Casey
on a wide range of issues. Yet in responding to a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request filed in 2005, the CIA claimed that it was unable to find any
correspondence between Lauder and Casey. The Agency subsequently
turned over sixty documents in Lauder's files when confronted with another
FOIA inquiry, but this material only included correspondence with
individuals outside of ~e CIA. In other words, the Agency essentially took
19
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the position that they could not locate any internal memos written by Lauder
while he headed public affai.rs. It is difficult to re-construct how PR strategies
were formulated in the mid-1980s given the paucity of de-classified
information. Lauder assured a newspaper editor in 1985 that "[w]e [the CIA]
do not lie to the American public nor do we engage in 'public relations
flimflam to boost' our 'image' in

the U. S.,"

22

but the documents that have

do not substantiate
this statement. In fact, not only did
been de-classified
..
.
.
Lauder and Casey employ.PR "flimflam" to defend the CIA, they also used
heavy-handed tactics that were undoubtedly intended to intimidate the
media.
Lauder routinely lambasted

newsp~pers

for printing articles that

portrayed the CIA in a negative light. In October 1984, he complained to an
editor at the New York Times about two earlier stories that had linked the CIA
with "death squad related activities in El Salvador." 23 Noting that a Senate
investigation of the allegations had arrived at different conclusions, Lauder
ridiculed the Times for its failure to issue a retraction: "The NEW YORK
TIMES says it carries 'All the News Fit to Print.' Apparently, a story that
corrects previous NEW YORK TIMES reporting isn't fit to print. I think the
TIMES owes the Agency and its readers better than that." 24 Despite the CIA's
complaints about the articles on El Salvador, it is now clear that the Agency
22 George V. Lauder to Emil Slaboda, 17 September 1985. Released by the CIA

to the author on 19 September 200.6 in response to a FOIA request; Lauder's
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24
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supported the right wing government in that country throughout the 1980s.
CIA offiCials almost certainly knew about the violent campaigns that the El
Salvadoran military unleashed on the opposition. 25 _Two years later Lauder
went on the offensive against the editor of the Christian Science Monitor after
the newspaper ran a story about the downing of a plane in Nicaragua. The
article said that the aircraft was on a CIA mission, and not surprisingly,
Lauder rejected the accusation. "Mr. [Joseph] Harsch [the author of the story]
owes the employees of this Agency an apology for his outrageous defamation
of them," he declared. 26 Even though the plane did not belong to the CIA,
Lauder failed to mention that the Agency had previously supplied an aircraft
that was used to send military equipment to Iran.
Like most PR men, Lauder insisted .that he was not trying to
manipulate public opinion .. When Vitaly Yurchenko, a Soviet operative,
defected .to the United.States, William Casey used the situation to hype the
Agency's mystique in the media. In June 1986, the New York Times provided
details of how the CIA had leaked information to journalists. Yet Lauder
claimed "that CIA said nothing at all about Yurchenko in other than classified
hearings or meetings until he redefected." 27 Lauder acknowledged that the
25
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details on Yurchenko's short-lived defection resulted from leaks, but he
denied that the Agency was responsible for them. 28 This denial was rather
unconvincing, especially since few individuals outside the CIA knew much
about Yurchenko. Lauder was obviously worried about any accusation that
the CIA had engaged in activity that violated Executive Order 12333, which
prohibited the CIA from· engaging in domestic propaganda.

When

Washington insiders discovered that Casey had been meeting with Bob
Woodward of the Washington Post, Lauder sent an angry letter to Woodward:
"if you are saying or implying that we are co-collaborators [on the book] you
are suggesting that we are in violation of the Executive Order [12333] .... We
resent both the violations of the ground rules under which we agreed to talk
to you and the implication that your product has our appro~al. It doesn't." 29
Casey, of course, had most likely agreed to meet with Woodward in hopes of
shaping how the legendaryreporter portrayed the CIA. When this strategy
backfired, Lauder attempted to distance the Agency from the upcoming
publication of Woodward's Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987.
~n

his correspondence with the press, Lauder frequently lectured

editors about the sanctity of classified information.. He declared to American

LegionMagazine that "the media must ... bear the responsibility for acting as
a 'fenc.e' for stqlen goods and for its ihvolvement in damaging the nation's
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security ."30 When USA Today ran an editorial that criticized the government's
excessive use of classification, Lauder suggested that there was nothing
wrong with the current system. He warned that lives were at stake: "In short,
the press often carelessly tosses about the verbal hand grenades that a leaker
hands it. When they explode, killing people and inflicting great damage, the
press shrugs and says in effect, well, it's a free country." 31 Despite the serious
accusatiori.s leveled against the media, he failed to offer any specific examples
of irresponsible journalism.
Lauder was certainly entitled to share his opinions about the First
Amendment, but in at least two situations, he found himself accused of
seeking to undermine the freedom of the press.

In October 1985, he

challenged the accuracy of an article that William Gertz wrote for the

Washington Times. 32 Less than two months later, he again contacted Arnaud
de Borchgrave, then the editor of the conservative newspaper, claiming that
·he had been quoted inaccurately by Gertz. 33

De Borchgrave, however,

defended Gertz and wondered whether Lauder was trying to pressure the
paper into re-assigning the young correspondent. Lauder replied that he had
no intention of telling de Borchgrave who should be assigned to cover the
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CIA, 34 but he also made it clear that Gertz was at risk of becoming persona
ri.on grata at the Agency. "You should know that Gertz is the only journalist
in Washington who consistently misrepresents what we tell him," he
.

.

asserted. "We have arrived at a point where I have had to issue instructions
that two of my media relations officers must be on the phone w~enever any
of us is talking to Gertz so that we will be able to confirm what was and what
was not said to him." 35 Lauder informed de Borchgrave that the CIA would
no longer grant background interviews to Gertz, and he lamented that the

Washington

Times was not providing friendlier coverage.

"THE

WASHINGTON POST at least quotes us accurately," he observed.36
De Borchgrave allowed Gertz to continue covering the intelligence
community, and he

n~ver

went public with his concern that Lauder was

maneuvering to undermine the reporter. Jack Anderson, the legendary
columnist, did not keep silent when he experienced a similar confrontation
with the CIA's.Office of Public Affairs. On the same day that Anderson wrote
an editorial indicating that the CIA might be involved in drug trafficking,
Lauder sent the columnist an unusual letter. "Since you have identified your
source," he wrote, "you should have no trouble in making the information
available. If no such evidence is forthcoming, we will assume that you have
none .." 37 Lauder requested that Anderson tum over evidence to the CIA, the
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Justice Department, and the appropriate· Congressional committees.38
Anderson quickly brought the incident to the attention of fellow journalists.
"I think the letter smacks of intimidation," he told the Los Angeles Times, "but
it's not going to be successful." 39 In his reply to Lauder's demands, Anderson
quipped that he "would be happy to exchange sources with the CIA at any
time. " 40 Until CIA officials divulged their informants to Anderson, in other
words, he would never reveal his sources of information to them. He
realized, of course, that the Agency would never agree to such a proposal.
His reporting had angered the CIA in the past, and in the early 1970s, the
Agency even placed him-along with his staffers-under surveillance. Yet,
according to Anderson, it was the first time that the CIA had ever approached
him directly about a story. 41
Lauder's confrontation with Anderson was part of a broader CIA
effort to downplay the Agency's connection to an investment company in
Hawaii known as Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham, & Wong (BBRDW).
Ronald Rewald had established the firm in 1978, and when it collapsed five
years later, he attemp_ted to commit suicide in a hotel room. Rewald survived
~d

ultimately went on trial for allegedly defrauding over .four

hundr~d

investors of approximately $22 million in what was .called at the time "a
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class~c Pon=?i scheme."~ Although BBRDW portrayed itself ~s an investment

house that offered a 20% rate of return, only a small percentage of the money
deposited was actually invested. Rewald embezzled millions of dollars to
finance a high-rollil;1g lifestyle ~f. polo matches, luxury cars, and beautiful
women. 43 Rewald rejected the accusation that his company had been nothing
more than a financial ~cam, arguing in a lawsuit that BBRDW had been the
creation of the CIA. He said that the Agency had used the firm to finance
arms deals with countries in the Far East and to spy on foreign leaders such
as Ferdinand Marcos. He even claimed that the CIA had sent him on a secret
mission to steal the designs for a Japanese bullet train. 44 Although CIA
qfficials denied most of Rewald's more sensational charges, they publicly
a<;lmitted "aslight involvement" with Rewald's firm. 45 Agency lawyers also
made sure that the documents in the Rewald case were sealed. 46
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It is possible that Rewald was telling the truth: perhaps the CIA
manipulated BBRDW for covert objectives and then allowed him to be the
patsy when the scheme imploded. After all, John Peyton, the federal lawyer
who prosecuted Rewald, was a former CIA man. 47 Yet the evidence points to
a less sinister-but more embarrassing-scenario. Rewald moved to Hawaii
in 1977 shortly after he had been convicted of swindling two teachers in
Wisco~sin, and it appears that he approached the CIA station chief in

Honolulu. 48 Explaining that he was an American patriot, he offered to
provide jobs in his new company for CIA officers who needed non-official
cover.

The Agency admitted that seven officers worked for BBRDW

subsidiaries; that Rewald was re-imbursed for around $2,700 in expenses; that
he signed a secrecy. agreement; and that his son spied on foreign students at
Brigham Young University's campus in Hawaii.49 When Jack Kindschi, the
Honolulu station chief, retired from the Agency in 1980, Rewald hired him as
a consultant, paying him an annual salary of $48,000. Kindschi' s replacement,
Jack Rardin, met with Rewald on several occasions, visited the offices of
BBRDW, and agreed to interfere with an IRS investigation of the firm. 50
Reporters in Hawaii also discovered "that as many as 14 CIA [officers]
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invested more than a total of $300,000 in personal funds in the company." 51
While Kindschi, Rardin, and other Agency employees were investing money
'

iri BBRDW, Rewald bragged extensively that he worked for the CIA and
promised clients that the federal government would insure all of their
deposits. Agency officers receive extensive training in the art of deception,
but the CIA investors apparently never worried that Rewald, a man with a
criminal record, might be trying to scam them.
Ronald Rewald became a household name in Hawaii in July 1983, but
the story did not receive much attention on the mainland until the following
spring. 52 Then, in September 1984, ABC News reported a new development
in the ongoing saga. "Not only was Bishop, Baldwin involved in selling arms
to Taiwan, India and Syria and promoti11g financial panic in Hong Kong,"
said reporter Gary Shepard, "it was also fueling capital flight from two allies,
Greece and the Philippines .... in exchange for intelligence information." 53
ABC claimed in a second report that the CIA had plotted to kill Rewald. The
accusation was based on an interview with Scott T. Barnes, who

h~d

once

been a prison guard in Oahu. According to Barnes, CIA officers instructed
him to eliminate Rewald; "We gotta take him out .... You know, kill him,"
they declared. 54 About a week.after ABC aired the story, the CIA insisted that
the charges were false and requested, a retraction. 55 Peter Jennings is~ued a
51
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partial retraction on "World News Tonight" in November, acknowledging
that ABC could not corroborate Barnes's claims.
Unsatisfied with ABC's response, CIA officials filed a petition with the
FCC on the same day. 56 The Agency argued "that ABC deliberately distorted
the news and violated the fairness doctrine" and asked the FCC to
"determine what corrective action should be taken by ABC." 57

After

investigating the reports, the FCC rejected both the complaint and the CIA's
subsequent appeal. 58 But although ABC prevailed in the proceedings, legal
experts worried that the precedent established in the case could potentially
make the media more reluctant to pursue controversial stories. In

essence~

the FCC ruled that any government agency had the right to file a complaint
against radio or television stations; in the event that the commission sided
with the government, broadcasting licenses could be revoked as punishment.
"If this (the fairness doctrine) is held to apply to a government agency,"

observed an ACLU official, "then we are concerned about the chilling effect
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on investigative reporting." 59 When faced with stories that they perceived as
unfair or inaccurate, Lauder and Casey certainly ?-ad every right to issue a
rebuttal. Yet the CIA's response to ABC News reflected a glaring contempt
for the First Amendment. The FCC complaint, which undoubtedly left the
network with significant legal costs, was not an aberration. It was consistent
with the tactics employed against William Gertz and Jack Anderson.
At the same time that Lauder publicly battled the media from inside
the Office of Public Affairs at Langley, there was also a covert dimension to
Casey's PR strategy. Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh have persuasively
argued that the CIA director actually helped to establish "what appears to be
America's first peacetime propaganda ministry." 60 In the summer of 1982, a
CIA officer named Walter Raymond, Jr. joined President Reagan's National
Security Council with Casey's direct approval. Raymond had much in
common with David Atlee Phillips; both men had been educated at The
College of William and Mary, and both were propaganda specialists. 61 Robert
Parry would later describe Raymond as "a slight, soft-spoken New Yorker
who reminded some of a character from a John le Carre spy novel, an
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intelligence officer who 'easily fades into the woodwork' .... " 62 Raymond
initially headed the Intelligence Directorate at the National Security Councit 63
which was not an unusual assignment for an intelligence officer .. Yet his job
description changed tremendously after Presiden.t Reagan signed National
Security Decision Directive 77 in January 1983.. This directive bolstered and
centralized the administration's "public diplomacy" apparatus, defined as
"those actions of the U.S. [g]ovemment designed to generate support for our
national security objectives." 64 While public diplomacy had been used in the
past to build support for the United States overseas, it was now re-defined to
include the American public. Raymond, who became the director of the
Office of International Communications and Public Diplomacy at the NSC,
outlined a "political action" offensive to covertly influence domestic
perceptions of Americall. foreign policy, especially as it pertained to Central
America,. 65
Much as Phillips had done in 1975, Raymond eventually resigned from
the CIA to ensure that "there would be no question whatsoever of any
contamination of this." 66 He vehemently denied the accusation that Agency
executives were involved in the public diplomacy crusade: "At no time
62
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during my 5 years with the NSC did I receive any instructions or guidance
from Casey or any other sentor CIA official." 67 However, as Parry and
Kornbluh have shown, Raymond's deposition during the Iran-Contra
investigation reveals a completely different story. In fact, he told
Congressional staffers "that he met.w~th then CIA Director William Casey
every Thursday between January and July 1983." 68 Raymond, in other words,
conijnueq to meet with Casey in the months following his official departure

.

,

"

.

from the CIA in April 1983. When asked during the deposition if he talked
about public diplomacy in these meetings, his response was woefully vague.
"I wouldn't rule it out that we might have. I cannot remember anything
specific on that," he said. 69 Fortunately for historians, Raymond's memos,
which were de-classified in the Congressional report on Iran-Contra, provide
a clearer picture of events than his deposition. On August 29, 1983, for

instance, he informed an official on the National Security Council that Casey
had phoned him three days earlier to discuss PR strategies. Raymond
apparently recognized that this ongoing communication with the CIA raised
constitutional issues, and he alluded to "an effort to get him [Casey] out of
the loop." 70
67
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Raymond may have wanted to establish plausible deniability for the
CIA in 1983, but Casey was still inside the loop three years later. After
Congress allowed the CIA to re,-commence covert action in Nicaragua,
Raymond drafted a memo for Casey in August 1986. "It is clear we would
not have won the House vote without the painstaking deliberative effort
undertaken by many people in the government and outside," he declared.71
In the same memo, he also noted that he continued to hold a weekly meeting
on public diplomacy. Several officials attended these sessions, including "a
representative from CIA's Central American Task Force, and key NSC
[s]taffers." 72 Raymond later defended his former boss with the unconvincing
claim that Casey was acting "not so much in his CIA hat, but in his advisor to
the president hat." 73 .The General Accounting Office (GAO) asserted in 1987
that the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean at
the State Department, which Raymond helped launch in the summer of 1983,
had engaged in "prohibited, covert propaganda activities designed to
influence the media and the public to support the Administration's Latin
American policies." 74
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Raymond downplayed his relationship with Oliver North in his
deposition: "I do know he was in contact with the contras, but beyond that, I
was not really involved in the details of his activities." 75 Yet a<;cording to
North's checklist for the final week of Februc;~.ry 1985, he shared responsibility
with Raymond for ."[a]ssign[ing] U. S. intelligence agencies to research,
report, and clear for public release Sandinista military actions violating
Geneva Convention/ civilized standards of warfare." 76 Needless to say, they
did not request intelligence reports on the human rights abuses and drug
trafficking of the Contras. Parry and Kornbluh point out that the
Congressional investigations could have done more to explore the
propaganda campaign that Raymond orchestrated in collaboration with
North, but Congressman Richard Cheney(Republican-Wyoming) skillfully
worked behind the scenes to prevent that from happening, "arguing that the
domestic operations were outside the committees' scope." 77
If there had been a more detailed investigation, the public ':Vould have

undo1,1btedly learned that Casey was not an innocent bystander.. In fact, it
turns out that he had invited PR experts to meet with him in the Old
Executive Office Building to develop ideas on the best way "to sell a 'new
materials to 1,600 college libraries, 520 political science faculties, 122 editorial
writers, and 107 religious organizations." Ibid., 17. .
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product'-Central America-by generating· interest across~the-spectrum." 78
William Greener, then the director of public relations at Philip Morris, was a
key participant in the meeting. Given his work for Philip Morris, Greener
instinctively recognized that secrecy and PR were inseparable. His company
knew for: decades that cigarettes caused. cancer and a long list of other health
problems, but instead of acknowledging the facts, executives at Morris
suppressed the

data~

claiming that the scientific evidence was inconclusive.

The CIA implemented a similar strategy during Casey's tenure. Rather than
providing a balanced view of events in Nicaragua, Raymond concocted
blatant propaganda: "concentrate on gluing black hats on the Sandinistas and
white hats on UNO [the contras' United Nicaraguan Opposition]," he
instructed in 1986.79
In his determination to win support for the Contras in Nicaragua,
Casey went so far as to personally embark on a domestic covert operation
against Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat-Vermont), arguably his most vocal
critic on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. During Leahy's
campaign for re-election, Casey leaked a letter that he had written to Leahy
that criticized him for allegedly revealing sensitive information about the

Achille Lauro hijacking. 80 Casey apparently spoke with Rowland Evans and
Robert Novak, and they subsequently wrote an article in Reader's Digest in the
lead-up to the election. Evans and Novak argued that Leahy's alleged breach
78
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of national security. "is one of many showing that the current era of
€ongressional oversight of the CIA is simply not working." 81
·Although Casey could not prevent Leahy from winning a third term,
he found it much easier to suppress the views of former CIA officials. In
order to combat the criticism from these insiders, he turned to the
Publications Review Board (PRB). Ralph McGehee, who had earlier battled
the PRB while Stansfield Turner headed the CIA, submitted an article to the
board in 1981 that alleged the Agency was falsifying intelligence on Central
America in order to hype the threat of the Soviet Union. McGehee provided
examples from CIA history to illustrate what was happening in El Salvador,
but the PRB barred him from mentioning details of previous
~'disinformation"

operations in countries like Indonesia. 82 The harassment

continued the following spring whenhe asked board members to review a
revised version of the manuscript that they had already cleared. The PRB
now ruled that McGehee had to delete several sections of the book, including
his description of a sophomoric prank at Camp Peary in the 1950s "involving
the booby-trapping of a toilet seat with a military firecracker." 83 The CIA
allowed him to re-insert passages that contained information released by
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Senator Frank Church's committee, and after several more disputes with the
board, he finally managed to publish Deadly Deceits in 1983.84
Admiral Stansfield Turner encountered similar problems after the PRB
examined his memoir. Turner, an ardent critic of the Reagan administration,
believed "that between 10 and 15 percent of the time it took me to complete
the book was spent in arranging with the CIA for its clearance .... It was all
most unreasonable and unnecessary~" 85 The irony, of course, was that Turner
had expanded the powers of the review board back in 1977. "As long as there
is almost no check on the arbitrariness of the CIA," he warned, "it is likely
that there will be further abuses of the public's right to knowledge about its
govemment." 86 When Frank Snepp learned about Turner's displeasure with
CIA censorship, he criticized the former director for creating a policy that
restricted the First Amendment rights of ex-intelligence officers: "I hate to
think of anybody being censoredr but I think there is poetic justice in the fact
that the architect of the C. I. A.'s censorship should now be feeling the heat." 87
In addition to worrying about criticism from former insiders like
McGehe~

and Turner, Casey and his advisors were concerned about student

protests against covert action in Ce:ntral

A~erica.

Nearly seventy student

activists at Brown University attracted publicity by initiating a ci~zen's arrest
of CIA recruiters in 1984, which was inspired in part by revelations of the
84
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Agency's illegal mining of Nicaraguan harbors.88 Casey thought that public
relc:ttions could revitalize the Agency's recruitment efforts on campuses, and
in 1985 he instituted the Officer in Residence Program, aPR effort that allows
CIA employees to join college faculties for two years to teach classes related
.

.

to their area of expertise. This program has proven especially attractive to
universities, because the Agency pays for most of the costs. There are
.

.

between eig.ht and twelve Officers in Residence at any given time, and more
than fifty schools have welcomed CIA officers to their campus in the past two
decades. According to the CIA's website, "Harvard, Princeton, Georgetown,
University of South Carolina, University of Oregon, University of Kentucky,
Texas A&M, Marquette University, Ohio State University and the military
academies" are a few of the universities that have participated in the project. 89
88
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Although Officers in Residence must now acknowledge their connection to
the CIA and are forbidden to recruit students, the venture obviously began as
a strategy to repair the CIA's relationship with the academic community.
Harry Fitzwater, the Deputy Director for Administration under Casey,
explained in an August 1985 memo that a key objective was to "[a]ssist
Agency staff recruiting efforts by placing in selected schools experienced
officers who can spot promising career candidates, can counsel students as to
career opportunities, and can use their knowledge and experience to address
questions or concerns students may have regarding the Agency." 90
Casey also established PR programs for businessmen who operated
internationally;

His biographer estimates that "[b]etween 1984 and 1985,

nearly three hundred major American business leaders carne to the Agency's
executive seminar." 91 When Casey spoke to these visiting executives, he
typically explained that Americans "returning from overseas trips have been
invaluable not only in providing information but in giving us leads to people
willing to make available information which may be .critical to our national
interests." 92 Casey made little attempt to disguise that he was attempting to
secure their cooperation. In soliciting help from corporations, he was even
willing to do favors for them. On one occasion, he instructed CIA analysts to
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research the market for chocolate products in Eastern Europe, and he turned
the results over to Mars Candy. 93
Enhancing the "culture of secrecy" was the most important objective of
Casey's legislative agenda, and he understood that PR could be used to
secure the passage of the lntelligence Identities Protection Act and to
undercut the Freedom .of Information Act. 94 The protection act, which made
it illegal to knowingly reveal the name of a covert operative, was an easy sell,
and it passed in 1982. Winning relief from the FOIA, on the other hand, was
much more complicated. Casey recognized that the earlier campaign for an
exemption had failed because of outrage from advocates of civil liberties.
Admiral Turner, moreover, had allowed his deputy to lobby Congress for the
legislation.
Casey initiated a public relations offensive against the FOIA; in many
of his public appearances, he talked about why the CIA could no longer
tolerate it. During a speech in March of 1982, which was later reprinted as an
essay in Presidential Studies Quarterly, he announced that "the presumption
that all Government records should be accessible to the public, unless the
Government can justify in detail a compelling national security rationale for
withholding them, unwarrantedly disrupts the

eff~ctive

operation of an

intelligence agency~" 95 He did not explain that the CIA spent only a tiny
fraction of its

bt~dget

on FOIA compliance, thq.t there were less than thirty

employees assigned to process requests on a full-time basis, and that the
93
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Agency had never lost a FOIA lawsuit. Casey lashed out against the FOIA
once again in a speech to the American Legion. "I question very seriously
wh~ther

a secret intelligence. agency and a Freedom of Information Act can

coexist for very long," he proclaimed. 96 He told the audience that it was time
to "[g]et rid of the Freedom of Information Act." 97 No longer did the CIA
want an exemption for their operational files; they now demanded a complete
exemption from the FOIA. "Instead of nourishing paranoia," the New York
Times complained, "Mr. Casey could ease those concerns by explaining to

everyone how freedom of information really works." 98
Yet Casey knew exactly what he was doing. "Nourishing paranoia"
helped win support from the American public, a tactic that had proven
successful for him as Reagan's campaign manager in 1980. Although he
complained that the media had "repeatedly distorted" his American Legion
speech, he nonetheless re-iterated the "inherent incompatibility in applying
an openness in government law to intelligence agencies whose missions must
be carried out in secrecy." 99 When read between the lines, Casey was
essentially saying that he had no problem with the FOIA as long as it did not
apply to the intelligence establishment. He recycled most of the arguments
that Frank Carlucci had first used in 1979, emphasizing, for instance, that
Congress was in charge of overseeing the CIA. He did not view the FOIA as
an instrument of accountability, since he claimed that the CIA was already
fully accountable to the intelligence committees. Casey even made reference
96
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to Philip Agee's FOIA lawsuit by quoting a federal judge who called the case
a "waste of resources." 100
At the same time Casey was lobbying the public to support changes to
the FOIA, he was shrewd enough to understand that nothing could be done
unless the Agency neutralized the ACLU. Although it is difficult to prove, it
appears that. Casey's demand for a total exemption was a classic bargaining
tactic. He had been a successful venture capitalist for most of his adult life, so
he knew the importance of demanding more than you expect to receive
during negotiations. In essence, when the CIA said that they would be
willing to consider an exemption for the operational files, it appeared that
they had made a concession.

In reality, however, their proposal was

comparable to the legislation introduced by Carlucci. The ACLU had
effectively blocked the CIA's campaign in 1980, but Casey and Agency
attorney Ernest Mayerfeld skillfully manipulated the organization. As Angus
Mackenzie has documented, Mayerfeld met with Mark Lynch, then an ACLU
attorney, in June .1982.
agreement .at the

Mayerfeld and Lynch established an informal

meeting~

"the .ACLU would no

long~r

oppose the

exemption, if, in return, the CIA would not seek to be totally exempt from the
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FOIA." 101 The ACLU, in what is undoubtedly one of the most shameful
moments in their history, reversed their earlier position. Rather than fighting
the CIA's effort to gain a massive exemption from the FOIA, ACL U officials
accepted its inevitability. Mayerfeld and Lynch kept in regular contact with
each other after their initial compromise in June, and the following March
they formalized the deal in the presence of Congressman Romano L. Mazzoli
(Democrat-Kentucky). 102
Reports of the ACLU's negotiations with the CIA first surfaced in May
1983/03 and on June 18, almost a year after Lynch and Mayerfeld had initially
talked about the FOIA exemption, the Nation revealed that "the agency has
convinced the American Civil Liberties Union to agree to exempt 'operational
files' from the Freedom of Information Act. It's a dangerous exemption." 104
ACLU officials, however, denied the accusation, persuading the magazine to
issue a "clarification" on July 2. 105 Mackenzie soon discovered that the
ACLU's denials were misleading, and he wrote a story about the ongoing
negotiations between Lynch and Mayerfeld in late September. Observing
101
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that "the A. C. L. U. appears to have swallowed the C. I. A.'s 'trust us'
argument/' he advised that "[the organization]. should tell Congress the deal
i~ .off, and it should use its. influeru~e to kill the legislation." 106
.

Morton

.

Halperin and Allan Adler of the Center for National Security Studies rejected

any suggestion that "the A. C. L. U. is being taken for a ride."

107

They talked

about a bill in the Senate (S. _1324) introduced by Senator Barry Goldwater
(Republican-Arizona), but they made no reference to what was happening
in the House of Representatives. Mackenzie has pointed out the ACLU's
agreement "was with Congressman Mazzoli in the House. In the clever
manner of a Capitol Hill insider, Halperin's denial was literally truthful,
while being wholly misleading." 108 Halperin and Adler, in other words, had
parsed their words quite carefully ..
Goldwater's.bill, which had been developed with assistance from the
CIA and closely resembled Carlucci's legislation, began a long debate over
the FOIA' s impact on the CIA. Agency officials had continued to argue that
the FOIA helped explain why some foreigners were reluctant to assist them.
When Casey testified in front of a Senate subcommittee, for instance, he
claimed that at least two assets had recently quit because "they felt
insecure." 109 Yet Senator Leahy (Democrat-Vermont) pressed Casey to
elaborate on how the examples he mentioned related to the FOIA, and the
director conceded that he could not specifically blame the law: "Well, I can't
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say that. I can't say FOIA [is the reason]." 11° Casey and his subordinates also
readily admitted that they already could withhold information from FOIA
requesters by invoking a variety of exemptions, something that Victor
Navasky learned after he filed a FOIA request in 1976 for a list of all the
books that had been published for the Agency prior to 1967. After the
Agency rejected his request and subsequent appeal, he took them to court.
The lawsuit dragged on for over five years, but the CIA ultimately prevailed
when the Supreme Court refused to hear the case on appeal in October 1982.
The Agency maintained that the documents that Navasky wanted had to be
withheld to protect sources-presumably the authors and publishers of the
books-and methods (e. g. the fact that the Agency engages in propaganda).
Agency lawyers also claimed that releasing the book list, which was over
fifteen-years old, would undermine national security, and "that its assertion
on this matter need not be buttressed by evidence, even shown in camera." 111
Navasky was left to wonder "why the Director wants the C. I. A. exempted
from a law that has yet to be seriously enforced against his agency." 112
The Agency had a flawless record in FOIA litigation, and Casey could
not provide specific examples of agents who quit because they feared that a
Ibid.
tit VictorS. Navasky, "Why Sue The C.i.A.?,'; 26 October 1982, A29; the
Supreme Court accepted a case involving a FOIA lawsuit against the CIA a
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FOIA_ request would lead to their disclosure. When the Senate Intelligence
Committee held hearings on the Goldwater bill in June 1983, _however,
Deputy Director John McMahon explained that "[i]t is difficult to convince
one who is secretly cooperating with us. that some day he will not awaken to
find in aU. S. newspaper or magazine an article that identified him as aU. S.
spy." 113 Rather than dwelling on the benefits that the exemption would
provide the Agency, McMahon emphasized that the bill would significantly
reduce the backlog of FOIA requests at the CIA. This would make it possible
for the Agency to respond more quickly to journalists, scholars, and other
FOIA requesters. Skeptics of the CIA remained unconvinced by McMahon's
promises, and they were especially alarmed by the absence of judicial review
in the Senate bill. Anna Kasten Nelson, a history professor who testified on
J?ehalf of both the American Historical
Ameri~an

Asso~iation

and the Organization of

Historians, warned that the Agency might "place ever-increasing

numbers of docum~nts in.file cabinets marked 'operational,' including those
that might be merely embarrassing." 114 Nelson was also one of the few
observers to point out that the proposed exemption of operational files would
be permanent. No matter how old these files were--whether three years old
or thirty years old-they would be entirely exempt from FOIA requests. 115
Despite the concerns about the exemption, the Senate passed the bill
by voice vote in November. The debate .over the FOIA then shifted to
~ 13
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Congressman Mazzoli' s bill in the House. 116 In February 1984, during an
appearance in front of a subcommittee of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence, McMahon repeated his assurance that the proposed legislation
would improve the Agency's ability to process FOIA requests. 117
Congressiilan.Mazzoli asked him whether the Agency could be tempted in
.

.

.

the future to adopt a broad definition of .operational documents in order to
stymi~

legitimate FOIA requests. "Yes . . . if we were prepared to do

something that violated the spirit and the legality of the law, that would be
possible," McMahon replied. 118 Yet he promised that this would never
happen; like Richard Helms, he believed that Agency employees were
honorable men, and as a consequence, "[m]y firm belief is that .... there will
not ever again be a repeat of the improprieties of the past." 119
Shockingly, the ACLU did not challenge the "trust-us" mentality of the
CIA.

In his prepared statement to the subcommittee, Lynch gave the

impression that the legislation under consideration in the House was a good
deal. "Only the operational files of the CIA's Directorate of Operations,
Directorate of Science and Technology, and Office of Security will be exempt
from search and review," he noted. "Thus, operational information located
elsewhere in the Agency will be subject to search and review." 120 But this
116
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description reflected a glaring ignorance of the CIA's filing system, since few
operational documents are found in the Directorate of Administration or the
Directorate of Intelligence. It is true that final reports based on information
gathered through espionage could still be requested through the FOIA, but
this was very similar to what the CIA offered in 1979, a deal that the ACLU
had justifiably opposed.
Another House subcommittee held hearings on H. R. 5164, a revised
version of two previous bills, in May. The ACLU predictably endorsed this
bill, since "the delay in responding to requests will be reduced and no
meaningful information which is currently released will be lost." 121 Angus
Mackenzie took issue with the ACLU's position, and he told the members of
the subcommittee about his research on Operation MHCHAOS, the CIA
domestic surveillance program in the 1960s and early 1970s. Although the
House bill had specified that operational files must still be searched in the
event that they were "the specific subject matter of an investigation by the
intelligence committees of the [C]ongress, etc.," Mackenzie believed that this
language was overly restrictive. 122

In the mid-1970s, both the Church

committee and the Rockefeller Commission had investigated Operation
CHAOS, but since Congress "did not SPECIFICALLY inspect the agency's
files on the underground press," the CIA had a "loophole" to reject any
121
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requests pertaining to the program. 123

In fact, Ernest Mayerfeld

acknowledged that Mackenzie's FOIA lawsuit might be thrown out if the
legislation passed. 124 "What the CIA needs is not this legislation to clear up
.

.

its paperwork, but rather instructions from Congress that it must now comply
with the FOIA/' Mackenzie told the subcommittee. 125 Ralph McGehee, author
of Deadly Deceits, had similar concerns about the legislation. He predicted
that the Directorate of Operations (DO) would be able to claim an exemption
for "some 80 to 90 percent'' of their records if the bill was approved. 126
The hearings in May were essentially a formality; only four members
of the subcommittee bothered to attend. With the ACLU supporting H.R.
5164, the protests from skeptics such as Mackenzie and McGehee could be

ignored. The ACLU of Southern California soon complicated the situation by
voting in June to fight against any legislation that would offer the CIA an
exemption to the fOIA. In order to reduce the ~engthy backlog of requests at
the CIA, the 22,000 member ACLU affiFate proposed that Congress should
make it more difficult for the Agency to engage in "obstructive conduct." 127
One member of the affiliate complained that "[t]he New York and
Washington offices of the A. C. L. U. seem to have become a part of the
establishment.

They have become comfortable with the Washington

1231bid.
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bureaucrats." 128 The conflict within the ACLU became such a problem that
Ira Glasser, the executive director of the organization, ordered a last minute
review of the legislation in September. 129 By that time, however, it was too
late. When the bill came up for a vote on September 19, Congressman Ted
Weiss went to the House floor, imploring his colleagues to oppose it. He had
helped block the earlier attempt to exempt CIA operational files from the
FOIA, but he was a voice crying in the wilderness in the fall of 1984. Only 35
representatives joined him in voting against the bill. 130 The following month
Casey threw a party on the seventh floor of CIA headquarters to celebrate the
CIA Information Act (Public Law 98-477). Three days later, President Reagan
signed the law. 131 He described the Information Act as "a small but important
first step," anticipating that the relief it provided to the CIA "will become
available to other agencies involved in intelligence, who also must protect
their sources and methods and who likewise wish to avoid unnecessary and
expensive paperwork." 132 During the debate over the FOIA exemptions,
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c;ntics worried that the administration would not stop with the CIA. It turned
out that their concerns were justified.133
In fairness to. the ACLU, they honestly believed that the CIA
Information Act would dramatically cut down the backlog of FOIA requests
at Langley. Once Congress passed H. R. 5164, Casey promised the House
Intelligence Committee that "the Agency will establish a specific program
designed to substantially reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the current two-tothree year backlog of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests." 134 He
also pledged not to reduce the funding allocated to FOIA compliance for two
years. 135 Anyone who has filed a FOIA request with the Agency since 1984
can attest that these commitments were not kept. Not only does the backlog
re:i:nain a problem, McGehee's prophesy about DO files turned out to be
accurate. According to James X. Dempsey, an expert on FOIA litigation, "it
has become much more difficult, if not impossible, for FOIA requesters to
obtain anything involving a program that was once in this directorate." 136
Moreover, one of the provisions in the Information Act requires the CIA to
review exempted files every ten years.

Congress expected that the

exemptions might be removed for some older documents, and although this
did happen during the first decennial review, the Agency actually
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undermined the public's right to know by increasing the number of files
placed off-iimits to FOIA requests in 2005. 137
Remarkably, despite all of his efforts to undermine historical
scholarship on the CIA, William Casey continued to take steps that portrayed
the CIA as an open institution. In 1985 he established the Historical Review
J'rogram, but in a fitting tribute to Casey's obsession with secrecy, this
program did not result in the de-classification of any CIA records until 1989,
two years after Casey died of brain cancer .138
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CHAPTER VII
THE RISE & FALL OF THE
NEW ERA OF OPENNESS AT THE CIA

A popular government without popular information or
the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy
or perhaps both.-James Madison (1822) 1
If you want a secret respected, see that it's respectable in
the first place.-Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1996)2
Secrecy in Governm~nt is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating
bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to
our national health.- Justice Hugo Black (New York Times v. United States,
1971)3
There's a big difference between openrzess and P.R.;
what we've got here is P. R.-Steven Aftergood4
Public relations at the CIA did not die with William Casey. If
anything, his successors improved and expanded the PR initiative. William
Webster used public relations to rehabilitate the Agency's image in the
aftermath of Iran-Contra; in 1992, with the Cold War over, Robert Gates
promised a new era of openness to assuage the concerns of CIA critics; R.
James Woolsey and John Deutch reached out to Hollywood to ensure a more
positive portrayal of the CIA in popular culture; and George Tenet embraced
PR to protect the Agency's legendary mystique. Like Stansfield Turner in the
1
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Once-Shy Spy Agency," New York Times, 6 May 2001, 36.
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late 1970s, all of these directors portrayed the CIA as an open institution.
Gates and Woolsey even expressed a willingness to de-classify CIA records
on covert operations. But in the final analysis, the "culture of secrecy" at
Langley prevailed. The reforms at the CIA between 1987 and 2007-most
notably the de-classification of millions of pages of documents-were
primarily the result of intervention from historians, Congress, and the White
House.
After William Casey resigned in early 1987, it appeared for a time that
his loyal deputy, Robert Michael Gates, would be the next CIA director.
However, because of the ongoing controversy surrounding Iran-Contra,
Gates withdrew his name from consideration and FBI Director William
Hedgcock Webster got the job instead. The new director continued to utilize
public relations during the final years of the Cold War. As Stansfield Turner
had done a decade earlier, Webste:r:· brought an outside PR specialist to
Langley. Bill Baker, who had perfected his craft at the FBI, re-invigorated the
CIA's public affairs division before handing the position over in 1989 to
James Greenleaf, a fellow G-man. 5 In 1991, according to an internal report,
public affairs fielded 3,369 telephone calls from the media, delivered 174
background briefings, and scheduled 164 interviews with high-ranking CIA

5
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officials. 6 Webster helped repair the damage that Casey had inflicted on the
CIA's image, and unlike his predecessor, he managed to keep himself out of
the headlines.
But as Webster distanced himself from Casey's recklessness, the CIA
continued its irrational obsession with secrecy. In 1989, for instance, the State
Department's historical division released a volume in the Foreign Relations of

the United States (FRUS) series th~t focused on American foreign policy in Iran
between 1952 and 1954. Since the CIA refused to release documents on the
toppling of Muhammad Mossadegh in 1953, the FRUS volume did not even
mention the event.

Diplomatic historians were outraged by the omission,

arguing that the American role in the Shah's coup had been previously
disclosed in the memoirs of Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA man who helped
execute the mission.

Warren Cohen, the chairperson of the historical

advisory committee at the State Department, resigned in protest the following
February. Cohen characterized the volume on Iran as "a fraud," and he
described the inherent danger of "an overly elaborate, costly declassification
process that encourages distortion and coverup." 7
.Senators Claiborne Pell (Democrat-Rhode Island), David Boren
(Democrat-Oklahoma), and Jesse Helms (Republican-North Carolina)
6
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responded. with a legislative proposal to bring greater oversight to the
publication of the FRUS. 8 Senator Helms summarized the bi-partisan co~cem
about the government's de-classification procedures when he complained:
"too much about our foreign policy is hidden for too long from public
~crutiny."

9

Congress eventually passed Public Law 102-138 in 1991 to change

how the State Department compiled and published the FRUS. As historian
Warren Kimball has explained, the legislation established a new advisory
committee that had the power to "kick open the doors, look at the records,
and then raise holy hell when it concluded that the bureaucrats were
withholding 30-year-old secrets without a legitimate 'national security'
reason .... " 10 Not only did PL 102-138 establish a thirty-year rule for
document de-classification, it also required government agencies like the CIA
to share information with the State Department's history staff. The law was a
stunning rebuke to the CIA's clandestine mindset.
When Webster stepped down in1991, President George H. W. Bush
boldly decided to replace him with Gates. The confirmation process was
brutal.

A group of Gates's colleagues testified that he intentionally

politicized intelligence while running the Agency's analytical division
between 1982 and 1986. According to Melvin Goodman, a retired CIA
analyst,, Casey and. Gates had selectively used analysis to support
"operational commitments" in Central America, Afghanistan, and the Middle
East, while simultaneously manipulating the evidence to present a more

8
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pessimistic interpretation of the Soviet Union. 11 CIA veteran Harold Ford
substantiated Goodman's accusations, arguing that Gates's actions went
"beyond professional bounds and clearly constitute a skewing of intelligence,
not in the fields of military and strategic issues, but chiefly concerning Soviet
political matters and the Soviets and the Third World." 12 Gates, in other
word,s, only interfered with CIA analysts in certain situations. As former CIA
~nalyst

Jennifer L. Glaudemans explained at the hearings, "politicization is

like fog .. Though you cannot hold it in your hand or nail it to the wall, it is
real. It does exist. And it does affect people's behavior." 13 Gates adamantly
denied the accusations, and the Senate ultimately confirmed his nomination.
Even before the controversy over the alleged politicization began,
however, Gates promised the senators on the intelligence committee that he
intended to make the CIA more accessible to Congress and the American
public. He acknowledged that Langley continued to have an image problem,
and from his perspective, "changing perceptions first requires greater
openness by the Agency." 14 As the opposition to his nomination mounted,
Gates repeated his promise of increased openness, even writing Senator Sam
Nunn (Democrat-Georgia) a letter in which he described his strategy for

11
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leading the CIA into the post-Cold War world. 15

There was obviously an

element of self-interest involved in Gates's proposals for the future; in fact, he
admitted to committee members that the Agency had to evolve in order to
justify its existence: "CIA and U.S. intelligence must change, and be seen to
change, or confront irrelevance and growing sentiment for their
dismahtlement. 1' 16
On November 18, 1991, just six days after he was sworn-in as CIA
director, Gates sent a memo to his director of public affairs, Joseph R.
DeTrani, requesting the establishment of a task force to examine the Agency's
existing policies on openness. Gates wanted the group to complete its study
by December 20, asking them to formulate "additional proposals for making
more information about the Agency available to .the American people and to
give greater transparency to our organization ...." 17 DeTrani wasted no time
in assembling· what became known as the Task Force on Greater CIA
Openness. Four days later he reported to Gates that a task force of seven CIA
officials had been formed with himself as chairperson, noting that the group
planned "to meet with John Scali of ABC, Jack Nelson of The Los Angeles

15
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Times, Dav:id Ignatius of the Washington Post, and Jerry Seib of The Wall
Street Journal, and others." 18

·

The task force first met on November 25, and during this session, they
I

· •.

'

1

started to· brainstorm ideas. Although it remains unclear ~hether DeTrani
and his colleagues were aware of the recommendations that a simil~r ad hoc
group had offered to William. Colby sixteen years earlier, they developed
suggestions that sounded much the same. For instance, the task force advised
that it would be useful to seek outside assistance in defending the CIA. Not
only should the Agency "get our customers to speak for us on the value of
our work/product," the members wanted to "do more with and through
professional organizations." 19 They also believed that the Agency must
"aggressively respond to 'cheap shots' by the media with op-ed pieces or
letters to the editor and if they aren't printed, work [the response] into public
statement by DCI." 20
The task force solicited comments on the their project from both
insiders and outsiders. During the first week of December, they held
discussions with Agency employees, and at their second meeting, the group
listened intently to an invited guest named George Tenet, then staff director
18
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for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), DeTrani told Gates in
a detailed memo that Tenet provided them with several "admonitions"; of the
ten that DeTrani listed, the first was undoubtedly the most significant: "keep
the mystique-we could lose if we are perceived as an ordinary bureaucracy
(in resource game and in public image)." 21 Instead of de-mystifying their
clandestine activities, in other words, Tenet encouraged them not to sacrifice
the CIA's mystique.

This recommendation unwittingly highlighted the

fundamental contradiction of CIA public relations since the "Year of
Intelligence" in that the Agency had consistently viewed openness in terms of
self-preservation rather than the public's right to know. "[G]ive the public a
better understanding of what [the CIA does], the quality of [CIA] people and
the risks they take," Tenet advised," ... keep openness institutional rather
than issue:-oriented." 22 In keeping with this sycophantic tone, he observed
"that Doug MacEachin, Bob Blackwell and George Kolt are the 'best show in
town' on the Soviet Union and should be seen and heard more widely." 23
Tenet further advised the Agency to reach out to academics by possibly reevaluating classification rules and "packaging information on former denied
areas to get some credit for past efforts." 24 As the staff director of the senate
21
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oversight committee, Tenet had a responsibility to ensure the CIA's
accountability to Congress. Yet his

recommen~ations

were dominated by a

focus on PR, eerily foreshadowing his tenure at the CIA.
In the week following Tenet's visit, officials on the task force kept a
busy schedule. They journeyed to Washington Post headquarters for a
meeting; they listened to presentations from CIA officials; and they had
conversations with scholars, retired CIA director Richard Helms, and
reporters such as Wolf Blitzer and Doyle McManus. 25 After gathering at least
twice to discuss their findings, the group submitted their final report to Gates
on December 20 for his review. On the second page of this document, the
authors borrowed several of Tenet's ideas without attributing them to him,
advising Gates to "preserve the mystique." 26 The following page of the report
was reminiscent of the "Telling the Intelligence Story" memo that had been
sent to Colby in 1975. "We have an important story to tell," the task force
announced, "a story that bears repeating. We are the most open intelligence
agency in the world which is proper in our form of democracy." 27 Yet despite
this pre-existing openness, they worried, "many Americans do not
understand the inteHigence process and the role of intelligence in national
security policymaking. Many still_operate with a romanticized or erroneous
"admit when we are wrong and work to find ways to cover dissent in our
product''; "recognize the dilemma in the intelligence success/policy failure
sequence and how to deal with that as an e;xecutive branch agency"; and "be
excellent in what we do in public." Ibid.
~ Joseph R. DeTrani to Gates, "Task Force on Greater CIA Openness - Week
Three," 13 December 1991. Released by the OA to the author o:h November
29, 2005. This memo had been previously de-classified in response to a FOIA
request.
·
26
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view of intelligence from the movies, TV, books and newspapers." 28 In
essence, the report suggested that only the positive elements of the CIA
mystique were wort;h protecting.
The Task Force on Greater CIA Openness described for Gates a variety
of "steps we can take which will benefit us and the American people,"
offering him a total of 30 recommendations to either approve. or reject. 29 The
media should be a top priority for the PublicAffairs Office, the task force
concluded, and they believed it would be beneficial to "[p]rovide more
background briefings, when practical, to a greater number of print and
electronic media journalists" and to encourage the media to interview top
CIA officia~s. 30 Their report then mentioned the possibility of allowing
reporters to do ."individual profiles" on CIA employees to "help personalize
the world of intelligence in broad circulation newspapers or magazines,"
which might also demonstrate "the growing number of women and
minorities in each directorate and increasingly in more senior positions." 31
Gates accepted almost all of the ideas for improving media relations, telling
DeTrani that "[c]areful records should be kept of such contacts (with the
press]."32 In responding to proposals outlined in another section of the report,
Gates supported the production of more PR-type material, expr_essed an
28
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interest in making television appearances, and agreed that "[t]he Agency's
briefing program for the full range of potential audiences should be expanded
as opportunities arise." 33
For anyone familiar with the history of CIA public relations, it is
obvious that the majority of recommendations in the report were not new.
The task force apparently thought they had developed a new idea when they
advised Gates to invite CEOs to Langley for seminars, but in reality, Casey
and other CIA directors had previously encouraged such visits. 34 Moreover,
the speaker's bureau that Herbert Hetu initiated over a decade earlier was
revived prior to Gates's arrival, and according to the task force, Agency
employees had made over sixty public appearances in 1991. Accepting the
report's advice, Gates called for the program to be expanded. 35 In addition to
reviewing the recommendations that were approved in January 1992, it is
important to consider those that were rejected. Generally speaking, Gates
viewed the program as a chance to sell the Agency's image to a wide
audience. He concurred with the task force "that our objective is to make CIA
and the intelligence process more visible and understandable rather than to
seek inevitably incomplete or unattainable openness on specific substantive
issues." 3~

When translated into practice, this mentality helps to explain why

Gates did not approve a recommendation to enco_urage the intelligence
33
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committees to "issue an unclassified annual report on the performance of the
Intelligence Community." 37 Gates wanted better PR, not accountability.
Less than a week after Gates issued his assessment of the task force's
report, Elaine Sciolino broke the story on the front page of the New York

Times. 38 DeTrani sent a memo to Gates about the article on the following day.
"Given the fact that Sciolino insisted on running this story now despite my
best efforts to convince her to hold off," he wrote, "I think the story is about
as good as we could have hoped for." 39 DeTrani was most likely hoping to
keep the task force's existence under wraps until Gates could publicly
announce the CIA's new policy on openness. In a speech to the Oklahoma
Press Association on February 21, 1992, about five weeks after Sciolino's
article, Gates formally outlined his strategy. At the beginning of the talk, he
jokingly compared his situation to the scene in Indiana

]one~

and the Last

Crusade (1989) where Jones must cross.to the other side of a. deep canyon o~
faith alone. "I will now step out into,that chasm [of credibili.ty] on faith," he
said, "the faith that what I have to say will persuade you of our seriousness of
purpose and action." 40 Although Gates acknowledged that there had been
previous attempts at greater openness, he noted that "all of this took place
against a backdrop of over9ll continuing and undifferentiated secrecy ....
37
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[t]his is going to change." 41 He focused on three aspects of the task force
report-the media, academia, and de-classification policies-and assured the
audience "that these measures, taken together, represent a real shift on CIA's
part toward greater openness and sense of'public responsibility." 42
By proclaiming greater openness at the CIA, Gates won excellent
'

'

publicity for the.Agency. His promise to de-classify more documents was
especially well received at the time~. Yet the praise quickly turned into
embarrassment when Agency officials refused to show the press a copy of the
Task Force Report On Greater CIA Openness. 43 The Center for National
Security Studies at the ACLU soon filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request for the document, but the FOIA office ruled that "[it] must be
withheld in its entirety." 44 Gates would later contend that the report had
been withheld initially "because some of the people who signed it were under
cover." 45 This explanation was somewhat misleading. On March 18, Gary
Foster, DeTrani's replacement at public affairs, told a Congressional
committee that in addition to the names of the signers, other information in
the report had to remain classified. He claimed that the unclassified sections
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"wouldn'.t mean much to anybody." 46 Gates, however, ultimately overruled
Foster, and in early April, he de:-classified the internal study and his memo of
January 6, choosing simply to redact the relevant names while allowing most
everything else to become public.
After looking over the recommendations of the task force, an ACLU
official dismissed the report as little more than "an internal discussion of how
we [the CIA] can get people to like us." 47 Steven Aftergood, editor of the

Secrecy & Government Bulletin [now Secrecy News], had previously quipped
that the CIA was "invulnerable to irony." 48 For why else would the Agency
classify as secret a study on greater openness to the public? CIA officials
moflt likely were worried about disclosing aspects of the report that evaluated
previous PR efforts. In the section on the media, for example, the authors of
the study boasted that the "PAO [Public Affairs Office] now has relationships
with reporters from every major wire service, newspaper, news weekly, and
television network in the nation. This has helped us tum some 'intelligence
failure' stories into 'intelligence success' stories ...." 49 They observed that
"[i]n many instances, we have persuaded reporters to postpone, change, hold,
or even scrap stories that could have adversely affected national security
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interests or jeopardized sources and methods." 50 The report also mentioned
that public affairs routinely mailed material to around 700 professors, held biannual events at Langley for college administrators, and was then in the
pro.cess of "building a database of information about Agency contacts with
academia: ... " 51
Three days before Gates announced the new policy in Tulsa, DeTrani
issued an update on what had been accomplished so far. He informed his
boss that a video entitled "In America's Interest" was nearing completion;
that briefings for the press had been expanded (twenty-eight during the
month of January); and that planning was underway for CEOs to tour the
CIA. 52 DeTrani's office had also hosted several guest speakers, including an
astonishing visit from Norman Mailer.53 Even though Mailer had once
accused the CIA qf manipulating

~he

stock exchange and eviscerating

'

A.mericart radicalism, he published a book about the Agency in 1991 called
•.

?

Harlot's Ghost that depicted the Agency as "a company of the elegant, secretly
gathered to fight a war so noble that one could and must be ready to trudge
for years through the mud and the pits.'' 54 During his promotion of the epic
novel, which totaled over 1,200 pages, Mailer did not hesitate to share his
personal views of the CIA. "I could have been in the CIA," he remarked.
50
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"And I probably would have been pretty good at it." 55 He also condemned
his participation in the Fifth Estate, telling Vanity Fair "I cringe when I think
of the name now." 56 Then, shortly before the nineteenth anniversary of his
Four Seasons debacle, Mailer visited CIA headquarters, delivered a speech,
and met with top CIA officials in Robert Gates's conference room. The size of
the audience was comparable to the turnout in 1973, but unlike the apathetic
party guests, the CIA employees were thrilled with the speech, offering
Mailer "standing ovations several times." 57 In his speech inside the "the
Bubble," Mailer announced that the Agency should assassinate Saddam
Hussein. He emphasized the importance of espionage in the aftermath of the
Cold War. "Now that the cold war is over," he observed, "the C. I. A. can get
out of the beartrap of ideology and begin to provide serious and needed
intelligence on the rest of the world." 58
In addition to the obvious PR component of Gates's new policy,
scholars were promised a radically different approach to the de-classification
of CIA records. The task force had outlined a proposal to "[e]stablish a seniorled, Agency-wide group to review the Agency's policy and practices related
to declassification and release of records under the Historical Review and
FOIA ·progr~ms . . . . with a view to accelerating ¢-e process," and they
followed this wit;h a recommendation to de-classify "historical materials on
specific events, particularly those which are repeatedly the subject of false
allegations, such as the 1948 Italian Elections, 1953 Iranian Coup, 1954
55
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Guatemalan Coup, 1958 Indonesian Coup and the Cuban Missile Crisis in
1962." 59 In his speech to the Oklahoma Press Association, he confessed "that
the results of our historical review program have been quite meager-the
consequences of low priority, few resources, and rigid agency policies and
procedures heavily biased toward denial of declassification." 60

Gates,

however, selected his words very carefully that evening. He announced "a
new approach" to increase the number of records de-classified, but in the
same sentence, he added an important caveat: the program would abide by
the CIA Information Act of 1984.61 This meant that operational records would
be exempt from the review process.
Of all the records that the task force listed for possible de-classification,
Gates only approved the release of documents pertaining to the Cuban
Missile Crisis. CIA officials organized a conference at Langley on the missile
crisis to commemorate its thirtieth anniversary, and during this event, "[the
Agency] issued a handsomely printed volume of documents tracing the
history of the crisis." 62 As James X. Dempsey has observed, however, it was
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not accidental that the CIA selected the missile crisis as the subject of its
inaugural symposium; after all, the Agency's handling of the nuclear standoff

is widely considered to be one of its finest moments. 63 Given the obvious PR
concerns about accentuating the positive, the Agency hierarchy rejected a
plan to hold a conference on the Team B ,episode. 64 Such an event would
inevitably raise questions about the politicization of intelligence, a topic that
Gates and his subordinates most likely wanted to avoid.
R. James Woolsey, who served as President Bill Clinton's first CIA

director from February 1993 through January 1995, attempted to cultivate the
support of the American public using the same techniques as Gates. In order
to more effectively convey the CIA message during television interview~ and
other public appearances, he even lll,red a PR consultant to provide pointers
on public speaking. 65 He told Congress that he would continue the openness
initiative, promising a "warts and all" approach to the de-classification of
older documents. 66

In September 1993, he testified about plans to release

documents '?n several covert operations from the Cold War. The CIA would
:r:nove forward with Gates's "plans tq declassify records on the Bay of Pigs
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operation, the coups against President Arbenz of Guatemala and. against
Prime Minister Mossadeq in Iran, and operations in the Dominican Republic
and the Congo," said Woolsey, and another six operations would be added to
the list: "France and Italy in the 1940s and 1950s ... Support to anti-Sukarno
rebels in Indonesia in 1958; Support to Tibetan guerillas in the 1950s and early
1960s; Operations against North Korea during the Korean War; and,
Operations in Laos in the 1960s."67
But despite these assurances, Woolsey's primary concern was the
improvement of public relations. While previous directors had reached out
to the media and academia, Woolsey understood that the CIA also needed to
focus attention on the entertainment industry: In 1994 he agreed to enter
negotiations with Television Production Partners (TPP), a production
company financed by advertising firms that was interested in developing a
series based on the CIA. Interestingly, plans for a CIA television show had
been kicking around for nearly three decades. During his retirement, Allen
Dulles hoped that CBS might develop a series on the CIA similar to "The
F. B. I." (1965-1974), a fictional show about the bureau that J. Edgar Hoover
enthusiastically supported. 68 The proposal re-surfaced during the "Year of
Intelligence," and although William Colby was intrigued by the idea, George
H. W. Bush reportedly had no interest in pursuing the project after his arrival
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at the CIA in 1976. CBS began to develop a similar program in the summer of
1980 with the support of the AFI0.69
It remains unclear whether Woolsey was aware of these earlier

projects, but even if he did know about them, he clearly wanted to take a new
approach; The agreement the Agency signed with TPP at the end of 1994
reflects Woolsey's desire to directly involve the CIA in the production
process. It gave the CIA the authority to 'ireview and approve or deny all
stories and scripts produced. In exchange for this extraordinary control, CIA
... granted TPP the right to use the CIA name and seal in the production and
to state that the stories are fictional accounts based on actual CIA files." 70
According to Dennis Boxx, then Public Affairs Director at Langley, "[t]his
project presents an unprecedented opportunity for CIA to influence the
portrayal of this Agency and US intelligence in a potentially high profile and
successful television series reaching millions of Americans. It has been
briefed to and has the support of both congressional oversight committees." 71
In order to adequately evaluate the scripts for the show, Boxx proposed the

establishment of an internal review board that "may include an Associate
Deputy Director from each directorate as well as the General Counsel and the
Director of Public Affairs [Boxx]." 72

69

"Hollywood Plots A CIA TV Series," 2.
.
Dennis R. Boxx to Executive Director~. "CIA Television Series," 16 April
1996, 1. Released by the CIA to the author on 21 December 2005 in response
to a FOIA request.
71
Ibid., 1.
72
Ibid., 2.
70

227
Since· the CIA has only de-classified two memos pertafning to the
agreement with TPP, 73 what happened to the project remains a mystery. John
Deutch~

President Clinton's second CIA director, shared Woolsey's interest in

shaping the CIA's image in popular culture. CIA officials on the "seventh
floor" approached a case officer named Chase Brandon with the idea of
starting the first film liaison office at the Agency. After initially declining the
offer, Brandon, who has family connections to the film industry, subsequently
re-considered and made the decision in 1996 to come out of the cold and into
the spotlight.74 He remained in the position until the summer of 2007. 75
Brandon began his career at the Agency in the early 1970s, shortly
before the CIA entered the contentious "Year of Intelligence." "[The] CIA and
I were both born in 1947," he proudly explained in 2005, "and I was recruited
into its organizational ranks when :we were both 25 years old." 76 Brandon
holds a Ph.D. in linguistics and spent over two decades in the Directorate of
Operations. The details of his clandestine work for the CIA are obviously
classified, but it is known that he participated in paramilitary operations in El
Salvador and other Central American locations during the 1980s. By the mid1990s, the Agency hierarchy had selected him to run the CIA station in
73
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Houston. Brandon remained undercover while serving as the Houston
station chief, and he appears to have worked closely with oil companies with
·.. ·

interests in Latin America. In fact, he sometimes distributed business cards
that indicated he was the Vice President of Patriot Petroleum in Baytown,
Texas. 77 In reality, of course, Patriot Petroleum was simply a CIA front
company.
·Between 1996 and 2007, Brandon participated in a long list of movies
and television shows. He described his philosophy of the liaison job by
paraphrasing a famous line from The Field of Dreams: "if I give them a phone
number, they will call." 78 By implementing a strategy he called the "three
legs of a stool approach" (i.e. documentaries, movies, and television shows),
Brandon attempted to "showcasegood qualities" of CIA employees in hopes
of improving the CIA's public image. 79 When determining whether to offer
CIA assistance to a project, he examined outlines and scripts to make sure
that they were "fair and balanced." 80 He openly admitted to withholding
support from proposals that might have portrayed the Agency in a negative
light: "if there is something wrong or maliciously ugly about us, they can
correct the part that's factually wrong or temper whatever is maliciously
ugly, and maybe they can film here. But if they have cliches about us as
rogue assassins, I'm sorry, but we're not going to let them come film here and
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use otir people, because that's not what we are." 81 Dan Neil, a Los Angeles

Times columnist, says that Brandon essentially replaced "tradecraft" with
"image craft," arguing that "Brandon's job dangerously stokes two of
America's most outsized appetites, for fantasy and authority." 82 Neil believes
that the CIA should simply not get involved with "producers who want to
make quasi-propaganda .... " 83
The issue of assassination is especially sensitive for CIA officials, and
when In The Line OfFire was released in the summer of 1993, they found it
horrifying that the deranged assassin (John Malkovich) in the movie was
scripted as a former CIA man. Brandon, for instance, turned down the
producers of The Bourne Identity (2002), a film starring Matt Damon as a
deadly CIA assassin on the run from Langley bosses who are trying to kill
him. "By page 25 [of the screenplay]," Brandon recalls, "I lost track of how
:many rogue operatives had assassinated people. I chucked the thing in the
bum bag." 84 Brandon also avoided projects that suggested the CIA topples
foreign governments. "There is always some ugly representation of us as a
·conspiratorial government-overthrow apparatus," he complained. 85 The film
liaison office is apparently interested in falsifying the historical record, for in
truth, the Agency has de-stabilized and overthrown the elected leaders of
numerous countries over the years.
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According to the late Angus Mackenzie, "[f]or the average outsider,
being taken into the CIA's confidence can be breathtaking." 86 Mackenzie
recognized that CIA officials often use the basic strategies of agent
recruibnent for PR purposes. Interestingly, Brandon was once an instructor
at "the Farm," the CIA's not so secret training facility at Camp Peary on the
outskirts of Williamsburg, Virginia.87 Winning a person's trust is something
that comes naturally to him. Recognizing that Hollywood celebrities are
often distrustful of the CIA, he frequently invited writers, actors, and
directors to visit Langley. He skillfully used these VIP tours to promote the
Agency's mystique. For instance, after Patrick Stewart journeyed through the
halls of the CIA in December 1997, headmitted that "[t]his visit has certainly
s~fted

my perceptions and made me review my attitudes toward the Agency

and my conditioning from previous reading about you [most notably, Harvey
Weinstein's book on MKULTRA]." 88 Since he and his fiancee planned on
forming a production company, Stewart promised that he would be willing to
consider "projects that give a more positive view of the good work of your
organization." 89 In fact, he was so impressed with the Agency that he even
offered to make a subsequent visit to deliver a lecture in the Bubble on acting
in espionage films. 90 Will Smith, Robert DeNiro, Ben Affleck, Dean Cain, and
Dan Ackroyd are just a handful of other actors who have toured the CIA with
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Brandon. 91 Like Stewart, Affleck commented on how normal the CIA seemed
during his visit to prepare for the role of JackRyan in The Sum Of All Fears
(2002): "It wasn't some kind of cloak-and-dagger operation, but more like an
office with a very diverse group of people-highly competent and very smart
people-who are dedicated, patriotic Americans." 92

Of course,

ne~ther

Affleck nor Stewart appears to have considered that their tour of Langley was
undoubtedly carefully managed from start to finish.
Having once encouraged Agency officials to maintain their mystique,
it is not surprising that George Tenet ardently supported the film liaison
office when he became CIA director in 1997. He soon took an interest in a
project that Brandon had undertaken with Robert Cort, a successful
Hollywood producer who briefly worked as a CIA analyst in the early 1970s.
Cort had written a story about a fictional CIA operation, and Roger Towne,
the screenwriter of The Natural (1984), was enlisted to prepare an adaptation.
Actor Tim Matheson, best known .to moviegoers as the unforgettable Eric
"Otter" Stratton in Animal House (1978), signed on as the film's director. As
plans for the television movie began to crystallize, Matheson, Cort, and David
Madden, the co-producer, visited Langley where Tenet personally welcomed
them. Matheson explained that he fully intended "to capture on film the
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professionalism, dedication, and patriotism which CIA truly represents and
which the American public little understands." 93
Matheson and the producers made arrangements for several of the
actors in the movie to receive similar tours. Tom Berenger, who in the film
portrays a CIA officer sent to North Korea on a covert operation, went to the
CIA for two days, meeting with Tenet and at least one top official in the
Directorate of Operations. Ron Silver, the actor selected for the role of DCI,
also visited CIA headquarters to prepare for the film. Silver said that Tenet
provided him with invaluable advice: "There's no way I could have ever
prepared as thoroughly for this role without talking to Mr. Tenet. His
responsibilities are enormous and I deeply appreciate the time and insights
he gave me-both will better enable me to portray the DCI in this movie." 94
Then, on June 20, 1998, two months after the start of principal photography,
Matheson spent the entire Saturday at CIA headquarters filming scenes in the
lobby, hallways, and rear entrance. Over fifty CIA employees participated as
"extras," because it would have been too time-consuming for the Office of
Security to obtain clearances .for civilians.95
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When the editing of the Showtime movie was completed, Tenet
arranged for In The Company of Spies 96 to premiere a~ the CIA in Oct~ber 1999.

1\r()t only did Agency officials literally roll out the red carpet for the event,
they also positioned klieg lights near the entranceway to welcome about five
hundred invited guests.97 Tenet had claimed only a year earlier that the
Agency simply could not afford to continue its voluntary de-classification
program, but he somehow managed to find room in the budget for the
extravaganza. Tenet commended the production team, happily noting that
"[t]hey were great to work with. They portray us in a good light, and I want
the American people to know the values we believe in. Our work is secret
and it will always be secret. But every now and then, we should take the
opportunity to portray ourselves. A little. bit of fun-there's nothing wrong
with that." 98 The CIA director had good. reason to be .thrille~ with what he
saw on the screen inside "the Bubble" that evening, and for the rest of his
tenure, he commonly described In The Company of Spies as "our movie." 99 At
the beginning of the film, a senator thanks Ron Silver's character for his
96
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honest testimony in front of the Senate Intelligence· Corrimittee. "We are,
after all, entering a neW era of openneSS and aCCOUntability," he observes. 100
The movie perpetuates the idea that the public only learns .about the CIA's
failures.

After the mission in North Korea is

p~rfectly

executed, the

president is over-awed with the CIA's brilliance:. "By God, when the agency is
good, it's spectacular. And n~ one even knows!" 101 CIA critics, however,
w~re

less than impressed with the

~ovie' s

message. "For pepple who get

their information from government documents, not from television and the
movies, there has actually been a reduction in accountability," said Steven
Aftergood. "They're going to have to do better than TV movies." 102
Given the success of In The Company of Spies, Brandon continued to
assist television producers. The Agency, a show that offered a fictionalized
view of Langley operations, premiered on CBS in 2001. The production team
received guidance from CIA officials, and they were allowed to film inside
Agency headquarters in April 2001. CBS apparently retained creative control
over the episodes, but the evidence also suggests that the CIA's willingness to
provide assistance to the network helped ensure that they were portrayed
positively. In a letter thanking Agency personnel for their support, the
production manager boasted that a scene from the pilot, which was filmed on
the first floor of Langley, "could be a recruiting movie for the CIA." 103
Brandon must have been thrilled with this compliment.
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Brandon served as a consultant to ABC's Alias (2001-2006), a television
show about an Agency operative named Sydney Bristow Gennifer Gamer).
Bristow is a full-time graduate student, but when she is not writing papers,
she wears tight outfits, hunts down the enemies of the United States, and then
punishes them with spin-kicks. Brandon acknowledges that Garner's
character is far-fetched, but he believes that Bristow displays many of the
qualities that the Agency looks for in potential recruits. Most importantly, he
says, Bristow is "rock solidly patriotic." 104 In 2003 he recruited Gamer for a
CIA recruitment video; this advertisement appealed to the patriotism of
young Americans:
I'm Jennifer Gamer. I play a CIA officer on the ABC TV
series Alias. In the real world, the CIA serves as our country's
first line of defense in the ongoing war against international
terrorism. [The] CIA's mission is clear and direct: safeguard
America and its people. And it takes smart people with
wide-ranging talents and diverse backgrounds to carry out
this mission ... people with integrity, common sense,
patriotism and courage ....Today, the collection of
foreign intelligence has never been more vital for national
secun"ty .... lb§
Having established connections in Hollywood, Brandon pursued
movie projects as well. He helped Roger Towne write another screenplay
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about the Agency, sharing information about his experiences as an instructor
a.t Camp Peary. The Recruit (2003) centers on the recruitment and training of
Ja:m~s

Clayton (Coli;n Farrell), a computer genius who graduated from MIT at

the top of his class. When Walter Burke (AI Pacino), a veteran CIA officer,
attempts· to sign him up, Clayton is initially uninterested, mocking the CIA as
"a bunch of fat, old white guys who fell asleep when we needed them
most." 106 Clayton, however, believes that his father was working for the CIA,
not an oil company, when he died in a plane crash in 1990. He reconsiders
Burke's offer in hopes of learning what actually happened to his dad, and he
begins his training at "the Farm."

One might argue that Burke's

proclamations are directed at both the actors and the audience; "Our failures
are known," he says,."our successes are not." 107 He also reminds the recruits
that "our cause is just," and that enemies of the United States are "all around
us."1os.

Reviewers were not kind to The Recruit . .A. 0. Scott jokingly des.cribed
the movie as an "AI Pacino crazy· mentor picture," noting that "what. Mr.
Pacino provides is an acting lesson, one that Mr. Farrell would do well to
heed." 109 Stephen J1unter of the Washington Post went so far as to argue that
the rpovie "clinically illustrates everything wrong with the modern American

motion picture [italics original]." 110 Although Brandon concedes that the final
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CUt was "not nearly as good as the story was originally," he claims that The

Recruit is "hugely popular" at the CIA. 111 In fact, he says that since the movie
was released, all of the recruitment classes are required to watch it during
training.112
The CIA does not sign contracts with filmmakers they are assisting; on
the contrary, the film liaison office prefers to establish "a gentlemen's
agreement." 113 When he discovered a problem in a script, Brandon simply
p'resented filmmakers ·with alternative options. For. instance, during a
conference call with Universal Studios about Meet The Parents (2000), he says
that the production team asked him what the CIA's kidnapping and torture
manuals might look like, because they wanted Ben Stiller's character to find
them on a desk to establish that his soon to be father-in-law was a CIA
operative. Uncomfortable with the idea, Brandon proposed that they make
the CIA connection by showing "a panoply of photographs" of Robert
DeNiro's character with several international figures. 114

The Universal

executives loved the suggestion, and they decided to write it into the
screenplay.
As Tenet expanded the scope of the Agency's PR crusade, he showed
little interest in releasing historical records. He essentially viewed the declassification process as an extension of its PR efforts; since documents had
the potential to undermine the CIA's .mystique, they needed to be .withheld
from the public. In May 1997, during his Senate confirmation hearing, Tenet
111
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warned about the perils of too much historical inquiry: "the new challenges
rushing toward us make it dangerous, frankly, to keep looking over our
snoulders." 115 Later that month the Nw York Times ran a story ~bout a speech
that George Herring had delivered at a historical conference. 116 Herring, a
well respected diplomatic historian and an expert on the Vietnam War,
belonged to the Agency's Historical Review Panel from 1990 until 1996 when
he was asked to step down. Reflecting on his experiences, he felt "a nagging
sense of frustration and a persisting anger at having, on occasion, been
used." 117 After the panel first met in August 1990, he revealed, it did not meet
again for another four years. Herring was outraged that the CIA projected an
image of openness throughout the committee's lengthy hiatus: "Now I'm
from Kentucky, and I'm not supposed to be swift, but it didn't take too long
even for me to realize that I was being used to cover the agency's ass

w~ile

having no influence. The fact was that ; ... the CIA panel had no chair, met at
the whim of the Agency, exerted no real influence, and at times was used as
window dressing." 118 He described Gates's openness initiative as "a brilliant
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public relations snow job" that established "a carefully nurtured myth that
was not at all easy for me to dispel." 119
Tenet· and his advisors responded to Herring's attack with a
demonstration of their PR tactics. Nick Cullather, who joined the CIA's
history_staff about five months after Gates announced the openness initiative,
wrote a classified history of Operation PBSUCCESS, the covert venture that
led to the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. Although Cullather
had completed the study before leaving the Agency in 1993, it remained
locked away inside Langley along with the thousands of pages of primary
documents on the operation.

Suddenly, two days after the Herring story

appeared in the Times, the CIA notified Cullather about the impending declassification of his project. The CIA had been promising to release the
documents on PBSUCCESS since 1992, but nothing was de-classified until
Herring slammed the Agency for its intransigence. Rather than turning over
all the files to the National Archives, the CIA initially retained almost
everything,. In fact, Cullather estimates that "less than 1 percent of the total
collection" emerged in 1997.120

(A.. large
.
. percentage of the remaining
.

documents were finally released in 2003 as part of the FRUS series.)
By releasing Cullather's study, the CIA ho,ped to deflect the ct?tic;ism
directed at the Agency's de-classification process. Yet it remained obvious
that the Agency had not honored the promises that had been maqe in 1992
and 1993. In attempting to explain the failure of the openness initiative, CIA
officials claimed many of the documents had been destroyed. Less than two
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weeks after the article on Herring's speech, the Times reported that most of
the records documenting the coup against Mossadegh were long gone. 121 But
··~-:·

in April2000, a front-page article in the newspaper revealed that the CIA had
been distorting the truth. Approximately 1,000 pages of the material on the
covert operation in Iran remained.- James Risen, the story's author, also
received a classified history of the operation that had been completed by
Donald Wilber in early 1954.122 Wilber, one of the CIA operatives involved in
the coup, had been frustrated by the lack of attention given to his study,
writing in his memoirs that "[i)f this history had been read by the planners of
the Bay of Pigs, there would have been no such operation." 123
Interestingly, although Gates had pledged in February 1992 to declassify documents on the Bay of Pigs invasion, nothing had been released by
1996. A non-governmental organization housed at George Washington
University called the National Security Archive decided to file multiple
Freedom of Information Act requests for the records, and after stalling for
two years, in February 1998 the CIA finally released the internal report on the
operation written by Lyman Kirkpatrick, the inspector general of the CIA
between 1952 and 1963. 124 The Kirkpatrick Report presented a scathing
assessment of the Bay of Pigs, and the CIA had burned most of the copies. If
the report ever became public, officials worried about what would happen to
121 Tim Weiner, "C. I. A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran Coup," New York Times,
29 May 1997, A19; "CIA Says It Is Trying To Determine Extent Of Document
Destruction," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 30 May 1997, A12.
122 James Risen, "How A Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79)," New York
Times, 16 April 2000, 14.
1231bid.
124 Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report On The Invasion of Cuba, ed.
Peter Kombluh (New York: The New Press, 1998), 5, 10.
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the mystique that Allen Dulles had so painstakingly created during the 1950s.
"In unfriendly hands," warned the CIA's deputy director in December 1961,
"[the Kirkpatrick Report] could become a weapon unjustifiably [used] to
attack the entire mission, organization, and functioning of the Agency ." 125
In July 1998, about five months after the release of the inspector
general's report, Tenet shut down all de-classification projects at the CIA not
mandated by law. 126 Nick Cullather perceptively described the article in the

Times on Tenet's decision as "an obituary for the openness program." 127 Since
the CIA was unwilling to voluntarily release information, Congress found it
necessary to pass the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act in 1998. The CIA had
long downplayed the use of former Nazis during the Cold War, but the
documents released in response to the law proved the skeptics had

bee~

correct. 128 In June 2006, the media reported that the Agency had been told in
1958 the alias of Adolf Eichmann and that he was hiding in Argentina. Even
though they knew that Israel had been searching for Eichmann, Agency
officials did not tum over the info1;111ation. It took the Mossad another two
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1bid., 15.
Tim Weiner, "C. I. A., Breaking Promises, Puts Off Release of Cold War
Files," New York Times, 15 July 1998, A13; George Lardner, Jr., "CIA Won't
Declassify Files, Blames Budget," Washington Post, 16 July 1998, A15.
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Figures," Boston Globe, 27 April 2001, A2. Fritz wrote a nine-part·series in the
Boston Globe based on records de-classified in 2001. See "The Secret History of
WWII," 11 March 2001, 15 April 2001, 31 May 2001, 1 July 2001, 2 July 2001, 26
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Norman J. W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe, U. S. Intelligence and
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years to capture him. 129 Researchers also learned more about Heinz Felfe, an
ex-Nazi that the CIA trusted to run counterintelligence in West Germany.
Felfe had actually been a classic double agent, betraying American secrets
and personnel to the Soviets.130
Within a year of the War Crimes Disclosure Act, President Clinton's
National Security Council ordered the intelligence agencies to "review for
release ... all documents that shed light on human rights abuses, terrorism
and other acts of political violence during and prior to the Pinochet era in
Chile." 131 The CIA released around six hundred documents in June 1999, but
they initially refused to de-classify records on the American effort to destabilize Chile in the years prior to the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende.
As Peter Kornbluh bluntly observed at the time, 11 [CIA officials] have decided
to sabotage this commitment to openness with the same degree of success
they used to sabotage the economy in Chile. The CIA is directly challenging
the president of the United States and the integrity of this White Housemandated project." 132
Despite the fact that the CIA was now mandated to participate in the

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, Tenet allowed his
subordinates to obstruct historians at the State Department. According to
129

Scott Shane, "C. I. A. Knew Where Eichmann Was Hiding," New York
Times, 7 June 2006, A3; Christopher Lee, "CIA Ties With Ex-Nazis Shown,"
Washington Post, 7 June 2006, A21.
130
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131
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Accountability (New York: New Press, 2003), 472.
132
Kornbluh quoted in Vernon Loeb, "Top CIA Officials Won't Declassify
Some Chile Files," Washington Post, 11 August 2000, A23; for more on the
conflict between the White House and Langley, see Kornbluh, The Pinochet
File, 472-476.
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Page Putnam Miller, a scholar who has carefully examined the CIA's
interference with the FRUS, "[t]he most troubling, unresolved barrier to
ensuring publication of .an accurate and comprehensive account of U. S.
foreign policy remains the CIA's lack of cooperation." 133 The CIA refused to
turn over documents on the Agency's operations in Japan for the FRUS
volume on Northeast Asia (1961-1963). The advisory committee, frustrated
by Langley's continued intransigence, warned readers in the preface of the
volume "that this published compilation does not constitute a 'thorough,
accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign
policy decisions,' the standard set by Public Law 102-138 ...." 134
In 2000, four years after the release of the Northeast Asia volume, the
CIA once again intervened with the publication of the series. CIA officials
successfully blocked for three. years the release of the volume covering
American foreign policy in Greece in the mid-1960s, and a few officers even
claimed that the revelations would lead to a resurgen~e of Greek terrorism. 135
The following spring the CIA used similar tactics to prevent the distribution
of a FRUS compilation on Indonesia. Yet the Government Printing Office
(GPO) had already sent copies to several libraries. The documents on
Indonesia did not contain any information that could damage national
security, but they did reveal how the American government had turned over
lists that helped Indonesian officials track down and violently eliminate left133
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wing opposition in the country. 136 A retired State Department official
lamented the CIA's power to withhold its history: "It's basically a case of the
CIA putting pressure on State and the State's bureaucratic culture being
wimpy. CIA usually gets its way.-n

In truth, the CIA is now a far more

open institution than it was in 1992, but this openness resulted more from
external forces than the policies of Gates and Woolsey.

Executive Order

12958, which President Clinton issued in April 1995, attempted to mandate
the release of government records over twenty-five years old. 138 This order
began with good intentions, but it soon became clear that the Agency wanted
exemptions for over 60% of its records. 139 The most important result of EO
12958 was the establishment of the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) at
National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. The CREST system is an
electronic database of de-classified CIA material that researchers can search
using four computers located on the third floor of the Archives building.
CREST contains over half a million CIA documents prior to 1982, which total
around ten million pages.140 . Unfortunately, most of the documents in the

~36 For more information

on the Indonesia volume, see "CIA Stalling State
Department Histories: Archive Posts One Of Two Disputed Volumes On
Web," The National Security Archive, 27 July 2001,
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database are not from the Directorate of Operations. 141 The CREST system
also includes thousands of pages of clipping files, articles from newspapers
afid magazines that CIA personnel have routinely compiled. This so-called
open source intelligence is often valuable to researchers, but by de-classifying
old stories from newspapers like the Washington Post and New York Times, the
CIA can inflate the number of documents that they release annually in
response to EO 12958. Even though the database is undeniably a positive
development, it is important to keep in mind that the Agency continues to
withhold literally millions of pages in its archives older than twenty-five
years.
The basic axiom of CIA public relations is that the Agency's failures
are known while its successes are secret. But if this statement is indeed true,
it would seem that the de-classification of older records would actually help
the Agency's public image. In reality, the documents released so far have
routinely undermined the Agency's mystique; the evidence that has emerged
from the archives on CIA operations_ in countries such as Iran, Guatemala,
and Chile has vividly shown that missions once viewed as successes
frequently_ had tragic long-term consequences. As Agency officials point out,
they have the power to keep secrets for reasons of national security. The
National Security Act of 1947 also requires the CIA director to protect
intelligence sou.rces and methods. No o"J;>server would questio~ ~at there are
very good
141

re~sons{or classifying

documents. Too often, however, the CIA

For scholars interested in studying other divisions of the CIA, CREST
proves quite useful. See, for instance, the footnotes in Chapters 4-7 of this
study for citations to documents found in the database dealing with CIA
public relations.
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has' invoked "sources and methods" to keep embarrassing information out of
the hands of scholars. ·
As Thomas Powers explained in The Man Who Kept The Secrets, the
forces of secrecy at Langley .have repeatedly distorted the Agency's history:
''CIA people are cynical'in most ways, but their belief in secrets is almost
metaphysicaL In their bones they believe they know the answer to that
ancient paradox of epistemology which asks: If a

~ee

falls in the forest

without witness, is there any sound? The CIA would say no. It would agree
with historian David Hackett Fisher that history is not what happened but
what the surviving evidence says happened. If you can hide the evidence
and keep the secrets, then you can write the history." 142
Sadly, not enough has changed at the CIA since Powers made this
observation in 1979.
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CONCLUSION

Although the National Security Act of 1947 specifically prohibits the
CIA from engaging in domestic operations, the Agency has not always
abided by the law. During the Vietnam War, it is now known that the
Agency spied on American citizens in· a. program called MHCHAOS. The
CIA has also repeatedly targeted the American public with propaganda since
the early years of the Cold War. Allen Dulles orchestrated an extensive PR
effort in the 1950s to ensure that the CIA remained unaccountable to
Congress; two decades later William Colby used similar tactics to prevent the
abolition of covert operations. After the intelligence investigations of the
mid-1970s, CIA officials embarked on a public relations campaign to
rehabilitate the Agency's damaged image.

They promoted the CIA's

mystique to defend against challenges to the "culture of secrecy." This study
has demonstrated that there has been overwhelming continuity ~n CIA public
relations between 1977 and the present. While CIA directors have created the
myth

of greater openness,

they have simultaneously obstructed legitimate

inquiry of the Agency's past. .
It will be recalled that in 1977 Herbert Hetu arranged for ABC's "Good

Morning America" to film segments at the CIA and to interview Stansfield
Turner. Not only did he hope to win favorable publicity for the Agency on its
thirtieth anniversary, he also saw the program as an opportunity to put a
posi1;ive spin on secrecy. In November 2005, twenty-eight years after Hetu
first invited ABC inside Langley, "Good Morning America" returned.
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Instead of launching a thorough and balanced investigation of the CIA, ABC
accepted the Agency's PR at face value. Reporter Charles Gibson even
parroted the CIA's favorite PR mantra, reminding viewers at the top of the
show that " [the CIA's] successes by nature have to. remain secret." 1 Gibso~
had earlier taped an interview with then CIA Director Porter Goss, which was
briefly shown.

Gibson asked a few tough questions about a CIA

interrogation method known as water-boarding, but when Goss pleaded
ignorance on the topic, Gibson did not press the issue. From that point
forward, ABC's coverage descended into an elaborate publicity festival that
had been carefully scripted by the CIA's Office of Public Affairs.
Gibson next participated in a scavenger hunt that the CIA had clearly
designed to sell the Agency's mystique to viewers at home. The Agency left a
hidden clue for Gibson outside of the headquarters building in a piece of
wood under a tree-a classic illustration of a "dead drop." He subsequently
executed a "brush pass" with an unidentified Agency employee in a hallway.
As he walked past this individual, Gibson received a pen with an enclosed
message. He read the word that was written ("Kryptos"), 2 crumpled up the
paper, and placed it in a bottle of water. Much to the amusement of Barbara
Walters back in the New York studio, Gibson proceeded to drink out of the
bottle to demonstrate how quickly the message had dissolved.3
But ABC',s.J:'lard-nosed reporli:ng on the CIA did not end there. The
producers .of the show

~ade

sure to include. Cl(;l.ire

Shipman'~

pre-taped

ABC, Go~d Morning America, 29 November 2005, "U~dercover Live Inside
The CIA: Security, Secrets, Spies."
,
2
Kryptos is a monument on the grounds of the CIA.
3
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discussion with a former CIA disguise expert named Bob Barron. After
retiring from the Agency, Barron devoted himself to helping people with
severe faciai injuries. The segment revealed how Barron has used his covert
training to re-constrUct countless faces, and by any standard of measurement,
his results are impressive. The profile on Barron masterfully re-enforced the
CIA's mystique, and the Viewers were left to imagine all of the breathtaking
missions he must have participated in during his years of service. If he can
re-build the faces of skin cancer victims, one is left with the impression that
perhaps Mission: Impossible might not be so far-fetched after all. 4
Gibson also talked about how effectively the CIA destroys records.
However, rather than examining the historical implications of the Agency's
often reckless document destruction, he enthusiastically observed that "it is
almost impossible to recreate any kind of a document that has been shredded
c.oming out of [the Langley shredder/incinerator]" and noted that the
machine is taxpayer friendly since it helps to heat and cool the headquarters. 5
ABC did not report on the CIA's long-standing

co~tempt

for the public's

right to know and its appalling backlog of FOIA requests. From Gibson's
perspective, Americans apparently have no need to worry: the CIA might
eviscerate secrets, but at least it is energy efficient.6

4

Ibid.
1bid.
6
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answer them. Brandon re-iterated that he only assists projects that are "fair
and balanced," and he also plugged In The Company Of Spies as one of the
most realistic espionage films. Ibid.
5

250
As the CIA conveyed an image of openness to Charles Gibson and
ABC viewers, Langley was actually in the midst of a covert operation directed
against scholars. The CIA, along with other government agencies, had been
secretly re-classifying documents at the National Archives since the late
1990s. In essence, although George Tenet claimed that the CIA could not
afford de-classification expenses, he had no problem finding a way to finance.
the re-classification project. This program expanded after President George
W. Bush took office in 2001/ and audits have revealed that over 50~000 pages
were re-classified in following years.8 Instead of telling researchers what was
happening, the CIA signed a secret Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the National Archives that instructed Archives staff to embrace .the
principle of plausible deniability. "NARA [National Archives and Records
Administration] will not attribute to CIA any part of the review or the
withholding of documents from this exposed collection," said the MOU. 9
7
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Matthew M. Aid, an expert on the National Security Agency, became
suspicious when he noticed that records formerly available to researchers at
the National Archives had been withdrawn. He also .discovered that the CIA
had removed documents. from the CREST system. 10

Thanks to his

determination and investigatory skills, the New Yo~k Times broke the story in
February 2006. Subsequent reports demonstrated that the .CIA had reclassified files for reasons unrelated to national. security or sources and
methods. In fact, many of the CIA records removed dated to the early years
of the Agency. Personnel from Langley arrogantly believed they had the
right to re-classify material that detailed an unsuccessful Cold War mission to
distribute propaganda in Eastern Europe using balloons; an inaccurate
prediction that China would not enter the Korean War; and an angry
response from the CIA director in 1948 about the negative publicity that
resulted from his analysts being unable to anticipate anti-American violence
in Colombia. 11

In 1999 the official in charge of the Office of Information

Management at the CIA had proudly explained that the de-classification of
the Korean War document was evidence of Langley's greater openness to
scholars; Langley would not withhold material simply because it might prove
embarrassing, he declared. 12 Needless to say,_ the covert re-classification team
at the National Archives obviously disagreed.
10
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Nothing better illustrates the CIA's obsession with secrecy than the
clandestine withdrawal of records between .1999 and 2006. When the Times
exposed the operation, it became abundantly clear that the Agency's rhetoric
about valuing de-classification, which had been perpetuated by every CIA
director since Robert M. Gates, was PR flimflam. General Michael Hayden
took over at the CIA a few months after the expose, and he recognized that
the Agency .needed to tC?-ke action. to regain t~e trust of the academic
community. He delivered a speech in June 2007 to the Society for Historians
of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) in which he spoke of the "CIA's
social contract with the American people." 13 While making no reference to
the scandal at the National Archives, he claimed that the Agency's right to
operate in secrecy was "[n]ot a grant of power, but a grant of trust. Each day,
we have to earn that trust-as our democratic system demands-by acting as
our fellow citizens expect us to: Skillfully, boldly, and always in keeping with
the laws and values of our Republic. That's our social contract." 14
As Gates had done in February 1992, Hayden expressed a willingness
to release documents of historical value. De-classifying records, he explained,
"is in CIA's interest: We want our history and our role in key decisions to be
written accurately and fairly." 15 He pledged that the CIA would continue to
release material. for the State Department's FRUS series; that officials would
review classified CIA documents housed in the libraries of former presidents;
and that more National Intelligence Estimates and Cold War reports would
13
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be de-classified. 16 The audience also received complimentary copies of a
volume that contained "147 documents amounting to more than 11,000 pages
of analysis done between 1953 and 1973" on the Soviet Union, China, and
their often tense relationship with each other. 17 Hayden's gifts, however,
were overshadowed by an announcement he made at the beginning of the
speech: the "Family Jewels," an infamous collection of memos and other
documents assembled in the early 1970s that detailed illegal CIA activities,
would soon be turned over to the public.
In the media frenzy surrounding the release of the "Family Jewels,"
most reporters failed to mention that a FOIA request had been filed for the
collection as early as 1992.18 The Agency should have de-classified the
documents at that time, since it is now obvious that none of the records
would have undermined national security or jeopardized sources and
methods. But in the.years following the end of the Cold War, there were calls
in Washington for the CIA to be dismantled. Perhaps CIA officials worried
that the scandals outlined in the "Family Jewels" would provide too much
damaging ammunition for their critics. Whatever the motivation, the CIA
161bid.
17 1bid. This volume was later posted on the CIA's website. See "The
CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of
Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973,"
http:// www.foia.cia.gov I cpe.asp (accessed March 26, 2008).
18 For newspaper accounts of the "Family Jewels," see Scott Shane, "C. I. A. to
Release Documents On Decades-Old Misdeeds," New York Times, 22 June
2007, A16; Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus,"CIA to Air Decades qfits
Dirty Laundry," Washington Post, 22 June 2007, Al; Mark Mazzetti, "C. I. A.
Chief Tries Preaching A Culture Of More Openness," New York Times, 23 June
2007, All; Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, "CIA Releases Files On Past
Misdeeds," Washington Post, 27 June 2007, Al; and Mark Mazzetti and Tim
Weiner, "Files on Illegal Spying Show C. I. A. Skeletons From Cold War,"
New York Times, 27 June 2007, Al.
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brazenly stonewalled the FOIA petition for fifteen years. Despite the blatant
violation of federal law, however, Hayden had the audacity to characterize
the CIA's processing of FOIA requests as "very successful." 19 Hayden
neglected to mention that the CIA· won the non-profit National Security
Archives~

"Rosemary Award" in 2006 for the worst FOIA compliance of any

federal agency. 20

It should be clear to all observers that Agency officials want to
withhold historical files from the public in order to prevent embarrassing
revelations from undermining the PR offensive started in the mid-1970s.
Hayden proclaimed in June 2007 that the "Family Jewels" records "provide a
glimpse of a very different time and a very different Agency." 21 His spin
evoked memories of the tactics that had been employed to secure passage of
the CIA Information Act; you can trust us, the Agency told Congress, the
improprieties of the past will never happen again. Yet these promises have
been broken on many occasions. The most recent betrayal occurred in 2005
when the head of· the clandestine service ordered the destruction of
videotapes that showed the interrogations of two AI Qaeda prisoners. After
the story leaked in December 2007, Hayden unconvincingly argued that the
tapes were eliminated to protect the identities of Agency operatives. The
investigative reporting of Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti has shown that, in
reality, the Agency wanted to protect its image: "every action in the
"Ge~deral Hayden's Remarks at SHAFR Conference," 21 June 2007.
"CIA Wins 2006 'Rosemary Award' for Worst Freedom of Information
Performance by a Federal Agency," 13 March 2006, ·
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prolonged drama of the interrogation videotapes was prompted in part by
worry about how its conduct might be perceived-by Congress, by
prosecutors, by the American public and by Muslims worldwide." 22

To

guard the "culture of secrecy," the Agency once again destroyed the historical
record.
The concerns about image are not unique to the CIA. Long before the
(:lA modernizedits Office of Public Affairs, the Pentagon had mastered the
art of public relations. More recently, public relations and secrecy were the
cornerstones of President George W. Bush's eight years in the White House.
An advisor to President Bush brilliantly described the White House's PR
strategy: "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.
And while you're studying that reality-judiciously, as you will-we'll act
again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how
things will sort out. We're history's actors ... and you, all

o~

you, will be left

to just study what we do." 23 In creating their "own reality," the Bush
administration withheld secrets from the public that might have undercut
their assorted PR campaigns. This, after all, was the president who flew on a
fighter jet to an aircraft carrier in May 2003 to deliver a speech in front of a
~'Mission.Accomplished"

22

banner. 24
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But even as most Americans have learned to disregard President
Bush's PR schemes, the CIA's mystique continues to thrive. A Harris Poll in
November 2004 revealed that 53% of Americans questioned ranked the CIA's
performance as either "excellent" or "pretty good." Only 11% of those
surveyed said that the Agency was doing a "poor" job.25 Perhaps more
tellingly, 70% of respondents in June 2002 agreed that "the C.I.A. (Central
Intelligence Agency) should .... work secretly inside other countries to try to
weaken or overthrow governments unfriendly to the United States .... " 26
Yet is there any evidence to suggest that the CIA's PR has influenced
its public image over the years? Some observers would say no: approval
ratings are impossible to control and tend to fluctuate unpredictably over
time. In October 1975, at the height of the "Year of Intelligence," 53% of
Americans polled gave the CIA a positive rating, 27 exactly the same level of
public support that the Agency would have nearly three decades later. This
study, however, adopts an alternative interpretation of the polling statistics.
It contends that the Office of Public Affairs should be given at least part of the

credit for maintaining the CIA's image over the years. By focusing on the
positive and diverting the public's attention from the negative, CIA officials
have protected both covert operations and the culture of secrecy.

In

reviewing a book about American public diplomacy in France after World
25
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War II, Christopher Endy has pointed to the power of ambivalence.

He

noted that the book's author acknowledged that public diplomacy did not
change French opinions of the United States, prompting Endy to ask an
insightful question: "what if ambivalence was all the United States needed to
obtain its goals? Ambivalence, after all, was not a coherent call to reject U.S.
1ri.fluence." 28 A similar argument could be made about the CIA's PR efforts
since the mid-1970s. Although the public often says that other agencies are
doing a better job-even the Internal Revenue Service-they tend to forgive
the CIA for its transgressions. In the aftermath of scandals like Iran-Contra
and the arrest of CIA mole Aldrich Ames, the poll numbers typically drop
before ultimately rebounding.
In the final analysis, Americans do not always trust the CIA, but they
have been convinced of the Agency's mystique; this mythology, which is not
supported by the historical evidence, has protected the Agency's "culture of
secrecy." A key result of this culture has been, in the words of historian
Jonathan Nashel, the creation of a vast "warehouse of hidden histories"
inside ~angley.

29

If these "hidden histories" .are ultimately revealed, how will

they change our understanding of American foreign relations since 1947?
Will they. indicate that American policymakers have spread democracy and
uplifted the downtrodden, or will they provide even greater evidence for the
existence of what revisionist historians have termed the "American empire"?
28

Christopher Endy, "The Empire Sneaks Back," review of Remaking France:
Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan, by Brian Angus
McKenzie, Diplomatic History 31, no. 4 (September 2007): 763.
29
Jonathan Nashel, "The Rise of the CIA and American Popular Culture," in
Architects of the American Century: Individuals and Institutions. in TwentiethCentury U.S. Foreign Policymaking, ed. David F. Schmitz and T. Christopher
Jespersen (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1999), 77.
. .
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Warren Kimball complained in 1998 that the CIA's unwillingness to abide by
their legal obligations to· de-classify older records for State Departinent
historians made it increasingly likely that the FRUS series could become "an
officiallie." 30 Needless to say, this "official lie" almost always supports the
orthodox interpretation of American foreign policy while concealing the
darkness on the edges of empire: the coups that have toppled

democr~tically

elected leaders and replaced them with authoritarian regimes, the interlocking relationships between the intelligence establishment and American
multi-national corporations, and the frequent manipulation of foreign
elections.

It is time for Congress to force the CIA tothoroughly de-classify the
older records in its archives. It, of course, remains uncertain how future
revelations will influence the field of diplomatic history, but it seems likely
that more documents will only strengthen revisionist scholarship. After all, if
the records promised by Robert Gates and R. James Woolsey in the early
1990s would improve the CIA's approval ratings, why haven't officials declassified them yet? The answer to this question, and to many others, remains
classified.

30

Kimball quoted in Aid, OAH Newsletter, 10.
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